Statistics or state-istics? : an anatomy of the corps social presented in the Belgian population censuses (1846-1947) by Louckx, Kaat
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
1. Prologue 
1.1.       “Lies, damned lies and statistics” .......................................................................... 9 
1.2. Theoretical challenges ....................................................................................... 12 
1.2.1.      States and state-istics .................................................................................... 12 
1.2.2.      Statistics and state-istics ............................................................................... 15 
1.3. Methodological approach .................................................................................. 20 
1.4. Source material .................................................................................................. 24 
1.5. Overview of the dissertation .............................................................................. 26 
1.6. Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 29 
1.6.1.      Belgian census reports .................................................................................. 29 
1.6.2.      Other references ........................................................................................... 30 
 
2. State-istics and Statistics: Exclusion Categories in the 
Population Census (Belgium, 1846-1930)  
2.1.        State-istics ......................................................................................................... 39 
2.2. Who counts? ...................................................................................................... 44 
2.3. Hospitals, hospices, asylums or colonies?........................................................... 47 
2.4. ‘Pensionnats’, schools, houses of correction or depots?..................................... 52 
2.5.        Incorporated population members? .................................................................. 56 
2.6.        Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 60 
2.7.        Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 61 
 2 
 
2.7.1.      Belgian census reports .................................................................................. 61 
2.7.2.      Other references ........................................................................................... 63 
 
3. Household and State-istics: Cornerstones of Society in 
Population Censuses (Belgium, 1846-1947)  
3.1.       Introduction ....................................................................................................... 71 
3.2. Enumeration forms ............................................................................................ 75 
3.3. Family households ............................................................................................. 80 
3.4. Collective households ........................................................................................ 84 
3.5. A place of belonging? ......................................................................................... 88 
3.6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 92 
3.7. Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 94 
3.7.1.      Belgian census reports .................................................................................. 94 
3.7.2.      Other references ........................................................................................... 95 
 
4. Population, Territory, and State-istics: ‘Habitual Residence’ 
in the Census (Belgium, 1846-1947)  
4.1.        Introduction .................................................................................................... 101 
4.2.  Principles ........................................................................................................ 105 
4.2.1. Habitual residence vs. temporary residence ................................................ 106 
4.2.2. Habitual residence vs. legal domicile ........................................................... 110 
4.2.3. Habitual residence vs. household membership ........................................... 113 
 3 
 
4.3. Specifications ................................................................................................... 115 
4.3.1. Military personnel ....................................................................................... 116 
4.3.2. Institutional inmates ................................................................................... 120 
4.3.3. Individuals without (habitual) residence ...................................................... 125 
4.4. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 127 
4.5. Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 130 
4.5.1.   Belgian census reports ................................................................................ 130 
4.5.2.  Other references ......................................................................................... 131 
 
5. The Nation-State in its State-istics (Belgium, 1846-1947)  
5.1.        Introduction .................................................................................................... 137 
5.2.        Religion and language ...................................................................................... 141 
5.3.        Place of birth and nationality ........................................................................... 149 
5.4.        Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 157 
5.5.        Bibliography .................................................................................................... 158 
5.5.1.      Belgian census reports ................................................................................ 158 
5.5.2.      Other references ......................................................................................... 160 
 
6. Epilogue 
6.1.        Une histoire a-historisante ............................................................................... 167 
6.2.        Inclusion, exclusion.......................................................................................... 170 
6.3.        Continuities, discontinuities............................................................................. 172 
 4 
 
6.4.       Power-knowledge in state-istics ....................................................................... 174 
6.5.       Bibliography ..................................................................................................... 177 
6.5.1.      Belgian census reports ................................................................................ 177 
6.5.2.      Other references ......................................................................................... 177 
 
Summary in English 
Nederlandstalige Samenvatting 
 7 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
Undertaking this Ph.D. would not have been possible without the support and 
guidance that I received from many people. 
First and foremost I wish to thank my supervisors Professor Frédéric 
Vandermoere and Professor Raf Vanderstraeten. I appreciate them for all their 
contributions of time and ideas to make my Ph.D. experience productive and 
stimulating. I have enjoyed the opportunity to watch and learn from their 
knowledge and experience. I am very proud of what we have achieved together, 
thank you both. 
I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Theresa Wobbe for she 
has been supportive since the very beginning of my work. She has always been 
helpful and provided me with her assistance throughout my dissertation. 
My time at the University of Helsinki was made enjoyable in large part due to the 
support of Professor Pauli Kettunen. I deeply appreciate his hospitality and 
encouragement throughout the last phase of my Ph.D. research.  
I would like to acknowledge the members of the Nordic Centre of Excellence 
NordWel at the University of Helsinki. Their insightful questions were an 
invaluable contribution towards my Ph.D. 
Many thanks also to Dr. Sven Vrielinck of the History Department of Ghent 
University for being so kind and helpful to offer me access to the PDF-files which 
he had generated of the print materials of the censuses.  
I am indebted to all my friends who have supported me over the last few years 
and to my colleagues of the Sociology Department of Ghent University and the 
University of Antwerp who have supported me in many ways. Special thanks to 
 8 
 
Charlotte Luyckx, Hadewijch Vandenheede, Stijn Haerens, Ellen Huyge, Anouk Van 
Der Wildt and Lore Van Praag.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my family for all their love and encouragement. For 
my parents and brother who supported me in all my pursuits. And most of all for 
my loving, supportive, patient and encouraging partner Raf. His unconditional 
support has been essential all these years. Thank you. 
 
Kaat Louckx 
November 2014 
 
 
 9 
 
1. PROLOGUE  
 
1.1. “L IES ,  DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS”  
 
Statistics are supposed to present ‘hard’ facts. They are supposed to provide 
factual or objective information to the legislator, the policy-maker, the political 
activist, the voter, etc. But this common presentation is also somewhat simplistic 
and misleading (see, e.g., Hacking, 2000). Already in the nineteenth century, 
administrators and politicians used the saying: “there are three kind of lies: lies, 
damned lies and statistics” to warn against the persuasive and deceptive power 
of numbers (see, e.g., Courtney, 1895). In more recent years, a number of authors 
have suggested that the truth of statistics is not confined to the presentation of 
objective numbers, but that its meaning primarily builds upon the subjective 
choices that underlie it. According to Thierry Hentsch (2000: 484), for example, 
the ways in which states choose what and how to count is not only indicative of 
their current self-image but also of their projects and intentions. The concepts 
and categories, designed to standardize the basis of observation of the 
statisticians, are also instruments to educate the observers and the observed; 
they eventually end up disciplining the ‘phenomena’ themselves. Along the same 
lines, Sarah E. Igo remarks in her research on social statistics in twentieth-century 
North America that “ways of knowing, although less visible than memberships in 
civic associations and labor unions, are equally critical resources for structuring 
people’s encounters with the social world” (2007: 6; see also Jasanoff 2004).  
Building upon some of the more recent scholarly literature, we might 
assume that statistical categories and classifications exercise a powerful influence 
over perceptions of the social body, of the corps social (Quetelet), of the societal 
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system. Or, in the words of Igo: “[…] social scientific data had a life and force of 
their own that extended far beyond the mere aggregation of facts. This 
knowledge could cause people to act in different ways, imagine their 
relationships in new lights, and re-evaluate their beliefs. [...] In a society 
constantly seeking information about itself, statistical means could themselves 
become normative” (2007: 261-262). Igo adds that these statistical techniques 
would also result in the development of modern survey methods, which not only 
helped to forge a mass public, but also “shaped the selves who would inhabit it, 
influencing everything from beliefs about morality and individuality to visions of 
democracy and the nation. […] They offer a partial explanation for the official, if 
not actual, cohesion of ‘the American public’ in the middle decades of the 20th 
century” (2007: 282). Against this background, it can be claimed that the diffusion 
of statistical methods and classifications has led to a situation in which it has 
become nearly impossible to ‘imagine’ the social body or the nation-state without 
relying on its charts and curves, its averages and deviations (see Starr, 1987; 
Patriarca, 1996; Poovey, 1998; Scott, 1998; Hacking, 2000; Curtis, 2002; Wobbe, 
2012). 
Seen in this light, it is important not to underestimate the social impact of 
the development and diffusion of statistical methods, such as those to count the 
entire population of a nation-state at a given point in time. It is equally important 
not to underestimate the social impact of impersonal, ‘objective’ techniques of 
data collection, which privilege the national over the local, the aggregate over the 
individual and the average over the unique. Statistical enumerations require kinds 
of things or people to count; statistics is in this sense “hungry for categories” 
(Hacking, 1982: 280). To put it somewhat differently: a nation-state is not only a 
politically unified and politically structured space, but also a common cognitive 
space (see, e.g., Desrosières, 1998; Anderson, 2006). In various respects, the 
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‘state of the state’ is perceived and ordered by means of particular concepts and 
categories, by means of particular classification schemes (Desrosières, 2000: 42; 
see also Meyer, Thomas and Raminez, 1997). Especially in the nineteenth century, 
the organization or ordering of this cognitive space took on quite a distinctive, 
statistical form (see, e.g., Hacking, 1982; Wargon, 2000: 327). But the statisticians 
not only make use of categories and classification schemes for their 
enumerations, but also change or adapt existing ones and create new ones. 
Bureaucracies and state administrations are not only working with statistical 
concepts; they are also “making up people” (Hacking, 2000). They are not only 
creating ways to identify and classify people; their categories and classification 
schemes also ‘interact’ with the people, thereby shaping and transforming them. 
Seen in this light, it may be hypothesised that social statistics gave way to a new 
mode of representation. It led to the creation of both new forms of scientific 
knowledge and new modes of intervention. It helped to conceive a new sort of 
object, society as population, which could be the target of both research and 
policy interventions (see, e.g., Scott, 1998; Curtis, 2002).  
In this dissertation, I will focus upon the genealogy of statistical forms and 
categories in order to analyse the articulation of ideas and ideals associated with 
modern government, and to shed light on the rules that underlie and make 
possible authorised state-ments of knowledge about the population in the state’s 
territory. By exploring this hitherto largely neglected aspect of the history of 
statistics by means of a case study, I hope to be able to throw new light on the 
articulation of ‘relevant’ or ‘legitimate’ distinctions and the elaboration of the 
complex interactions between science, government, and society. In order to 
delineate the subject of this dissertation in more specific terms, I will hereafter 
briefly discuss the socio-historical context within which modern statistics 
emerged in the western world, and the theoretical challenges that ensue from 
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this view on statistics as state-istics. Afterwards, I will introduce the 
methodological approach that has been adopted in this research. I will finally also 
provide a brief overview of the different chapters of the body of this work.  
 
1.2. THEORETICAL CHALLENGE S  
 
1.2.1.  STATE S AND STATE-I STI CS   
 
One can say that there have always been numerical people, for merchants and 
bureaucrats have been keeping accounts since ancient times. What was new in 
the eighteenth century, especially in the so-called Enlightenment era, was the 
idea that numbers could be used to analyse something other than money, such 
as population, health and illness, poverty, nature, etc. (see, e.g., Foucault, 1966; 
Hacking, 1982; Frängsmyr, Heilbron and Rider, 1990). In the course of the 
eighteenth century, a number of practical concerns with ‘the people’ (their 
health, well-being, productivity, etc.) aroused not only fear among ‘enlightened 
rulers’, but also a desire to be informed, to understand, to predict, to prevent, 
and to intervene (see also Bayatrizi, 2008). In the words of Ian Hacking: “The 
census became a hallmark of the enlightenment, but always for what at first sight 
seem good practical purposes” (1982: 289). While the first attempts to apply 
numerical methods to the study of population thus gradually took shape in the 
Enlightenment era, it is also clear that numerical data required amounts of 
information so large that only ‘big’ institutions like the church or the state had 
the resources to gather it (see also Headrick, 2000: 59-61). There is indeed a close 
relationship between state and state-istics. Only in the course of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, as governments and state administrations grew more 
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elaborate and better organized, could the ‘quantifying spirit’ also spread rapidly 
throughout both the Old and the New World.  
‘Conceptual’ issues also played a prominent and determining role in the 
history of administrative statistics. As Theodore Porter puts it: “The French 
Revolution, and perhaps one should add the American one, created conditions 
for the modern census” (2000: 492). In more general terms, it is important to 
take into consideration Benedict Anderson’s statement that the answer to the 
problem of the authority of the state was to ground the state in the sovereignty 
of the ‘people’. Questions like: ‘Who are the people, actually?’, ‘Who constitutes 
‘the people’?’, imposed themselves on ‘enlightened’ or ‘modern’ rulers and 
policy-makers (Anderson, 2000: 109; see also Schulten, 2012). Such questions 
also served to fuel their interest in the ‘state of the state’, in the ‘nature’ of their 
nation and their people. The first ‘revolutionary’ nation-state was indeed also 
one of the first to conduct a population census within its territorial boundaries. 
The authors of the American Constitution of 1787 agreed to take a census every 
ten years in order to apportion both the expenses of the national government 
and the seats in the House of Representatives on the basis of state populations. 
The idea of counting the people was thus written into the original American 
Constitution – which also means that it became unconstitutional not to count the 
American people. As Hacking argues: “This was not some trifling bureaucratic 
aside: it is written into Article 1, section 2. The overt purpose of the 
constitutional counting was plain enough. It was to determine the size of 
congressional districts, so as to give equal representation to all free persons” 
(1982: 290).1 In line with Hacking’s line of analysis, a number of other authors 
                                                                   
1 Hacking, moreover, notes another link between state and statistics. “The name of the 
first enlightenment ‘state’, the United States of America, was invented by Richard Price, 
 14 
 
have also pointed to the existence of feedback or loop effects at this level. 
According to Margo Anderson, for example, the history of the American census 
makes clear that “the successful implementation of the population count and its 
use for legislative apportionment was absolutely essential to organizing the state 
itself” (2000: 111; see also Michels, 1911; Selznick, 1948; Merton, 1957; Woolf, 
1989: 588; Beaud and Prévost, 2000: 64). In may also be said that the history of 
statistics displays the various dimensions in which modern nation-states are 
“holding” a national unity (see Desrosières, 2000: 43). 
Along these lines, the French statistician and social scientist Alain 
Desrosières has pointed to the close link between democracy (one man, one vote) 
and administrative statistics, such as population censuses, in which all inhabitants 
of a particular territory are counted. He speaks of an “equivalence agreement”, 
which would be institutionalized within the modern nation-states. In Desrosières’ 
words: “Dans le cas de la statistique, l’acte politique fondateur n’est pas 
seulement l’exhibition d’un nombre (de préférence grand) comme celui de la 
population, […] mais la convention d’équivalence permettant de compter et 
d’additionner” (2000: 42). It is, however, also important to distinguish between 
the idea of an “equivalence agreement” and its implementation in population 
statistics. In the first American censuses, for example, the Indians (who did not 
have to pay taxes) were not counted. All other persons were counted, but only 
the free persons were counted as a whole person. Other people, like slaves, were 
figured in at the rate of 3/5 of a person (Hacking, 1982: 290). Statistics thus do 
not just provide a picture of ‘the people’. They do not treat all individuals equally. 
                                                                   
the publisher of the work of Thomas Bayes (1702-1761), that we now call Bayesian 
statistics, and also publisher of the only tolerable actuarial tables available until well into 
the middle of the nineteenth century” (Hacking, 1982: 289). 
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Statistics also distinguish between people who count and people who do not 
count, between the individuals who are considered to be part of the population 
and the ‘strangers’ who are not considered to belong to the population. Seen 
from this perspective, analysing the history of statistical constructions may help 
us to shed light on the ‘system of thought’ underlying the categories and 
classification schemes used by states to enumerate, to represent, to classify and 
to ‘take care’ of their respective populations (see also Anderson, 2000: 109). It 
may help us to elucidate the ways in which the modern nation-state is indeed, to 
adopt Benedict Anderson’s (2006) felicitous phrase, an “imagined community”. 
Empirically detailed analyses of the cognitive or conceptual representations of 
this imagined community, which are produced by state administrations and their 
statistics, will thus help us to reveal the ‘knowledge regimes’ (Foucault), the 
‘systems of thought’ (Bachelard, Hacking) and the intellectual frameworks that 
allowed administrators and bureaucrats to relate in new ways to ‘the public’ in 
the modern era (Scott, 1998; Anderson, 2000; Headrick, 2000: 59-95; Curtis, 
2002; Foucault, 2007). 
 
1.2.2.  STATI STI CS AND STATE-ISTI CS   
 
Ian Hacking has famously spoken of an “avalanche of printed numbers” in the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century, which started to change the ways in 
which the state and state administrations operated. Focusing on France, he 
argues that in the period 1820-1840, “the rate of increase in the printing of 
numbers appears to be exponential whereas the rate of increase in the printing 
of words was merely linear” (1982: 282). He links the avalanche of printed 
numbers, in France and elsewhere, with the elaboration of state administrations: 
“many new bureaucracies were created to collect information about the people 
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and to arrange populations into a well-organized data-bank” (1982: 285). Hacking 
moreover postulates that in the years 1820-1840 the population or public 
changed from non-numerate to numerate, thereby suggesting that “there are 
pretty good grounds for speculation that the illiterate were, by gossip, made 
fairly numerate thirty years before general education made them literate” (1982: 
287).  
For Hacking, early nineteenth-century statistics was, at least in part, a moral 
science. One of its main aims was to collect information about the morality of the 
population. While, according to Hacking, its motives were certainly philanthropic, 
statistics also aimed at the preservation and conservation of the social world as it 
was known or imagined at that time. Although it clearly had difficulty improving 
the morality of the population, the nineteenth-century ‘statistical enthusiasm’ put 
in place a strong administrative and bureaucratic apparatus that could later also 
serve other ‘regulatory’ and ‘administrative’ goals. In Hacking’s (1982: 282) 
words: “Equally important was the subtler, subversive influence of the new 
groups of human categories coming from this avalanche of numbers”. In this 
regard, Hacking (1982: 281) especially notes that “the subversive effect of this 
transition was to create new categories into which people had to fall, and so to 
create and render rigid new conceptualizations of the human being”. Hacking’s 
observations here also point beyond the period within which the so-called 
avalanche of printed numbers took place.  
Hacking and several other authors also direct attention to the influence of 
the nineteenth-century Belgian homo statisticus Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). 
For Hacking, for example, Adolphe Quetelet was a “master statistical informant 
and creator of national bureaucracies and international congresses in the 
nineteenth century” (1982: 288). In 1828, Quetelet had become the first director 
of the Royal Observatory in Brussels. At that time, he also became involved in the 
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planning of the 1830 population census in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a 
census that was never completed due to Belgium's secession from the 
Netherlands in 1830. In 1835, with the publication of Sur l’homme et le 
développement de ses facultés, essai d’une physique sociale, he started to gain 
world-wide fame. In the Belgian administration, he was in charge of its activities 
in demography and statistics at the Bureau de Statistique, and, from 1841 
onwards, at the Commission Centrale de Statistique. The procedures to be used in 
the new census were tried out first in the city of Brussels in 1842, and the 
nationwide population census took place in October 1846. Both the method of 
census taking and the subsequent analyses with detailed tabulations on the basis 
of a range of population categories set new standards for similar undertakings in 
most other western countries (Lesthaeghe, 2001).  
Quetelet remained in charge of the censuses conducted in 1856 and 1866 in 
Belgium, but for more than two decades he also defined the objectives of the 
Congrès International de Statistique (or International Congress of Statistics), 
whose sessions were actively attended by many high-level ‘state servants’ from 
countries throughout Europe and America. In the literature, there is a broad 
consensus that, via the Congrès International de Statistique and other 
international transfers of knowledge, Quetelet’s focus on the development of 
uniform methods and conventions had considerable impact on a broad range of 
statistical traditions in different nation-states – both in the nineteenth century 
and afterwards (e.g., Porter, 1986: 41-55; Brian, 1989, 2002; Bracke, 2008: 131-
167; Desrosières, 2008: 7-59; Randeraad, 2011; Prévost and Beaud, 2012: 49-62). 
Indeed, ‘those who attended pushed their governments to adopt a standard 
template for census making on the Queteletian model’ (Curtis, 2002: 20-21). 
In terms of theory, Michel Foucault’s late work has hitherto constituted an 
important point of departure for this approach. In a series of lectures on Security, 
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Territory, Population, delivered in 1978 at the Collège de France, Foucault uses 
the term ‘bio-power’ to refer to the set of mechanisms developed in the 
eighteenth century “through which the basic biological features of the human 
species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power” 
(2007: 1). For Foucault, the ‘population’ as a “sort of technical-political object of 
management” only developed in the eighteenth century (2007: 70). According to 
Foucault, in that century, a movement took place which revealed “the population 
as a given, as a field of intervention, and as the end of government techniques” 
(2007: 108). Following the author, in the nineteenth century, population finally 
became “the vis-à-vis of government, of the art of government” (2007: 79). Also, 
in that time-period, the instruments of government became “diverse tactics 
rather than laws” (2007: 99). As Foucault puts it: “a whole series of objects were 
made visible for possible knowledge on the basis of the constitution of the 
population as correlate of techniques and power”. It is against this background 
that Foucault refers to the human sciences as “nothing other than a figure of 
population”, which “should be understood on the basis of the emergence of 
population as the correlate of power and the object of knowledge” (2007: 79).  
Foucault also notes the close relationship between the elaboration of 
statistical methods and the rise of the idea of the ‘population’. According to the 
author, statistics helped to establish a new idea of government and to replace the 
model of the family with that of the population (Foucault, 2007: 103). Or, in the 
words of Foucault: “statistics […] discovers and gradually reveals that the 
population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, 
its regularities of accidents. Statistics also shows that the population also involves 
specific, aggregate effects and that these phenomena are irreducible to those of 
the family […] Statistics enables the specific phenomena of the population to be 
quantified and thereby reveals that this specificity is irreducible [to the] small 
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framework of the family” (2007: 104). Because statistics produces aggregate-level 
data that can both reveal realities at the population level and legitimate new, 
‘refined’ forms of control, Foucault included statistical observation methods 
among the key bio-political instruments.  
It is against this background that the present dissertation focuses upon the 
sociological history of the Belgian population censuses. In line with Foucault and 
Hacking, I depict the modern census as a technology for screening and sorting 
large populations, whose development coincides with the rise of modern states. 
The chronological frame of the following chapters spans about a century; my 
focus is on the period from the middle of the nineteenth century – the first 
Belgian censuses organized by Quetelet – up until the middle of the twentieth 
century. I will hereafter discuss how the ‘modern’ Belgian state, prior to the 
expansion of the welfare state, not only aimed at acquiring and processing 
detailed information about its population, but also used its statistics to ‘take care 
of’ its population. I argue that the study of the concepts and categories used in 
the censuses sheds light on how particular ‘systems of thought’ and forms of 
social knowledge have been developed over time (Foucault 1998; Hacking 1979). I 
also argue that the study of the statistical representations of the social body may 
shed light on the population politics of the modern state (see also Foucault, 1994, 
1998: 137-159, 2008: 44-46). In Foucauldian language: I use this case-study of 
Belgian statistics to shed light on the ‘power/knowledge grid’ in which individuals 
were processed and constituted as ‘governable citizens’ prior to the expansion of 
the welfare state (and the firm institutionalisation of inclusion imperatives).  
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1.3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 
According to Theodore Porter, “histories of social science that cared about power 
and practices would assign statistics a far more prominent role than they do at 
present” (2000: 490-491). A history of social science that cares about the genesis 
of statistical forms may indeed shed a different light on the genesis and 
development of the social sciences than other forms of history, such as histories 
based on longitudinal series of printed numbers and classical histories of ideas 
and theories (see also Davidson, 1986; Power, 2011). In this context, Porter 
moreover suggests “that there is no better place than the history of social 
quantification to seek out that intersection of power and knowledge now 
associated with the name of Michel Foucault” (Porter, 2000: 495). 
In spite of the popularity of Foucault, however, there is as yet little research 
that has looked into the episteme (Foucault, 1966) or conditions of possibility 
(Kant, 1781/2007) of social statistics. In the last two decades, a number of studies 
have contributed to the history of statistical reasoning (e.g., Hacking, 1990, 2006; 
Desrosières, 1998, 2008; Bayatrizi, 2008; Prévost, 2009) or of statistical bureaus 
and bureaucracies (e.g., Anderson, 1990; Bracke, 2008). For a range of states, 
there also exist studies of the genesis of official classifications of occupations, 
religious adherences, or ethnic distinctions (e.g., Szreter, 1984; Curtis, 2002; 
Desrosières and Thévenot, 2002; Van de Putte and Miles, 2005; Vanderstraeten, 
2006; Patriarca, 2011; ILO, 2012; Wobbe, 2012). Also, in recent decades, some 
historical-sociological studies have tried to trace the genesis of distinctly modern 
statistical forms or categories, such as that of the inactive population or the 
unemployed individual (e.g., Topalov, 1994: 312-350; Baxandall, 2004). However, 
far less scholarly effort has hitherto been invested in genealogical analyses of the 
statistical representations of the corps social (see also Porter, 1986; Power, 2011). 
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As previously mentioned, social statistics has emerged both as a science (of the 
state) and as a technique of governmental intervention, viz. state-istics. Seen 
from this perspective, it may be argued that the actors of modern social science 
are ‘made up’ via knowledge practices that necessarily individuate their objects in 
ways we take for granted today (see Power, 2011: 38; Foucault, 1966). Seen in 
this light, the study of the genesis and evolution of statistical representations of 
the corps social may shed light on the conditions of possibility for the field of 
social statistics, and, hence, of later sociology. But, also, the study of the 
evolution in the statistical representations of the social body may also contribute 
to political sociology by shedding light on the intimate link between forms of 
government and modes of thoughts (about governing) in modern nation-states 
(Foucault, 1991b).  
In this dissertation, I attempt to explore this hitherto largely neglected 
aspect of the historical sociology of knowledge by focusing on the study of one of 
the main instruments which states have used to ‘embrace’ their populations and 
to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice, viz. the modern 
population census. More particularly, my focus is on one national tradition of 
statistics, viz. the Belgian population censuses. My time frame spans about a 
century; my focus is on the period between the first Belgian population census, 
which took place about a decade and a half after its independence (in 1846), and 
the tenth, which was taken shortly after the Second World War (in 1947). The 
period from the census of 1846 to the census of 1947 allows me to document the 
changes that took place in the statistical representations of the social body before 
the rise of the post-war welfare state in Belgium. This period is also of particular 
interest because the roots of the modern social sciences are usually traced back 
to this time-period. 
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In my dissertation, I do not focus on the disciplinary actions rising from 
the abstract capacities and intentions of ‘law’, ‘the state’ or ‘the economy’ which I 
consider to be too mythicized abstractions (see Power, 2011: 40; Foucault, 
1991a). In my dissertation, I try to contribute to a new way to write the history of 
social knowledge regimes by centring on the ‘archival foundations’ of specific 
forms of disciplinary knowledge that are materialized in documents produced in 
the interest of the state in its population (see Foucault, 1995). In my dissertation, 
my focus is not on the census data themselves, nor on their accuracy. I intend to 
pursue the promising research avenues that have been opened up by calling into 
question our most familiar and taken-for-granted statistical notions and 
classifications. Statistics makes it possible to classify, to form categories, to fix 
norms. Seen from this perspective, the statistical representations and statistical 
classifications not only inform us about the social realities they strive to measure, 
but also about the constructs which organize that measuring. It is against this 
background that, in my dissertation, I focus on the emergence and transformation 
of representational categories and observation methods in order to shed light on 
the way in which these practices function, and to analyse the kind of order they 
create. Inspired by authors such as Foucault and Hacking, I do not regard the 
historical variability and historical contingency in the methodologies and 
nomenclatures used in the population censuses as a source of difficulty, but 
rather as a source of precious information on the genesis of the categories that 
have organized and still organize our observations and representations of the 
social world. 
I have used discourse analysis to examine the genesis and evolution of 
statistical concepts and categories in the censuses. For my research, I had access 
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to the censuses on PDF-files, which were easily readable and searchable.2 I 
started each analysis by identifying one key concept (e.g. indigence [l’indigence]) 
which repeatedly occurred in the censuses on different ‘places’ and in different 
contextual fields (e.g. in the explanatory notes of the statisticians on the results of 
the censuses, in the household enumeration sheets, in the stipulations to the 
census-takers, etc.). Next, I searched through the first census and made a detailed 
inventory of the statements I had found and of the ‘places’ and contexts in which 
the key concept appeared. On the basis of this detailed data collection, I gradually 
identified new key terms which repeatedly occurred in the context of the first key 
concept (e.g. hospitals [hospices], being admitted [admis(e(s))], the ‘alienated’ 
[les aliénés]). Next, I repeated this systematic analysis for each of the base words 
of these key terms and for the words related to these terms. My research could 
lead to concepts referring to a social phenomenon (e.g. indigence [l’indigence]) 
but also to concepts referring to more ‘practical’ and ‘technical’ issues, such as 
data collection and processing techniques (e.g. the de facto/de jure enumeration 
method [population de fait/de droit], the household enumeration sheet [bulletin 
de ménage], etc.). I repeated this systematic analysis for each census. Because 
the Belgian censuses are a serial source, published every ten years, it was possible 
to notice the way in which definitions, classifications and techniques in the 
censuses had changed every ten years. I compared the outcome of the discourse 
analysis of the different censuses in order to find out how definitions and 
formulations had changed over time and which concepts had appeared, 
disappeared or been modified over time. When deemed useful, I applied 
                                                                   
2 I would like to thank Sven Vrielinck of the History Department of Ghent University for 
being so kind to offer me access to the PDF-files which he had generated of the print 
materials of the censuses. 
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etymology to clarify the shifts in the meaning of concepts. On the basis of the 
outcome of my analyses, I have tried to explain the contingently formed relations 
of similarity that underlie the classifications. When I noticed that one of the 
concepts I had been focusing on often re-appeared in different contextual fields, I 
decided to take this concept as the starting point for a new chapter of my 
dissertation.  
 
1.4. SOURCE MATERIAL  
 
As previously mentioned, my focus is on the Belgian population censuses. My 
main historical sources consist of the official census reports – which contain the 
enumeration sheets, the printed numbers, an interpretation of them and a rather 
technical part that reproduces the instructions to the census-takers and 
administrators. Besides, the censuses contain also juridical excerpts and other 
‘related documents’, such as letters from the Governors of the Provinces 
addressed to the Minister of the Interior. Until 1920, the Belgian census reports 
were only published in French, but the enumeration sheets were send out in 
French, Flemish or German, depending on the language most spoken in the 
municipality (see, e.g., B 1846, X). From the census of 1930 onwards, the censuses 
were published in Dutch as well. After that, people were also free to choose the 
language of the questionnaire they had to fill in (see, e.g., B 1930, 21).  
The first Belgian population census took place in 1846. Afterwards, 
censuses followed at regular, mostly ten-yearly intervals.3 Over time, however, 
                                                                   
3 Throughout the last centuries, the population census has thus continued to serve as an 
important ‘apparatus of knowledge’; only recently has the availability of a range of 
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the number of items included in the census expanded considerably. New tools for 
data analysis were put to use (such as punch cards) – although the overall aim 
remained the same: providing a comprehensive overview of the population that 
would satisfy “the needs of most public administrations as well as those of 
science in its diverse manifestations: ethnography, history, economics and 
statistics” (B, 1880: XIV).4 In 1930, the ninth Belgian population census took place. 
The census scheduled for 1940 was never executed because of the outbreak of 
the Second World War. Without much preparation, the tenth census only took 
place in 1947. It was, moreover, a limited census in that much information was 
omitted, and was primarily intended to take stock of the state of the nation after 
the devastation of the Second World War. The censuses of 1930 and 1947 
constitute the endpoint of the analyses presented in my dissertation. Although 
my primary source material consists of all the census reports of the Belgian 
statistical authorities, I also make use of additional source material for my 
research. I have, in particular, also drawn upon the relevant sections of the 
Belgian parliamentary papers (on line available via www.plenum.be), and 
legislative sources. For the international context, I have also made use of the 
reports of the International Statistical Congresses and the International Statistical 
Bureau (which was the successor to Quetelet’s Congrès).  
 
                                                                   
electronic databases led to questions about the political as well as the scientific relevance 
of new population censuses in Belgium (e.g., Surkyn, 2006). Since 2001, the census has 
been replaced by ten-yearly ‘General socio-economic surveys’, which relies much more on 
the national population register. Data for 2011 have not yet been published. 
4 I refer to the census reports by the letter B followed by the year the census. For an 
overview of the reports cited here, see the list of references at the end of this 
introductory chapter. 
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1.5. OVERVIEW OF THE DISSE RTATION 
 
The main part of this ‘cumulative’ dissertation consists of four articles and thus 
of four case studies, which use Belgian administrative statistics to analyse 
different aspects of the state- and nation-building processes and governmental 
techniques that were developed and used between the mid-nineteenth and the 
mid-twentieth century. Each case-study has theoretical ambitions, which reach 
beyond the case-study itself. Each time, an attempt is made to articulate the 
complex interactions between science, government, and society in the modern 
era in new ways.5  
In the first case-study, the point of departure is the ‘modern’ ambition to 
include the entire population into the nation-state and into the population 
censuses. On the foregoing pages, I have already referred to the “equivalence 
agreement” (Desrosières), underlying the modern nation-state. But in spite of 
this strong emphasis on social inclusion, censuses also legitimate and reinforce 
several kinds of exclusion. In this chapter, attention is drawn to the range of 
exclusions and exclusion places that appeared in the Belgian population 
censuses. It is shown how statistics identify ‘residual’ categories such as the poor 
and indigent, the disabled of body or mind, the elderly and invalids, beggars and 
vagabonds. It is also shown how the Belgian statisticians used exclusion places – 
asylums, barracks, colonies, madhouses, mental hospitals, monasteries, prisons, 
and so on – to distinguish between different categories of population members. 
                                                                   
5 I have also co-authored an A1-article that deals with the census data on ‘human capital’ 
within Belgium during the second half of the twentieth century (Vanderstraeten, R., 
Louckx, K. and Van der Gucht, F., (2012), ‘The geographical diffusion of high- and low-
skilled human capital in Belgium, 1961-2001’, Journal of Belgian History, 42 (4): 51-73). 
But this article is hereafter not reproduced. 
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The analysis presented here highlights the intimate relationship between 
population and territory in the ‘search engines’ of the Belgian statisticians. The 
discursive constitution of territorial exclusions allows me to analyse the 
articulation of inclusion ideals – in the period before such ideals became firmly 
institutionalised in the so-called welfare state of the post-war period. 
The main unit of observation of the Belgian population census was the 
household in its place of residence. The second case-study focuses attention on 
the re-articulation of this time-honoured institution of the household within 
modern statistical discourse. The household was the proverbial cornerstone of 
society, to which individuals were attributed but to which they were also 
considered to ‘belong’. In this chapter of my dissertation, I focus on the 
representation and definition of the household in the censuses. Also, I pay 
attention to the implications following from more ‘technical improvements’, i.e. 
changes in data collection techniques, introduced by the statisticians to count 
the population. The changes in the notion of ‘belonging’ to a household show 
how the state (re-)articulated its expectations regarding the cornerstones of 
society. It is also shown how the representation of the household in state-istics 
not only reflected new ways of managing the population, but also mobilized 
specific norms and evaluative standards about the individuals who constitute 
the household. 
The third case-study focuses on another aspect of belongingness in the 
nation-state, viz. that expressed by the notion of the habitual place of residence. 
In this chapter, I use the history of Belgian state-istics more particularly in order 
to shed light on the politics of membership in the modern state. Each territorial 
state is expected to embrace the social lives of the people contained in it; each 
claims the right to monitor the condition, to promote the welfare, and to protect 
the rights of ‘its’ people. In the modern world, individuals have become conceived 
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as incorporated into the political order as exclusive subjects of a single state. In 
this chapter of my dissertation, I try to illuminate this politics of membership and 
belonging by studying the instruments that states have used to embrace their 
populations. Changes in the articulation of the notion of ‘habitual residence’ in 
the Belgian population censuses show how the history of statistics is also a history 
of the struggles over belonging in and to the territorial state. Here again it 
becomes clear that the census not only generates facts about the population; it 
also creates facts that may form the basis of social interventions.  
Nowadays conceptions of citizens and non-citizens, of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ and their respective rights and obligations in a nation-state, highly 
depend on the historical trajectory of the nation-state itself. The final case-study 
addresses this historical trajectory by focusing on the socio-cultural aspects of 
‘belonging’ to or citizenship in the nation-state. These socio-cultural aspects of 
citizenship involve mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. In this final chapter of 
my dissertation, I examine the evolution of the socio-cultural boundaries of 
citizenship as conceptualized in the state-istics of the Belgian state, more 
particularly in terms of each individual’s place of birth, nationality and language. 
My analyses show how the statistical constructs did not merely reproduce 
existing concepts of citizens and non-citizens, of foreigners and nationals, but also 
actively contributed to the installation of new citizenship boundaries by changing 
the census questionnaires and putting forward new categories and classifications. 
By examining the modifications in these state-istical constructs, I hope to 
elucidate the more complex history of the construction of citizenship identities in 
the contemporary Belgian nation-state.  
The epilogue, finally, presents a brief summary of the main findings of my 
research as well as some more general reflections on the anatomy of the corps 
social presented in the population censuses of the Belgian nation-state. 
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For reasons of clarity, I add that I am the sole author of the prologue and 
the epilogue. For the other chapters, I developed the research question and 
theoretical approach, collected the data, made the analysis and interpretation of 
the source material, and authored the first full draft. Afterwards, Raf 
Vanderstraeten seconded me in drafting the final version. I hold the final 
responsibility for each chapter. 
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2. STATE-ISTICS AND STATISTICS:  EXCLUSION 
CATEGORIES IN THE POPULATION CENSUS 
(BELGIUM ,  1846-1930)1 
 
2.1.  STATE-ISTICS 
 
The term ‘statistics’ was first used in the eighteenth century. For Gottfried 
Achenwall, a professor at Göttingen and the author of Abriss der 
Staatswissenschaft der europäischen Reiche (1749), the term referred to the 
study of the state (Staatswissenschaft). In the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, the term also appeared in English. In 1797 the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
described statistics as ‘a word lately introduced to express a view or survey of any 
kingdom, country or parish’. These state-istics had to cover the growing need for 
information in the emerging ‘enlightened’ regimes and nation-states by means of 
surveys, population registers or censuses. In the scientific context, statistics has, 
from the late nineteenth century onwards, increasingly become perceived as a 
branch of mathematics, specifically concerned with theories of probability and 
inference (Porter, 1986; Stigler, 1986). This mathematical statistics, however, was 
antedated by various attempts to gather data about the state of the state. 
Ian Hacking has used the phrase ‘avalanche of printed numbers’ to 
characterise the rapid development of information technologies and the growing 
scale of statistics in the nineteenth century. For illustrative purposes, he refers to 
the United States census and its expansion. In 1790, the first census asked four 
                                                                   
1 This chapter of my Ph.D. has recently appeared in The Sociological Review as Louckx, K. 
and Vanderstraeten, R., (2014), ‘State-istics and statistics: exclusion categories in the 
population census (1846-1930)’, The Sociological Review, 62 (3): 530-546.  
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questions of each household. In 1880, the tenth census posed 13,010 questions in 
various questionnaires addressing people, firms, farms, hospitals, churches and 
more. As Hacking puts it, statistical thinking has been implanted in a great 
bureaucratic machinery: ‘It may think of itself as providing only information, but it 
is itself part of the technology of power in a modern state’ (1991: 181). In this 
regard, the state-istics had unforeseen consequences. It gave way to a new mode 
of representation, a new discourse about society. Society was made conceivable 
for statistics (Starr, 1987; Scott, 1998: 91; Curtis, 2002; Porter, 2003: 26-33; see 
also Bayatrizi, 2008; Osborne et al., 2008; McFall, 2011). It might hence also be 
argued that the contribution of social statistics was to conceive a new sort of 
object, which could be both the target of research and of policy interventions.  
An exploration of this discourse may build on the work of Michel Foucault. 
For Foucault, statistics helped to unblock and reorient ‘the art of government’. It 
helped to establish a new idea of government and to replace the model of the 
family – characterised by diffuse concerns with the happiness of the family and a 
‘power over “things” rather than territory’ (Foucault, 2007: 103) – with that of the 
population. It produced aggregate-level data that could both reveal realities at 
the population level and legitimate new, ‘refined’ forms of control. In a series of 
lectures on Security, Territory, Population, delivered in 1978 at the Collège de 
France, Foucault argued that statistics became part of ‘an administrative 
apparatus which would not just be the agent for executing the sovereign’s orders, 
or for raising the taxes, wealth, and men needed by the sovereign, but one that at 
the same time would be an apparatus of knowledge [...] as an essential dimension 
of the exercise of power’ (2007: 274-75).2 The activities associated with modern 
                                                                   
2 After the demographic and social transitions of the eighteenth century, Foucault argued, 
the family became merely an instrument in the government of large populations. ‘The 
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government only became possible on a systematic basis if states were in a 
position to successfully ‘embrace’ their populations for the purposes of carrying 
out those activities (Torpey, 2007: 7). Seen from this perspective, the history of 
statistics may thus be used to analyse the articulation of these ideas and ideals, 
and to shed light on the rules that underlie and make possible authorised 
statements of knowledge about the population in the state’s territory. 
We focus in this paper on the perception of population problems through 
the lens of state-istics, especially through that of censuses. In line with Foucault 
and Hacking, we think of the modern census as a technology for screening and 
sorting large populations, whose development coincides with the rise of modern 
states. The census is expected to embrace or include the state’s population. The 
term is commonly used ‘to refer to an attempt to count all the people in a 
country at a given point in time’ (Headrick, 2000: 76; see also Desrosières, 1998, 
2008). But in spite of this strong emphasis on social inclusion, censuses also 
legitimate several kinds of exclusion. They distinguish and count particular groups 
of people; they create and legitimate particular social divisions; they identify 
‘residual’ categories such as the poor and indigent, the disabled of body or mind, 
the elderly and invalids, beggars and vagabonds (Crossick, 1991; Paugam, 2005). 
We argue that the range of exclusions sheds light on the inclusive population 
politics of the modern state (see also Foucault, 1994, 1998: 137-59, 2008: 44-6). 
We do not postulate that the emergence of these exclusion categories is the 
                                                                   
shift from the level of model to that of instrument in relation to the population is 
absolutely fundamental. And in actual fact, from the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the family really does appear in this instrumental relation to the population, in the 
campaigns on mortality, campaigns concerning marriage, vaccinations, and inoculations, 
and so on’ (Foucault, 2007: 105).  
 42 
 
result of the censuses; obviously, the emergence of census classifications 
coincides with what is happening at ground level (Uprichard, 2012: 107). But we 
argue that these official representations rationalize and standardize the social 
into an administratively more convenient format. They not merely enhance state 
power; they make possible quite discriminating interventions of any kind, such as 
public health measures, political surveillance, and relief of the poor (Scott, 1998: 
77, 343; Torpey, 2000: 8). 
Historically our focus is more particularly on one national tradition of 
statistics: the Belgian population censuses. In 1846, about a decade and a half 
after independence, the first census was organised in Belgium by the homo 
statisticus Adolphe Quetelet. After 1846, censuses followed at regular, mostly 
ten-yearly intervals in Belgium (Quetelet remained in charge of the censuses 
taken in 1856 and 1866).3 In the following, we direct attention to the period in 
which concerns with the inclusion of the excluded became firmly incorporated 
into the self-description and raison d’être of the modern state. Our chronological 
frame spans about a century; we focus on the period before the Second World 
War (the census scheduled for 1940 was never executed because of the outbreak 
of the war). Our main historical sources consist of the official census reports – 
                                                                   
3 Quetelet was a tireless promoter of statistical data collection based on standard 
methods and definitions. Both nationally and internationally, he gained a strong 
reputation for his approach to statistics and ‘social physics’. In 1841, he organised the 
Commission Centrale de Statistique in Belgium. In 1853, he organised, hosted and 
presided over the first International Statistical Congress, which launched the development 
of many methodological standards as well as of uniform nomenclatures applicable to all 
countries. Quite a number of contemporary statistical practices and classification schemes 
still build on these standards and nomenclatures (see, e.g., Porter, 1986; Desrosières, 
1998; Beaud and Prévost, 1998). The following case-study may thus have broader 
relevance. 
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which contain the printed numbers, an interpretation of them, and a summary of 
the instructions to the census-takers and administrators. We hereafter discuss 
how the Belgian state, prior to the expansion of the welfare state and the firm 
institutionalisation of inclusion imperatives, aimed to ‘take care of’ its population 
– by providing social protection arrangements and thereby exercising ‘power over 
territory’.  
In spite of the popularity of Foucault, we cannot build upon much research 
that has looked into the conditions of possibility of state-istics. While the census’ 
longitudinal series of ‘printed numbers’ are frequently used in quantitatively-
oriented historical and sociological research, much less scholarly effort has 
hitherto been invested in genealogical analyses of the production of these 
numbers (see also Porter, 1986; Power, 2011). In the last two decades, a number 
of studies have contributed to the history of statistical reasoning (e.g. Hacking, 
1990, 2006; Desrosières, 1998, 2008; Bayatrizi, 2008; Prévost, 2009) or of 
statistical bureaus (e.g. Anderson, 1990; Bracke, 2008). For a range of states, 
there also exist studies of the genesis of official classifications of occupations, 
religious adherences, or ethnic distinctions (e.g. Szreter, 1984; Desrosières and 
Thévenot, 1988; Curtis, 2002; Vanderstraeten, 2006; Wobbe, 2012). To our 
knowledge, however, there exist as yet no studies that look directly into the 
historical evolution of the various designations for inclusions and exclusions in 
official state-istics. By exploring this hitherto largely neglected aspect of the 
history of statistics by means of a case study, we hope to be able to throw new 
light on the articulation of ‘relevant’ or ‘legitimate’ distinctions and the 
elaboration of the complex interactions between science, government, and 
society.  
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2.2. WHO COUNTS? 
 
For most of the nineteenth century, the statistical enthusiasm of Western 
government officials was not matched by the ability of local administrators to 
furnish the information requested, or by that of central bureaucracies to process 
the data. Reliable bureaucratic systems of population surveillance were hard to 
establish. Some ten years after the foundation of the new state, Quetelet’s 
Commission Centrale de Statistique became the central agency for the collection 
and publication of administrative statistics in Belgium. In 1846, this commission 
organised the first nationwide population and housing census, participation in 
which was obligatory for all residents. As Quetelet and others repeatedly 
stressed, the organisation of the census required extensive preparatory efforts, 
such as the introduction of a system of house numbering (B, 1846: XII-XIII; see 
also Curtis, 2002: 26-27; Tantner, 2009). Its results also had to provide the basis 
for a flexible registration system of the Belgian population (see B, 1846: LI-LII).  
As in most other nineteenth-century censuses, the main unit of observation 
of the Belgian population census was the household in its place of residence. In 
the census of 1846 Quetelet introduced a household questionnaire to gather 
detailed information at the individual level. In each household, the household 
head had to provide detailed information about each resident.4 The 1846 
                                                                   
4 In England and Wales, the first population census was held in 1801; subsequent 
censuses were organised every ten years after that. At the individual level, however, one 
initially did not collect much detailed information. In the 1811 census, for instance, the 
census-takers gathered information of the following kind: ‘John Tubbs, bricklayer, 3 
males, 2 females, total 5’ (Glass, 1973: 101). Not until 1841, nominal censuses were 
organized in which the names of all household occupants were taken. As similar 
developments took place elsewhere, it is not difficult to see why the origins of the 
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questionnaire asked for each resident’s age, place of birth, mother tongue, 
religion, marital status, profession, and type of stay at the place of residence on 
census day (habitual, temporary, de passage). The household head also had to 
indicate what kind of school education the children received (if any) and whether 
the household or particular residents received help from a public welfare 
institution. Similar information was requested from individuals who had no 
permanent home or who lived in institutions. Special schedules and enumeration 
sheets were distributed in ‘total institutions’ such as monasteries and cloisters, 
barracks, hospitals, madhouses, prisons, houses of correction, colonies for 
vagabonds, etc. The information for all the ‘inmates’ had to be provided by the 
directors of these institutions. 
After 1846, the Belgian census combined two enumeration principles: the de 
facto principle, which calls for the enumeration of the actual population, and the 
de jure principle, which focuses on the legally or habitually resident population. 
Officially, the distinction between habitual place of residence and temporary 
residence was introduced in order to include individuals who were temporarily 
away from home on census day. But to avoid double counting, reliable ways had 
to be found to identify ‘temporary migrants’, such as students, migrant workers, 
fishermen, travellers, hospital patients, prison inmates, or soldiers in military 
quarters (Curtis, 2002: 26-27; Thorvaldsen, 2006).5 This not only required official 
                                                                   
avalanche of printed numbers are dated in the period of 1830-1850 (Porter, 1986; 
Headrick, 2000: 59-95).  
5 De facto and de jure counts differ in the way they put stress on the inclusion of some 
populations and the exclusion of others. The de jure principle puts stress on the inclusion 
of permanent residents who are temporarily absent on the census day, but it excludes 
temporary residents and visitors. The de facto principle incorporates everyone who is in 
the country on census day, including temporary residents and visitors, but it excludes 
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definitions of temporary absence or presence. The census-takers also had to 
reassign individuals administratively to places considered more appropriate. For 
sure, the statistical representations of the population could not but rely on a 
range of administrative conventions and interventions.  
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Belgian government 
continued to organise extensive population counts. Many adaptations and 
adjustments were made, but the core of the census technology remained the 
same over this period. Censuses continued to be taken at the level of the 
household – although several changes were made in the way in which 
information was collected and processed about both population members 
without habitual residence (such as vagrants and beggars) and members of total 
institutions (e.g. B, 1866: VIII; B, 1880: IX; B, 1890: IV, LXIX; B, 1900: III-IV). 
Censuses continued to be conducted at regular intervals – although, following a 
recommendation of the 1872 International Statistical Congress to all its member-
states, the project was shifted to the last year of the decade in order to facilitate 
the production of internationally comparable tables (B, 1880: VII-VIII). The 
number of items expanded considerably – although all schedules still had to be 
filled out by household heads at their place of residence and under the 
surveillance of local census-takers. New tools for data analysis were put to use 
(such as punch cards) – although the overall aim remained the same: providing a 
comprehensive overview of the population that would satisfy ‘the needs of most 
                                                                   
permanent residents who are temporarily absent. With two exceptions, the combination 
of both principles was practiced in the Belgian census. In 1846, the focus was on the de 
facto population, as the registration of the resident population was still incomplete (B, 
1846: X, XLIV). In 1920, the Belgian statistical authorities invoked the mass migration 
caused by World War I in order to legitimate their near-exclusive focus on the de jure 
population (B, 1920: 1-3). 
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public administrations as well as those of science in its diverse manifestations: 
ethnography, history, economics and statistics’ (B, 1880: XIV).  
Throughout the last centuries, the population census has continued to serve 
as an important ‘apparatus of knowledge’; only recently has the availability of a 
range of electronic databases led to questions about the political as well as the 
scientific relevance of new population censuses in Belgium (e.g. Surkyn, 2006). 
Hereafter our interest is not in the census data themselves, nor in their accuracy. 
We are, as mentioned before, interested in what interested the official observer, 
the state-istician. We attempt to reconstruct the genesis of the logic upon which 
the statistical discourse is built, the evolution of ‘the groundwork of bodies of 
knowledge’ (Hacking, 2004: 88). We direct our attention more particularly to the 
designations for inclusion or exclusion – in terms of ‘exclusion places’ and 
excluded populations. We do not argue that the diffusion of these designations is 
but the result of the census (see also Uprichard, 2012). As is well-known, 
however, the state is well equipped to insist on treating people according to its 
proper classifications and designations. State-istical categories may become 
categories that organize people’s experiences precisely because they are 
embedded in state-created institutions that structure that experience (Scott, 
1998: 82-83). 
 
2.3. HOSPITALS ,  HOSPICES ,  ASYLUMS OR COLONIES? 
 
The 1846 census was the first to count the population of the new Belgian state. 
By law, all the residents had to be treated equally and uniformly. However, the 
last item of the questionnaire was intended to distinguish the needy or indigent 
(the term more commonly used in the census reports). It was used to identify 
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those who relied on public charity. In this sense, it was used to identify individuals 
with a precise legal or administrative status. But, as Quetelet remarked, this part 
of the census was less reliable than expected. He presented the aggregated data 
with great caution: ‘to avoid all confusion, it should above all be recalled that we 
deal here only with individuals assisted by the welfare bureaus’ (B, 1846: XXIX). 
While the welfare bureaus were locally funded, these data also depicted the 
prosperity of the local authorities. As some poor municipalities could not afford 
to finance local welfare bureaus, they also did not count residents who relied on 
public charity; as prosperous municipalities could entitle many of their residents 
to help, this resulted in an ‘exaggerated number’ of indigents being registered in 
these municipalities (B, 1846: XXIX). Although the Belgian census-takers 
continued to define ‘indigents’ as ‘all inhabitants depending on public charity, 
such as the elderly and the sick’ (e.g. B, 1866: XI), it should, in the light of these 
ambiguities and paradoxes, not come as a surprise that the Belgian statisticians 
removed the indigence item from their questionnaires after 1846. Nevertheless, 
their interest in the excluded parts of the population did not disappear.  
As early as 1846 the census also contained references to needy groups, who 
could be more readily identified by the fact that they were maintained in 
institutions and thus lived outside the framework of the private household. In the 
instructions to the census-takers, special attention was directed to the 
enumeration of the indigents in ‘hospitals’ or ‘hospices’ (B, 1846: L; see also B, 
1856: LIV). More detailed categories and instructions appeared after 1866. 
Between 1866 and 1900, the census-takers distinguished between the sick being 
treated in ‘hospitals’, the mentally ill or the ‘alienated’ [aliénés] residing in 
‘hospices’ and ‘nursing homes’ [maisons de santé], and indigents staying in 
‘charitable institutions’ [établissements charitables] or ‘with private families’ 
[chez des particuliers] (B, 1866: VIII, XLI; see also B, 1880: XLV; B, 1890: LXX, CXVII-
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CXVIII).6 From the 1900 census report onwards, residences for the sick were 
distinguished from residences for the elderly and incurables. While the sick were 
‘temporarily admitted for treatment in hospitals or in other public or private 
institutions destined to receive the sick’, the elderly and incurables were residing 
for indefinite time [à demeure] in ‘hospices’ or ‘placed in private families by a 
charitable institution’ (B, 1900: LXXXIII; see also B, 1910: 2, 28; B, 1920: 18-19, 
109; B, 1930: 6-7). According to the designations used in the statistical reports, 
the mentally ill were no longer staying in hospices, but were forcibly interned 
[colloqués] in ‘asylums or colonies for the alienated and in nursing homes’ [dans 
les asiles ou colonies d’aliénés et dans les maisons de santé] (B, 1900: LXXXIII; see 
also B, 1930: 7).  
The use of terms such as ‘charity’ or ‘charitable’ points to the religious origin 
or inspiration of the help provided to the indigent, but the differentiation and 
specialization of state-controlled organisations also reflect the expanding reach of 
the modern state. With Max Weber (1922/1976: 122-176), it might be maintained 
that the differentiation and specialization of institutions for indigents is 
characteristic of the development of a ‘rational bureaucracy’ that allows for the 
legitimate exercise of power over the population and territory of the state. The 
discourse reflects, moreover, the crystallization of a particular perspective on the 
reintegration and rehabilitation potential of these ‘non-members’. The 
differentiation of state-controlled organisations corresponds to differences in the 
                                                                   
6 Between square brackets, we provide the original formulation used in the census reports 
when some ‘translation’ was necessary. Until 1920, the Belgian census reports were only 
published in French. French was the only official language there throughout the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century – although the questionnaires and instructions 
were send out in all national languages (French, Dutch and German). 
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expected duration of their treatment or stay. The mentally ill live more or less 
permanently in nursing homes, asylums and colonies; the elderly and incurables, 
such as the infirm, stay for an indefinite period in hospices or with private 
families; the sick reside temporarily in hospitals and other public or private 
institutions; whereas the less-identifiable remaining group of indigent people 
relies on the support of charitable institutions or private families for a less 
identifiable or less definable period of time.  
The different places of exclusion to which indigents (sensu lato) could be 
confined also reflect different degrees of exclusion. Those for the alienated or 
mentally ill offer a good example. According to the censuses, the mentally ill were 
expected to reside in ‘colonies’ and ‘asylums’. The corresponding closure or 
exclusion is well expressed by the etymology of these designations. The French 
asile originally comes from the Greek a-syle (without right of seizure). An asylon 
was a refuge, an inviolable place. The Latin asylum refers to a sanctuary and 
reflects a religious connotation. The term later gained a more general meaning as 
a safe or secure place, a benevolent institution that could provide shelter. To 
formulate this differently: asylums are located within the territory of the state, 
but their residents can be subject to a different regime. The use of the 
designation colonie indicates a similar reference to territorial exclusion. This latter 
designation is derived from the Latin terms colonia (settlement) and colonus 
(colonist, tenant farmer, settler); the term colonus is in turn derived from colere 
(inhabit, cultivate, guard). Just as the asylums, the ‘colonies of the alienated’ 
[colonies d’aliénés] were states within the state – created and legitimated by the 
administrative apparatus of the modern state. In these places of exclusion, the 
residents could be set apart and counted as separate populations. In these places, 
one could impose severe limitations on the freedom of movement of the inmates, 
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but due to their confinement to specific social protection spaces, the excluded 
population groups were socially included.  
In the Belgian population censuses, the designation aliénés remained in use 
until the census of 1930 (see B, 1930: 7). For the census-takers, the inmates of the 
colonies and asylums were to be defined as individuals who were strangers to 
themselves, who were estranged from themselves. The designation they used 
defined mental illness as psychological alienation, as an alienation of the self from 
itself. At the same time, the colonies and asylums were depicted as spaces where 
the self could re-gather itself. The exclusion space was transformed into a medical 
or psychopathological space – in which, on behalf of the state, experts could take 
care of the inmates and their problems. In other words, such classifications of the 
population do not merely register or reproduce ‘social’ problems. They also 
legitimate the progressive exclusion and subjection to expert power of particular 
groups of individuals – by inscribing these exclusions in a discourse that owes 
authority to its scientific character (see also Power, 2011: 37).  
In the competitive political and economic environment of nineteenth-
century Europe, the vitality of the population became closely tied to the larger 
projects of nation-building and modern government (see also Bayatrizi, 2008: 
138). From this perspective, the poor were often the first subjects of social 
planning or social engineering. Our analyses also show the gradual elaboration of 
other exclusion categories, which correlated with other risks of unproductivity, 
deviance or illness. These categories reflected and reinforced differentiated 
management goals. The identification of hospitals, hospices, asylums and colonies 
as exclusion places legitimated far-reaching forms of surveillance and 
‘normalization’. The distinctions were roughly commensurate with the depth of 
the envisaged intervention: the greater the officially perceived need for expert 
manipulation, the stronger the territorial exclusion.  
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2.4. ‘PENSIONNATS ’ ,  SCHOOLS ,  HOUSES OF CORRECTION OR 
DEPOTS?   
 
In the Belgian population censuses, special enumeration sheets or bulletins were 
also used for ‘total institutions’ with explicit educational, re-educational and/or 
penitential goals. To various degrees, these institutions too were defined as 
places of exclusion in which the inmates could be legitimately subjected to 
‘people-changing’ or ‘people-processing’ interventions by experts. Their inmates 
were identified as another group of excluded individuals. 
In the 1846 and 1856 censuses a distinction was made between ‘boarding 
schools’ [pensionnats], houses of correction or ‘reform schools’ [écoles de 
réforme], ‘prisons’ and ‘depots of mendicancy’ [dépôts de mendicité] (B, 1846: 
XXXIX, L; B, 1856: LIV). From 1866 onward the statisticians also used the term 
‘penitential institutions’ [établissements pénitentiaires or établissements 
pénitentiers] (B, 1866: VIII, XLI; B, 1880: X, XLIII-XLIV; B, 1890: LXVIII, LXX, CXVII-
CXVIII). In 1900, a number of new designations appeared which remained in use 
until the middle of the twentieth century. The term ‘reform schools’ was 
abandoned and replaced by ‘welfare schools of the state’ [écoles de bienfaisance 
de l’État]; ‘houses of refuge’ [maisons de refuge] were added while ‘penitential 
institutions’ became ‘penitential houses’ [maisons pénitentiaires] (B, 1900: 
LXXXIII; see also B, 1930: 7). In 1910 Belgian statisticians also added residential 
institutions devoted to instruction or education of all kinds [de toute nature], as 
well as residential institutions for ‘the deaf-and-dumb, the blind, etc.’ (B, 1910: 
28; B, 1930: 7). 
These shifting distinctions and designations reflect underlying premises 
about the susceptibility of the different populations of inmates to disciplining 
processes (see also Dupont-Bouchat, 1995). The pensionnats and related 
 53 
 
residential institutions are expected to educate their boarders; écoles de réforme 
and écoles de bienfaisance are expected to correct, to re-form or re-educate; 
penitential institutions must take in or im-prison; depots must store or stow away 
beggars and vagrants, and houses of refuge intern their residents [les personnes 
internées dans les maisons de refuge] (B, 1900: LXXXIII). From the perspective of 
population control, these institutions are hierarchically ordered. The designations 
reflect different degrees of exclusion from and within society. Proceeding from 
the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, we may distinguish between the pupils 
who are educated or re-educated in pensionnats, écoles de réforme, écoles de 
bienfaisance or other residential institutions, the delinquents who are detained in 
prisons or penitential institutions, and the beggars and refugees who are either 
stored in depots of mendicancy or interned in refugee houses. Again, these 
distinctions seem to reflect both the strength of the perceived deviance and the 
depth of the envisaged interventions. 
In this respect, it is also interesting to have a closer look at the changes in 
the ‘fine distinctions’ between the inmates of total institutions. In the 1846 
census, beggars are described as ‘those detained in the depots of mendicancy’ 
[les détenus des dépôts de mendicité] (B, 1846: L). In 1856, the census 
distinguished between ‘those detained’ [les détenus] and ‘those enclosed in the 
depots of mendicancy’ [les reclus des dépôts de mendicité] (B, 1856: XL). From 
1866 on, the term reclus was not only used for the beggars in the depots of 
mendicancy, but also for the inmates of reform schools [les reclus … des écoles de 
réforme] (B, 1866: XLI). In 1900 the statisticians moreover added the category of 
‘those enclosed in houses of refuge’ [les reclus des … maisons de refuge] (B, 1900: 
LXXXIII; B, 1910: 28). As a counterpart, the term détenu became used exclusively 
for the imprisoned. 
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The etymology of the terms may also shed some light on these 
distinctions and designations. The French term détenu is derived from the Latin 
detinere, meaning ‘hold off’, ‘keep back’, ‘keep away’. The term reclus comes 
from the Late Latin verb recludere (which comes in turn from re-claudere), 
meaning ‘to enclose’, ‘to shut again’. The terms thus have different emphases. 
Both the détenus and the reclus are included in society – but on the basis of 
different forms of territorial exclusion. The term détenu suggests a more active 
intervention by the state. While individuals in penitential institutions are detained 
and therefore ‘kept away’ from society, the various groups of reclus are 
‘enclosed’ within society. The places of exclusion for the détenus and reclus 
facilitated and legitimated specific forms of population control, of surveillance, of 
intervention and of the maintenance of order.  
In this respect, there exist clear parallels with the designations used to 
specify the exclusion of the mentally ill. As noted above, the mentally ill are 
forcibly interned in ‘asylums or colonies for the alienated and in nursing homes’. 
Delinquents are im-prisoned; their social inclusion is dependent on territorial 
exclusion, on detention. Refugees are interned; the verb ‘to intern’ is originally 
derived from the Latin internus, which means ‘within’ or ‘internal’. The state-
istically relevant status of beggars, too, is defined in terms of the complex relation 
between exclusion places, the inmates and the kind of surveillance and control 
that their confinement to these places made possible. The dépôt is literally a 
‘place of deposit’. Beggars and vagrants are stored in the same way that objects 
are.  
It might be said that no ‘agency’ is expected of these populations of non-
members. About half a century ago, Erving Goffman has drawn attention to 
processes of ‘curtailment’ and ‘dispossession’ (of roles, of property and of the 
‘identity kit’ required for managing one’s personal status and identity): the 
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inmates of total institutions are stripped of several of the rights and qualities 
which are commonly attributed to the rational, autonomous actor in the modern, 
enlightened world (Goffman, 1961: 14-35; see also Foucault, 1995). As our 
analyses show, the official discourse of the Belgian population censuses takes for 
granted and legitimates an instrumental treatment of the individuals in asylums 
and colonies, prisons and depots. These inmates do not have to be treated as 
subjects.7  
This is also illustrated by the verbs used to ‘describe’ the relationship 
between these institutions and their members. These verbs express various 
expectations regarding people’s ‘agency’. As indicated before, verbs pointing to a 
somewhat active, ‘agentic’ role have been used in relation to the sick. The sick are 
temporarily ‘admitted’ [admises] for treatment in hospitals, while public and 
private health care institutions have to ‘receive’ [recevoir] them (see, e.g. B, 1900: 
LXXXIII). A less active role is assigned to the elderly, the infirm and the indigent. 
According to the census reports they are ‘assembled’ [recueillis] in hospices or 
‘placed’ [placés] in private families (e.g. B, 1866: XLI). This is also the case for 
children; they are ‘placed in custody’ [placés en garde] or ‘placed’ in other private 
families or specialized institutions (e.g. B, 1910: 28). The alienated, refugees and 
prisoners, finally, are allowed to play at the most a passive role in entering their 
                                                                   
7 One is also reminded of the Categorical Imperative, as formulated by Immanuel Kant at 
the end of the eighteenth century. In its second formulation, this moral imperative states: 
‘Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’ 
(Kant 1785/1993: 36). But the administrative apparatus of the modern state allows for the 
institutionalisation of ways in which the other (for a certain period of time, under certain 
conditions) does not need to be treated as a subject, but may be dealt with as a mere 
instrument or object. 
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residences. The mentally ill have to be ‘forcibly interned’ [colloqués], while 
delinquents and refugees are ‘imprisoned’ or ‘interned’ [internés] (e.g. B, 1866: 
XLI; B, 1900: LXXXIII). They are included as non-members, as excluded individuals.  
From the state’s point of view, these different categories reflect different 
social risks (see Lupton, 1999: 114). These categories tend either to position 
individuals as particularly unproductive or weak, or as particularly dangerous to 
themselves or to others. In both cases, these categories both echo and reinforce 
calls for directing special attention to these individuals, positioning them in a 
network of monitoring and intervention. By including these individuals in 
exclusion categories, they can be made the object of intensive forms of social 
welfare – or social engineering. 
 
2.5.  INCORPORATED POPULATI ON MEMBERS? 
 
As noted above, the Belgian census-takers used special enumeration sheets for 
certain ‘total institutions’. These institutions were dealt with as ‘collective 
households’ [assimilé à un ménage] (see, e.g. B, 1866: VIII; B, 1880: X-XI, XLV; B, 
1890: 19, 32). Next to the hospitals and hospices, colonies and asylums, reform 
and welfare schools, prisons and depots, religious organisations constituted the 
most important collective households. As such, these religious organisations did 
not cause much concern.8 Membership of these organizations was clearly 
                                                                   
8 Of importance was the religious distinction between withdrawing from the world (vita 
contemplativa) and activity within the world – mostly in fields of education and/or health 
care (vita activa). In the light of the conflicts between state and church, statisticians were 
primarily interested in the active orders and congregations. For an overview of the printed 
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regulated; their members had taken religious vows (chastity, obedience and 
poverty) and had committed to spending their entire life in the order or 
congregation. It was also commonly accepted that all members had joined 
voluntarily, and that the convent constituted their place of residence (e.g. B, 
1880: X). 
 In relation to the inmates of other total institutions, such as prisons or 
asylums, however, the ambiguity of the underlying assumptions of this statistical 
construction is obvious. On the special sheets or bulletins for the exclusion places, 
discussed above, inmates were asked to declare their habitual place of residence. 
As a matter of principle the inmates of institutions such as colonies, reform 
schools or prisons were considered to reside only temporarily where they were at 
the time the census was taken (e.g. B, 1900: IV; B, 1910: 27-29; B, 1920: 37, 109; 
B, 1930: 27, 158). Despite the fact that inmates could be assigned for many years 
(if not for life) to these institutions, they were not expected to reside in these 
institutions. Their habitual place of residence had to be somewhere else. These 
inmates had to be reported and coded by the census-takers as being temporarily 
absent from their last residence. But the instructions to the census-takers also 
testify to the difficulties encountered in practice in this regard (e.g. B, 1890: 
CXVII). 
Time and again, the instructions to the census-takers stipulated that an 
institution such as a depot, prison or hospital could only constitute a temporary, 
but not a habitual place of residence for its adult inmates. Their last residence 
prior to their admission into the institution had to be declared on the 
                                                                   
numbers and debates in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Vanderstraeten 
(2014). 
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enumeration sheet. Over the years, however, several exceptions were granted. In 
the 1866 census, for example, the institution could be the place of residence for 
‘the detained and the enclosed who have no parents, no residence, and who do 
not know where to settle after their release’ [des détenus et des reclus qui n’ont 
ni parents, ni habitation, et qui ignorent où ils se fixeront à leur sortie] (B, 1866: 
XLI). In 1890 an exception was made for inmates who did not belong to any other 
household (B, 1890: CXVII; see also B, 1900: CXLV; B 1910: 96). In 1920 the 
Belgian statisticians chose to illustrate the range of possible exceptions by means 
of a single example, namely that of the elderly and incurables placed for 
indefinite time in a hospice [vieillards et incurables placés à demeure dans un 
hospice] (B, 1920: 109).  
For ‘minors’, the instructions to the census-takers repeatedly directed 
attention to the registration of those fed by or placed with a wet nurse [les 
enfants (placés) en nourrice] (e.g. B, 1846: IL-L; B, 1856: LXI; B, 1910: 28).9 In 1880 
and 1890 the instructions also referred to the young placed in apprenticeship [les 
jeunes gens placés en apprentissage] and students residing in university colleges 
(B, 1880: X; B, 1890: LXX, CXVII). From 1900 on ‘children in custody’ [les enfants 
placés en garde], pupils in residential educational institutions (which now also 
comprised the apprenticeships), and boarders in the ‘institutes for the deaf-and-
dumb, the blind, etc.’ were added (e.g. B, 1900: LXXXIII; B, 1930: 7). These 
categories had to be distinguished from ‘foundlings or abandoned children’ [les 
                                                                   
9 The practice of wet nursing was quite common in the nineteenth century, although the 
growing popularity of artificial feeding eroded demand at the end of that century (see 
Fildes, 1986; Golden, 1996). The labour force of wet nurses comprised two groups: 
women seeking other women’s babies to suckle in their own homes and women looking 
for jobs in service as maids. Under the category of wet nursing, the Belgian census-takers 
only registered women working in their own homes.  
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enfants trouvés ou abandonés] (B, 1866: XLI), and ‘orphans entrusted to wet 
nurses or placed in an orphanage’ [les orphelins qui ont été confiés à des 
nourriciers ou placés dans un orphelinat] (B, 1900: LXXXIII; B, 1910: 28). Only for 
these last categories could an institution of itself be the habitual or legal place of 
residence for the minors.  
The increasing concern with the whereabouts of population members 
reflects the growing political emphasis on the resident population. ‘Temporary’ 
shelters, such as boats, sheds or caravans [navire ou bateau, baraque foraine, 
chariot nomade, etc.], too, were ruled out as legal or habitual places of residence 
(e.g. B, 1910: 31, 96; B, 1920: 18; B, 1930: 8, 47). But, in quite a number of cases, 
habitual residences were difficult to determine. As noted before, the census-
takers could reassign people to places of residence considered more appropriate. 
Judged on the basis of the instructions to the census-takers, ambiguities of 
different kinds have continued to emerge during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century. While the variability of the statistical conventions may be an 
obstacle to establishing historical long series or comparative tables (Thorvaldsen, 
2006), genealogical analyses of these conventions also show how bureaucratic 
control was exercised over the population. Such analyses clarify how the 
incorporation of population members has come to depend on territorial control, 
on addresses and places of residence. The exclusion categories of the population 
censuses were closely tied to exclusion places; these exclusion places did not 
have a ‘normal’ status, but remained exception places.  
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2.6.  CONCLUSION  
 
In many regards, nineteenth-century statistics prepared the ground, and 
suggested a good deal of the content, for later sociology. It was conceived as 
empirical social science (or ‘social physics’, as Quetelet would have it). Following 
the original prospectus of the Statistical Society of London, for example, statistics 
were ‘facts which are calculated to illustrate the conditions and prospects of 
society’ (1838: 1). Statisticians tried to create order in the facts – not only 
biological (such as birth or death rates), but also social – that they collected. They 
developed a new mode of representing society, and hence a new object to act 
upon (Hacking, 2006; Gane, 2012). Their instruments translated the existing social 
complexity in a ‘legible’ and state-istically convenient format (Scott, 1998: 77, 
343).  
We have argued that the census helped to establish the practice of 
thinking of society as a population. But this practice also depended on the 
exercise of state authority; it depended on the exercise of ‘power over territory’ 
(Foucault). In our analyses of the Belgian population censuses, we have more 
particularly shown how the Belgian census-takers simultaneously included and 
excluded particular parts of the population. They identified particular individuals 
as both members and non-members. The excluded individuals remained 
members of the corps social (Quetelet) and thus part of the state’s population. 
But they were also identified as individuals who had to be treated, who had to be 
subjected to specific interventions. The statistical categories of exclusion achieved 
legitimacy, because the perceived deviances were judged to be an issue for 
intervention through action taken by public authorities and institutions (Scott, 
1998: 3, 80). Put more generally: the modern state-istics contributed to creating 
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and representing an object, namely society, in the process of governing it as a 
population.  
This statistical ‘system of thought’ was closely linked with the state’s 
interest in the productivity of its population. As we have shown, the different 
designations for excluded populations reflected and legitimated different modes 
of monitoring and treatment, different regimes of surveillance and regulation, 
different degrees of exclusion from and within society, different expectations 
regarding full membership of the state. In this regard, the structure underlying 
the exclusion categories of the population censuses indeed reflects ‘the 
regularities that determine a system of thought’ (Hacking, 2004: 90). The 
hierarchy of exclusion categories displays the importance of particular social 
parameters – and the necessity of monitoring and manipulating them. The state 
thus does not just make use of reliable data or facts produced by population 
statistics. The history of state-istics is in itself a history of the construction of 
authorized and powerful state-ments. 
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3. HOUSEHOLD AND STATE-ISTICS:  CORNERSTONES 
OF SOCIETY IN POPULATION CENSUSES 
(BELGIUM ,  1846-1947)1 
 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In the last decades, promising research avenues have been opened up by 
interrogating the history of our most familiar and taken-for-granted statistical 
practices. While statistical data are nowadays routinely used in fields such as 
historical demography and historical sociology, the genesis of the methods and 
categories that define our representations of the social universe has only recently 
started to attract scholarly attention. The etymology of the word ‘statistics’, 
however, is telling in itself: statistics was originally state-istics, a scientific 
representation of the state for administrative, governmental purposes (e.g., 
Hacking 1991; Desrosières 2008). Examining the history of statistical forms may 
thus shed light on specific structural features of modern society – if only because 
the establishment of power structures is necessary to gather the information or 
data demanded by governments and state administrations.  
In terms of theory, Michel Foucault’s late work has hitherto constituted 
an important point of departure for this approach. In Naissance de la Biopolitique, 
for instance, Foucault included statistical observation methods among the key 
bio-political instruments. He also noted the close relationship between the 
                                                                   
1 This chapter of my Ph.D. is forthcoming in the journal Social Science History as Louckx, K. 
and Vanderstraeten, R., ‘Household and State-istics: Cornerstones of Society in Population 
Censuses (Belgium, 1846-1947)’, Social Science History (scheduled for the Summer issue 
of 2015, volume 39 (2)).  
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elaboration of statistical methods and the rise of the idea of the ‘population’. 
Statistics or state-istics gave way to a new mode of representation. It led to the 
creation of both new forms of knowledge and new modes of intervention. It 
helped to conceive a new sort of object, society as population, which could be the 
target of both research and of policy interventions (see, e.g., Scott 1998; Curtis 
2002).  
In recent decades, some historical-sociological studies have tried to trace 
the genesis or ‘genealogy’ (Foucault) of distinctly modern statistical forms or 
categories, such as that of the inactive population or the unemployed individual 
(e.g., Topalov 1994: 312-50; Baxandall 2004; Vanderstraeten 2006; Wobbe 2012). 
However, the rise of the modern world also depended on forms of continuity with 
older traditions, on the incorporation (in one way or another) of existing forms or 
categories. In this paper, we will focus on the re-articulation of the household in 
the modern state with special regard to its state-istics. Following the Oxford 
Dictionary, the term has been used since the fourteenth century for a group of 
people (especially a family) living together as a unit; it refers to a domestic 
establishment (including any servants, attendants, etc.). It has often also been 
defined in terms of the common cooking pot: the household includes those who 
eat together at the same table. For the early-modern era, the household is widely 
considered to be the most fundamental unit for social, political, economic, and 
reproductive purposes (see, e.g., Laslett and Wall 1982). In the modern era, too, 
the social order is often perceived to revolve around the household. Despite 
growing heterogeneity at the household level, this social unit remains in most 
discourses the proverbial cornerstone of society. In the population censuses, 
which have been conducted from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, 
for instance, household schedules have nearly always been used to gather and 
process individual data. But how have the expectations regarding the household 
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as a distinct social institution shifted in the modern era? In our view, the history 
of social statistics may also be used to analyse the articulation or re-articulation of 
this notion.  
A sociological history of the household, as it is depicted and defined in the 
world of social statistics, may not only add to the relatively small body of 
historical-sociological research of statistical conventions and observation 
methods (see Curtis 2002: 506; Ellickson 2008: 5). It may also be relevant for the 
large body of historical and comparative contributions about, for example, the 
size and composition of the household, the cultural values that underpin its 
modes of solidarity, and/or the forms of management of the state’s population 
(e.g., Laslett and Wall 1982; Wilk and Netting 1984; Tadmor 2004). In this paper, 
we intend to complement the existing bodies of research by means of a case-
study of the Belgian population censuses. These censuses have been organized 
with regular, mostly ten-year intervals since the mid-nineteenth century. We will, 
more particularly, focus upon a period of about one hundred years: from the mid-
nineteenth until the mid-twentieth century, when the ‘welfare state’ more 
actively ‘took responsibility for’ its population.2  
In our view, the Belgian population censuses provide an interesting case-
study, as it was the homo statisticus Adolphe Quetelet who played a key role in 
their development. Quetelet had already acquired a solid international reputation 
                                                                   
2 The ninth Belgian population census took place in 1930. In 1940, no census could be 
conducted because of the outbreak of the Second World War. Without much preparation, 
the tenth census only took place in 1947. It was, moreover, a limited census (limited in 
terms of much information being omitted), primarily intended to take stock of the state of 
the nation after the devastations of the Second World War. In 1961, the next decennial 
census was organized. The censuses of 1930 and 1947 constitute the endpoint of the 
following analyses. 
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as statistician (or ‘social physicist’) when he established the Commission Centrale 
de Statistique (in 1841), tried out new procedures for census-taking in the city of 
Brussels (in 1842), and organized the first nationwide population census in 
Belgium (in 1846, i.e. about a decade and a half after its independence). While 
Quetelet remained in charge of the censuses conducted in 1856 and 1866 in 
Belgium, he also defined the objectives of the Congrès International de 
Statistique, whose sessions were actively attended by many high-level ‘state 
servants’ from countries throughout Europe and America, for more than two 
decades. As other researchers time and again testify, Quetelet’s focus on the 
development of uniform methods and conventions had considerable impact on a 
broad range of statistical traditions – both in the nineteenth century and 
afterwards (e.g., Porter 1986: 41-55; Brian 1989, 2002; Desrosières 2008: 7-59; 
Bracke 2008: 131-67; Randeraad 2011; Prévost and Beaud 2012: 49-62). Indeed, 
‘those who attended pushed their governments to adopt a standard template for 
census making on the Queteletian model’ (Curtis 2002: 20-21). Although and 
because we are attentive to differences in social statistics in Europe and 
elsewhere, we also believe that a sociological case-study of the history of Belgian 
statistics and statistical constructs may have broader relevance.  
Our primary historical sources consist of the Belgian census reports. 
These reports contain a presentation of the results of the census, as well as a 
rather technical part that reproduces the instructions to the census-takers and 
local authorities.3 We will particularly focus on the ways in which data about the 
household were collected and processed in the successive Belgian censuses. 
While the census questionnaires had to be intelligible to both the census-takers 
                                                                   
3 We refer to the census reports by the letter B followed by the year the census was 
taken. A list of all the primary sources is included in the bibliographic part of this article. 
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asking them and the population answering them, the changes in the descriptions 
and definitions of the household may reflect more fundamental shifts in our ways 
of representing society, and conceiving of the population. We therefore believe 
that the world of statistics and state-istics allows us to develop a sociological 
history of the household in the modern era.  
Hereafter, we start with an overview of the development of the 
enumeration techniques used by the Belgian statisticians. We then consider 
changes in the representation of both family households and collective 
households, such as barracks, religious communities, hospitals or prisons. Next, 
we discuss the changing expectations with regard to the membership of these 
households, to the inclusion and exclusion of particular individuals as household 
members. In the concluding section, we formulate and discuss some more 
general conclusions regarding the ‘reorganization’ of the modern population and 
its basic social units.  
 
3.2. ENUMERATION F ORMS  
 
Although a population census is mostly defined as an ‘attempt to count all the 
people in a country at a given point in time’ (Headrick 2000: 76), social 
statisticians have often distinguished between two definitions of the population. 
The total population may comprise either all ‘usual’ residents of the country or all 
persons present in the country at the time of the census. The total of all usual 
residents is referred to as the de jure population and the total of all persons 
present as the de facto population. In Belgium, both principles have been used 
side by side, although the statisticians’ emphasis shifted in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century from the de facto to the de jure principle. In this section, we 
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will trace the adaptations of the census questionnaires and enumeration forms, 
while the technical ‘improvements’ of the statistical armamentarium also embody 
structural changes in the idea of the population and of the household as its basic 
social unit.  
In Belgium, the 1846 population census was mainly based on the de facto 
principle, which was considered to be the simplest and most efficient method at 
that time (e.g., B 1846: X; B 1856: VIII, XLV, LIV, LV, LXXVI; see also Thorvaldsen 
2006: 84-5). The census-takers made use of household schedules, on which all 
persons living within the household had to be listed. Two types of schedules were 
used: one for ‘typical’ family households and one for institutions or ‘collective 
bodies’ [corps collectifs], such as barracks, monasteries or prisons. In principle, 
the head of the household or of the institution had to fill out the questionnaire. If 
the head was absent or unable to complete the form (e.g., because the head was 
illiterate), other household members or the census-takers themselves had to fill 
out the form (B 1846: L, LXIX). According to the official instructions, the census-
takers had to control and, if necessary, correct the information provided on each 
questionnaire.4  
The household schedule collected data about a wide variety of issues, 
such as age, gender, place of birth, language, religion, civil estate, occupation, 
                                                                   
4 As a rule, one census-taker was responsible for one hundred households (see B 1846: 
LXII; B 1856: XLIII; B 1866: XXXVIII). Already in the 1846 census it was argued that an 
attractive remuneration was necessary in order to find sufficient competent census-
takers: “Afin de prévenir les difficultés auxquelles donneraient lieu l’ignorance, 
l’indifférence ou la mauvaise volonté, il fallait que l’agent de recensement, partout où il se 
présenterait, surtout dans les communes rurales, ne se bornât pas à distribuer et à retirer 
les trois bulletins du recensement; il devait, en outre, être en état de les rédiger d’après 
les déclarations des habitants qui n’auraient pas été à même de le faire” (B 1846: 3). 
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reading and writing skills, and reliance on public support (see, e.g., B 1846: X, 
XXV). In line with the de facto principle, information about the whereabouts of all 
individuals present in the household or institution had to be provided. But the 
1846 census also distinguished between three types of residences: habitual, 
temporary and de passage. Hotels or dwellings, where people stayed for less than 
one month, were considered to constitute résidences de passage. Institutions that 
sheltered individuals for more than one month, such as prisons, barracks or 
boarding schools, were called temporary residences. Generally, however, 
individuals were expected to be in their usual residence on census day (e.g., B 
1846: L). For the statisticians, the distinction between these types of residences 
made it possible to identify and count the so-called ‘floating population’ (as part 
of the de facto population). In 1846, the individuals also had to be listed in a 
specific, prescribed order on the household form: the head of household, the 
spouse, the children, the in-living family or non-family members, the in-living 
servants, and finally the individuals who were but temporarily present in the 
household. Although the main concern was with the de facto population, this last 
category thus again served to distinguish between the floating population and the 
habitual, resident population.  
In 1856 the individuals had to be listed on the household schedule in the 
same order as in 1846, although it was added that the children had to be ranked 
by age. But the household schedule now also included a field in which 
information on the habitual residence of temporary visitors had to be listed (B 
1856: XXXVIII-XXXIX, XLI-XLII). In addition, the head of household was explicitly 
instructed to provide the information for individuals who did usually belong to 
the household but who were temporarily absent. The 1856 census thus also 
included and counted absentees, at least if they were expected to return to their 
habitual place of residence (B 1856: XLVIII, LVI). This may be regarded as the first 
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deliberate attempt to apply the de jure principle, as well as to distinguish 
between the de facto and de jure population. 
In the 1866 census, the de facto and de jure method were officially used 
side by side in Belgium. On the household schedule, the list of individuals was to 
be divided into two separate groups: those who belonged to the household, 
whether present or temporarily absent on census day, on the one hand, and 
those who were present in the household but did not belong to it, on the other 
(e.g., B 1866: VII-VIII, XI-XII, XXXVI, XLII). A field was also added to provide 
information about their actual residence [séjour réel] and their habitual or regular 
place of residence [résidence habituelle] on census day. To guard against over-
enumeration, the Belgian statisticians started to reiterate that individuals could 
only be member of one household or institution at the time (e.g., B 1866: XII). For 
each individual in the household, the degree of parenthood with the head of 
household had to be indicated, too (B 1866: IX, XXXII-XXXIII). 
Following a recommendation made by the International Statistical 
Congress, the Belgian statistical authorities started to conduct censuses in years 
ending on a 0 (Quetelet 1873: 121). Therefore, the fourth population census, 
which was originally scheduled for 1876, ended up taking place in 1880.5 In the 
1880 census, two extra census forms were distributed (see, e.g., B 1880: IX). Next 
to the household schedule, special forms were introduced for the individuals who 
                                                                   
5 After the death of Quetelet in 1874, the organization of the Belgian censuses 
increasingly became part of the routine practices within the Belgian Ministry of the 
Interior. The ninth and last session of Quetelet’s Congrès International de Statistique took 
place in Budapest in 1876. Its successor, the International Statistical Institute, was 
founded in 1885. The detailed guidelines and instructions, issued by the Congrès and its 
successor, provide evidence of the ‘path-dependent’ character of the statistical regimes in 
national and international contexts (Brian 2002; Randeraad 2011).  
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were only temporarily present in a dwelling on census day. A distinction was 
made between the individual card [carte individuelle] for the ‘strangers’ or 
temporary visitors in family households and the bulletin special, which was used 
to collect the same kind of information for all the ‘inmates’, who were expected 
to reside only for a limited time in the collective bodies. In 1890, these forms 
were reused but named bulletin spécial personnel, on the one hand, and bulletin 
spécial collectif, on the other (B 1890: IV, CXXXI). As such, it proved to be a 
relatively stable statistical innovation; together with the household schedule, 
both bulletins remained in use throughout most of the twentieth century (see B 
1900: CVI-CIX; B 1910: 44-47; B 1920: 18-21; B 1930: 46-51; B 1947: 108-113; B 
1961: 49-51; B 1970: 46-49). As a consequence, the ‘visitors’ were immediately 
set apart and counted by means of separate forms. By focusing on the number of 
individuals formally belonging to the household in its regular place of residence, 
the Belgian censuses also began to elevate the de jure principle above the de 
facto one (see, e.g., B 1880: LXXXVIII; B 1890: CXXXI; B 1900: X; B 1910: VI). 
In the discourse of the statisticians, these ‘technical’ changes in/of the 
enumeration forms mostly constituted innovations and improvements. They were 
accompanied by numerous instructions to the census-takers and heads of 
households, who had to complete the forms. However, these technical 
improvements also reveal basic changes in the idea of population. The 
statisticians developed a particular idea – at the cost of others. In contrast with 
the de facto method that informed about the ‘real presence of individuals’ 
[présence réelle], the de jure method focused on individuals’ official or regular 
residence (B 1890, XIV). The de jure counts emphasized the place where 
individuals ought to be on census day, regardless of the place where they were 
actually staying on that day. Concomitantly, the criteria for household 
membership shifted. The first, de facto censuses registered all individuals who 
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were staying at the same place on census day as members of the same 
household. From the 1880 census onwards, a regular residence became a sine 
qua non for household membership. Only the habitual or regular residents could 
be registered on a household sheet; only de jure habitants could be counted as 
household members (e.g., B 1880: IX, CXXII; B 1890: CLIV, CLXXVIII; B 1900: IV; B 
1910: 2; B 1920: 3; B 1930: 5). The state thus became involved in (re-)defining the 
household and the conditions for individual membership of the household and 
the population. As we will see, the history of the enumeration principles and 
practices not only – mostly indirectly – informs us about the difficulties that this 
legalization process brought about, but also displays the practical and state-istical 
consequences of this shift.  
 
3.3. FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS  
 
As mentioned before, the household is the basic population unit for the censuses. 
In the first Belgian censuses, the household was described as ‘the union’ [la 
reunion] of two or more individuals who were ‘living together’ [vivant en 
commun] (B 1846: L, LXIX; B 1856: XXXVIII, LIV). But after the adoption of the de 
jure method, the statisticians were forced to be more specific about the criteria 
for household membership. From 1880 onwards, they mostly defined the 
household in terms of habitual co-residence. Although the rather vague 
description l’ensemble des personnes was used in the 1880 and 1890 censuses (B 
1880: XLV; B 1890: IV), the statisticians typically made use of phrases like 
‘habitually living under the same roof’ [résider habituellement dans la même 
maison/habitation] or ‘sharing a common life’ [avoir une vie commune] (e.g., B 
1880: XLV; B 1890: IV; B 1900: LXXXII; B 1910: 28; B 1930: 6). In its specific 
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historical details, however, the criteria for household membership also displayed 
some important implications of state-istical decision-making.  
From the first census onwards, it was already specified that ‘singles’ [les 
individus de l’un ou de l’autre sexe, vivant seuls] could be considered to constitute 
a household of their own (e.g., B 1846: LI; B 1866: XXXIX). From the 1900 census 
onwards, the statisticians distinguished more explicitly between a ‘simple unit’, 
which consisted of ‘one person living alone’ [une personne vivant seule], and a 
‘collective unit’, which was formed by ‘the union of two or more persons’ [la 
réunion de deux ou plusieurs personnes] (e.g., B 1900: LXXXII; B 1910: 2-3, 28; B 
1930: 6). 
Of more conceptual concern was the relation and distinction between the 
‘household’ and the ‘family’. In the first censuses, these terms were occasionally 
used as synonyms (B 1846: XLV, L; B 1856: LX; B 1866: XI). At the same time, 
however, attention was directed to the distinction between both social 
institutions. For instance, it was stipulated in the instructions to the census-takers 
that live-in servants or workers had to be treated as members of the households 
in which they were employed (e.g., B 1846: L; B 1856: LIV, LXXII; B 1866: VIII, 
LXXV, LXXXV).6 In the 1846 and 1856 censuses, the information about the heads 
of households and their relatives also had to be listed prior to that of the other 
residents on the household schedules. From the 1866 and 1880 censuses 
onwards, the census-takers were more explicitly instructed about the distinction 
                                                                   
6 But housekeepers and porters, living with their family on the premises of their ‘master’ 
or their ‘patron’ [leur maître ou leur patron], could receive a separate household sheet (B 
1866: XXXIX). Following the instructions, they were often not considered as living together 
with, and being part of, their master’s family household. The census-takers were urged to 
make the ‘appropriate’ decision after having visited the dwelling(s).  
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between co-residential groupings and family or kinship structures (e.g., B 1866: 
XXXIX; B 1880: XI; B 1890: CXVI; B 1900: LXXXIII; B 1910: 2-3, 28; B 1920: 4; B 
1930: 6). It now became routinely reiterated that households were not 
characterized by kinship relations (see also B 1880: XLV; B 1890: IV). But such 
instructions also defined ‘the facts,’ which the censuses had to inform about.  
Initially, the elaboration of the distinction between household and family 
mainly provided the background for analyses of family and kinship relations. The 
1866 census started to inquire into the family ties established by marriages. In 
1846 and 1856 only an indication of marital status was required (with two 
options: married or widowed), but the 1866 questionnaire also asked for the 
name of people’s (former) spouse (B 1866: XLI). After 1866, it was stressed that 
married women could not use their own family name, but had to be registered 
under their husband’s name – even when they were no longer married, but 
widowed or divorced (e.g., B 1890: CXX, CXXVI; B 1900: CIV-CIX, CLIII).7 These 
women thus became defined by their (former) marriage; men were expected to 
represent the family households. In this sense, the censuses both confirmed and 
                                                                   
7 In 1866, divorced individuals were treated as widowed ones [on assimilera les habitants 
divorcés aux veufs] (B 1866: XLV); they also had to report the name of their former 
spouse. In 1880, the option ‘divorced’ was included among the civil status categories, 
although an instruction to the enumerators summoned them to record divorced 
individuals as married ones (B 1880: LXXXV). In 1890, it was stressed that divorced women 
had to keep using the name of their (former) husband (B 1890: CXX, CXXVI). In 1900, 
married and widowed women had to provide their husband’s family name and add their 
own one, while divorced women had to provide their own family name and add their 
former husband’s name (B 1900: CIV-CIX, CLIII). In the following censuses, widowed and 
divorced women were treated alike: their own family name had to be mentioned first, 
while that of their former husband had to be added (e.g., B 1910: 103; B 1920: 16-21; B 
1930: 40-51).  
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reinforced the subordinate position of women in the family household (see also 
Zimmermann 2001; Wobbe 2012). 
Moreover, the 1866 census started to inquire explicitly into the filiation 
between the head of household and the other residents in the household. 
‘Popular terminology’, instead of a formal description of the degree of 
parenthood, was allowed in order to clarify this filiation (B 1866: XLI). Among the 
examples provided were terms such as son, grandson, son-in-law, nephew, 
cousin, and uncle. According to the summary report, this part of the census 
questionnaire was specifically intended to gather information about ‘the filiation 
within households that bring together several generations of the same family’ [en 
établissant la filiation dans les ménages qui réunissent plusieurs générations de la 
même famille] (B 1866: IX). The wording of the item and the related instructions 
to the census-takers also shows that the lineage with the pater familias was 
considered to be a defining characteristic of each family member. 
Similar items and instructions were used in the following population 
censuses (see B 1880: XLVIII-XLIX; B 1890: LXXXII-LXXXIII, CXX). But, after that the 
distinction between household and family had been firmly established, more 
response options for this item were allowed for. From 1900 onwards, residents 
without kinship relation with the head of household also had to inform about 
their ‘position’ or ‘situation’ [position, situation] in the household and their 
relation to the head of household. Among the examples provided in the 
instructions were descriptions such as governess, tutor, servant, pupil, friend and 
associate. In cases that the relationship could not be specified, the answer ‘none’ 
was allowed (B 1900: CLIV; B 1910: 2-3, 103; B 1920: 10; B 1930: 6; B 1947: 104; B 
1961: 43). Like the family, the household was depicted as a unitas multiplex, as a 
structured whole (see also Luhmann 1990: 196-217). Perhaps this extension of 
response options first of all signals a growing awareness of the household as a co-
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residential voluntary association that may bring together different individuals in 
different constellations.  
In sum: the relative neglect of the distinction between household and 
family in the mid-nineteenth-century censuses may be seen to still reflect the 
traditional, lasting importance of the family household as the basic social, co-
residential unit of individuals who share in common consumption and production. 
The emphasis on the difference between family and household, as it can be 
observed in the censuses of the latter part of the nineteenth century, signals the 
institutionalization of different forms of understanding. In the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, the household could no longer be depicted as a traditional 
and ‘natural’ reality. Gradually it became perceived as a voluntary association, 
even if the statisticians initially focused most of their attention on the natural, 
kinship relations within the family (as part of the household). In the twentieth-
century population censuses, the family household itself became analysed as a 
dynamic – relatively unstable – institution, to which individual members might 
belong for various reasons. The social statistics rely on this Gestaltswitch, 
although the ‘printed numbers’ themselves do not shed light on it. 
 
3.4. COLLECTIVE HOUSEHOLDS  
 
Because of its focus on co-residential groupings, the term ‘household’ could also 
be applied to individuals living together in ‘collective bodies’ [corps collectifs], 
such as monasteries, nursing homes, asylums, prisons, workhouses (providing 
employment for paupers and support for the infirm), barracks, orphanages, and 
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so on.8 As mentioned before, two types of schedules were used in the first 
Belgian censuses: one for the typical family households and one for the collective 
bodies (B 1846: XIV; B 1856: XXXVIII, XXXIX).  
The extension of the term ‘household’ was, however, not obvious. In fact, 
the term was initially only used for the typical family households (B 1846: L; B 
1856: XXXIX). In 1856 and 1866, it was added that collective bodies were 
‘assimilated to a household’ [assimilé à un ménage] (B 1856: XXXIX; B 1866: 
XXXIX).9 From the last decades of the nineteenth century onwards, (several of) 
these collective bodies were no longer just ‘assimilated to’, but presented as ‘real’ 
alternatives to households (e.g., B 1880: X; B 1890: IV, LXX). In the censuses of 
1900 and 1920, for example, both family and collective households were 
described as elementary social groups [groupe sociale élémentaire] (B 1900: XXVI) 
or elementary social collectivities [collectivités sociales élémentaires] (B 1920: 4). 
Such statistical formulations may reflect the growing social importance of ‘total 
institutions’ in the modern era. On the basis of their household definitions, the 
                                                                   
8 In international contexts, one also speaks of group accommodation or group quarter. 
The expression initially used by the Belgian statisticians describes the co-residential unit 
as a body, a corps, a social organism. This expression already conveys the idea of a 
differentiated and structured whole. In this sense, knowledge about the organization of 
the collective households was a priori knowledge. In the middle of the nineteenth 
century, it was not uncommon among ‘proto-sociologists’ to use metaphors borrowed 
from biology (see Heilbron 1995). In the following section, we will see how the Belgian 
statisticians defined this idea of structure within the corps collectifs. 
9 Remarkably, even hotels and hostels were treated as distinct households in the first 
Belgian censuses; the inn-keepers had to provide the information for all their guests (e.g., 
B 1856: XXXIX; B 1866: XL). At the moment that the focus of the census shifted towards 
the de jure population, the visitors in hotels and hostels had to be assigned to other 
habitual residences (see, e.g., B 1890: CXVIII).  
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‘disciplinary institutions’ may be dealt with in the same way as the ‘typical’ family 
households (see also Foucault 1978: 107; Foucault 2006: 47). Interestingly, 
however, there were also differences in the way in which the meaning of the 
term ‘household’ was extended by the Belgian statisticians. 
Special attention was given to religious communities, such as orders and 
congregations (see Vanderstraeten 2014). But despite the strong tensions 
between state and church in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Belgium, the 
statistical definition of religious communities did not cause many problems. For 
the statisticians, membership of these organizations was clearly regulated. Their 
members lived in splendid isolation behind high brick walls; they had taken 
religious vows (chastity, obedience and poverty) and committed to spending their 
entire life in the religious organization. It was also commonly accepted that all 
members had joined voluntarily, and that the convent constituted their place of 
residence (e.g., B 1880: X). In this light, it seemed obvious to treat these total 
institutions as households – characterized by a joint, shared life (e.g., B 1900: V, 
LXXXIII).  
But more ambiguity existed regarding the ‘status’ of a number of other 
total institutions, such as prisons, barracks, hospitals, sanatoria, madhouses, 
hospices, homes for the elderly, or boarding schools. Census after census, the 
statisticians tried to draw a distinction between institutions that either 
temporarily or permanently sheltered individuals – such as sanatoria and 
hospitals, on the one hand, and residences for the elderly and incurables, on the 
other (e.g., B 1900: LXXXIII; see also B 1910: 2, 28; B 1920: 18-19, 109; B 1930: 6-
7). Time and again, the census-takers were instructed to deal with institutions of 
the first type as temporary, but not as habitual places of residence for their 
inmates. By consequence, the ‘inmates’ were perceived as formally belonging to 
another family household, to which they were believed to return – at the end of 
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their posting, after having served their sentences, after having been treated for 
their illnesses, etc. In the population census, the inmates thus had to be reported 
as being momentarily or temporarily absent from their last residence. Despite the 
fact that they could be assigned for many years (if not for life) to these 
institutions, their habitual place of residence had to be somewhere else. 
According to the instructions, these inmates had to be enumerated ‘back home’ – 
in what was considered to be their habitual place of residence (e.g., B 1900: IV; B 
1910: 27-29; B 1920: 37, 109; B 1930: 27, 158).  
In other words: the census-takers had to reassign these individuals 
administratively to places considered more appropriate. In practice, however, this 
requirement often proved difficult to fulfil. Time and again, exceptions had to be 
granted. In the 1866 census, for example, it was noted that institutions, such as 
prisons and colonies, could be the habitual place of residence for ‘the detained 
and the enclosed who have no parents, no residence, and who do not know 
where to settle after their release’ [des détenus et des reclus qui n’ont ni parents, 
ni habitation, et qui ignorent où ils se fixeront à leur sortie] (B 1866: XLI). As of 
1890, a more general formulation was used to indicate the special circumstances 
that could provide the ground for exceptions: the institution could constitute the 
habitual place of residence for all the inmates who did not belong to any other 
household (B 1890: CXVII; see also B 1900: CXLV; B 1910: 96; B 1920: 109; B 1930: 
7). Only in exceptional cases, the disciplinary institutions could constitute 
households in themselves. Or stated differently: the statisticians remained 
cautious in extending the term ‘household’ to disciplinary contexts. Despite the 
fact that their definition allowed and forced them to apply the term ‘household’ 
to all co-residential groupings, they continued to use other, mostly unarticulated 
criteria to redefine the idea of household and household membership. Their 
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instructions reveal a hidden preference for a social order based upon family 
households. 
 
3.5. A  PLACE OF BELONGING? 
 
Co-residence is the main distinguishing feature of the household. Obviously, 
however, co-residence has a social dimension, too. In this section, we analyse 
whether the household was also regarded as a social and emotional setting that 
embodied a sense of belonging.  
Not coincidentally, the statisticians’ language was often formal. The 
household was said to be ‘formed’ [formé] (B 1846: LI; B 1866: XXXIX; B 1880: XI; 
B 1890: LXX; B 1900: XXIV; B 1910: 3; B 1930: 6), ‘composed’ [composé] (B 1846: 
XXIX; B 1856: LXXXII; B 1890: LXVIII; B 1900: LXXXV; B 1910: 3; B 1920: 10; B 1930: 
29) or ‘constituted’ [constitué] (B 1880: XI; B 1890: IV; B 1900: CXLV; B 1910: 95; B 
1930: 26). The individuals within the household were considered to be its 
constitutive parts (B 1846: L; B 1856: LXXXII; B 1866: LXXXIV; B 1880: X; B 1890: 
LXVIII; B 1900: XCV; B 1910: 2; B 1920: 10; B 1930: 5).  
More ‘coloured’ expressions of belongingness, however, also appeared. In 
1846, for instance, the term ‘membership’ was not yet used in the context of the 
household. While persons were included [comprises] in the household, only the 
family had ‘members’ (e.g., B 1846: LII, LIV). But from 1856 onwards, the 
statisticians also started to speak of household membership (e.g., B 1856: LXXXII; 
B 1866: VIII; B 1880: X; B 1890: LXVIII; B 1900: CLIV; B 1910: 6; B 1920: 29; B 1930: 
10). A similar shift in the use of the term ‘belonging’ [appartenir] took place. 
Initially, this term was reserved for the family and its members (B 1856: LXXII). 
However, its use was extended to the household and household members as of 
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the 1866 census (B 1866: XL; B 1880: XLVIII; B 1890: CXXXIII; B 1900: CXCV; B 
1910: 2; B 1930: 6). As we have already pointed out, the state-istical interest in 
intra-household relations gradually also transcended the level of family or kinship 
relations. From the 1900 census onwards, the statisticians adapted the 
questionnaire items dealing with intra-household relations to include non-family 
or non-kinship relations in the household, too. In other words: for the 
statisticians, the household gradually developed into a social entity sui generis, 
evoking a sense of belonging. Interestingly, this shift not only applied to the 
‘typical’ households. We found similar developments for the collective 
households. They were initially described as corps collectifs, as organized social 
bodies. In the early-twentieth century, the statisticians occasionally also 
underlined the existence of some forms of ‘solidarity’ (as Durkheim would say) 
within all households (e.g., B 1900: XXVI; B 1920: 4).  
From 1866 onwards, the questionnaires had to inform about the nature 
of the bonds between the household members and the head of household – not 
about the bonds of all the household members among each other. Perhaps 
mainly for reasons of statistical calculability, the household members were listed 
primarily as dependents of the head of household; they were registered as, for 
example, ‘the son of the head of household’, ‘the spouse of the head of 
household’, or ‘the mother of the head of household’ (e.g., B 1890: CXX). As we 
mentioned before, the procedures for the registration of family names also 
confirmed and reinforced the central position of the head of household. In the 
statistical representations, the relational network within the household thus was 
expected to revolve around the head of household. In the prototypical case (i.e. 
for the family households), ‘belongingness to the household’ was translated in 
terms of ‘dependence from the male head of household’.  
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At the start of the twentieth century, at the moment that an inventory of 
non-natural bonds was demanded, other forms of depicting the household 
structures could be probed. But the Belgian statisticians remained inclined to 
focus on hierarchical structures. This is perhaps best illustrated by two technical 
‘innovations’, with which they experimented in the first half of the twentieth 
century. In the 1920 census, the Belgian statisticians introduced a special 
individual card for each head of household – in addition to the household sheet. 
This special card was used to gather more detailed information about these heads 
and their households and to separate this information from that of the ‘mass’ of 
other data (B 1920: 3-4). A quite similar special individual card was used in 1930 
in order to acquire more detailed information about all married men and their 
offspring (B 1930: 10-11). Both innovations did not have a lasting effect; these 
special cards did not reappear in the censuses conducted after the Second World 
War (see B 1947: 51-52). But both these innovations make clear that the Belgian 
statisticians continued to depict the household and the family in hierarchical 
terms in the early-twentieth century. Heads of households and married men were 
singled out; the other members of the family or household were regarded and 
classified as dependents.  
As we have already seen, the statisticians also began to reiterate the rule 
that every individual could only be member of one household at a time in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century (e.g., B 1866: XII; B 1900: LXXXII). 
Technically, this rule had to be emphasized in order to guard against over-
enumeration in the de jure population censuses. Remarkably, however, the 
notion of ‘not belonging’ to the household also emerged – as a complement of 
the legalization of household membership and of the conceptualization of the 
household as a place of belonging. Its diverse manifestations have already been 
discussed. From the 1866 census onwards, those present in the household on 
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census day had to be divided into two separate groups: the members of the 
household and the individuals who were regarded as ‘being foreign to the 
household’ [les individus étrangers au ménage] (e.g., B 1866: XL; B 1900: XCIV; B 
1910: 39; B 1930: 30).10 Especially with regard to the residents of collective 
bodies, it then became common practice among the census-takers and 
statisticians to focus on household membership status. In most cases, they had to 
reassign these residents to other family households. As we have seen, the variety 
of instructions and regulations dealing with the population of the ‘total 
institutions’ also incorporate normative expectations underlying the statistical 
notion of solidarity within, or belongingness to the modern household. Not all 
forms of ‘living under the same roof’ were considered to be of equivalent social 
value. The census-takers repeatedly had to distinguish between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ forms of belongingness.  
In the Belgian censuses, individuals have always been registered on 
household sheets – as household members. But the meaning of ‘household’ and 
‘household membership’ shifted substantially in the era between the mid-
nineteenth and mid-twentieth century. The distinctions that were drawn and the 
relations that were depicted in the households also shifted considerably in this 
period. The changing statistical perspectives on belongingness illuminate the 
shifting concerns of the state with its population; they shed light on the premises 
                                                                   
10 All de jure household members had to be registered on the census questionnaires as 
household members, regardless of whether they were present or absent on census day 
(e.g., B 1866: XL; B 1880: X). ‘Foreigners to the household’ could only be registered when 
they were present in the household on census day (e.g., B 1866: XL). They were counted 
as part of the de facto population (e.g., B 1880: IX). 
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on the basis of which the welfare state developed alternatives to kinship and 
household dependence in the era after the Second World War.  
 
3.6. CONCLUSION  
 
Although the history of social science has usually been written with an emphasis 
on social theory, social science was from the beginning also a project of collecting 
and analysing facts or data. Much of this work was performed by state 
administrations. It was also bound up with systematic ‘governmental’ 
interventions. In this perspective, a basic task of social science in general and of 
state-istics in particular was to work out forms of observation and classification 
appropriate to the new, ‘modern’ social conditions (Porter 2012: 299). At present, 
it can also be maintained that statistics has become a way of ‘making up people’ 
(Hacking 1991). It has become a way to understand, interpret and reform social 
reality. 
Our interest in this paper has not been in the observed facts or the data 
as such, but in what interested the official observer, the state-istician. We have 
focused on the administrative tools, which were constructed and reconstructed 
by the statisticians. In particular, we have focused on the variability of the 
concepts and definitions of the household, which have been used in the Belgian 
population censuses, and which constitute in our view traces of the intentions 
and conflicts that presided over the production of these data.  
As our findings show, the mid-nineteenth-century statistical notions of 
the household were still closely linked with early-modern ideas and ideals. The 
household was perceived to be a natural, ‘sovereign’ institution grounded in 
kinship. The articulation of the household in de jure terms, which took place in 
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the latter part of the nineteenth century, reflected and enhanced the trend 
towards a ‘governmentalization’ of this social institution. The state not only 
became entitled to control and regulate membership within this institution; its 
state-istics also contributed to specifying ‘normal’ household structures or 
relationships.  
Of course, statistical definitions of the household had to come to terms 
with changing social realities, with changing forms of co-residence in modern 
society, with new expectations regarding the role of individuals in this co-
residential unit. But the process of defining and redefining the household was 
also one of endorsing particular ideas and ideals about the household. The state-
istical and de jure view on the household also mobilized specific norms or 
evaluative standards. It disciplined and ordered the reality it aimed to measure. 
The observation and classification forms of statistics not only identified the 
cornerstones of society, but also depicted the ‘normal’ household in very specific 
hierarchical terms. They not only focused on the de jure population members, but 
also reinvigorated a view of the social order based on family households and their 
male heads. They not only distinguished between those who belong and those 
who do not, but also articulated specific expectations regarding solidarity within 
the household and the population. As such, statistics thus certainly do not merely 
collect scientific facts about the state of the state. The preceding ‘genealogical’ 
analyses have shown how the population statistics also served to produce and 
reproduce ‘normalized’ individuals and households. L’homme moyen (Quetelet) 
also is a result of the conceptual and administrative organization of statistics. 
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4. POPULATION ,  TERRITORY ,  AND STATE-ISTICS:  
‘HABITUAL RESIDENCE’  IN THE CENSUS 
(BELGIUM ,  1846-1947)1 
 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
In most European languages, the term ‘state’ (état, Staat, estado, etc.) was 
originally used to designate social status or real estate. Only between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries did it become the name of a particular 
type of political organization (see Reinhard, 2001: 14972). Most dictionaries now 
define the ‘modern’ state as a nation-state, as an organized political community 
under one government. Its attributes commonly include: a clearly defined 
territory, a resident population, a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence 
internally, and independence from outside authority (or recognition as a 
sovereign entity within the global system of nation-states). Accordingly, there are 
at present about 200 political communities in the world that are considered as 
constituting nation-states. Alternative types of political organization are even no 
longer considered to be legitimate types (e.g., Tilly 1975; Rueschemeyer, Skocpol 
and Evans 1985; Beaud 1994; Meyer et al. 1997; Reinhard 1999).  
As an emerging or actually existing territorial unit, the modern state has 
been assumed to coincide with the nation as an “imagined community” – to use 
Benedict Anderson’s (2006) well-known phrase. Each territorial state has been 
expected to be able to embrace the social lives of the people contained in it; each 
                                                                   
1 This third case-study is submitted for publication to the European Journal of Sociology / 
Archives Européennes de Sociologie. 
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has claimed the right to monitor the condition, to promote the welfare, and to 
protect the rights of ‘its’ people. With Michel Foucault, we may in this light also 
speak of a new politics of belonging, of the étatisation of membership and 
belonging (Foucault 1984: 302-303; see also Noiriel 1997; Brubaker 2010; Surak 
2012). In the modern world, individuals are conceived as being incorporated into 
the political order as exclusive subjects of a single state. 
One way to illuminate this politics of membership and belonging is to 
study the instruments that states have used to embrace their populations. In this 
paper, we will present a case-study that focuses on one such instrument, viz. 
statistics. In the eighteenth century, statistics was understood and designed as 
state-istics, as a scientific representation of the state, its territory and its 
population for administrative, governmental purposes. In 1797 the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, for example, described statistics as “a word lately introduced to 
express a view or survey of any kingdom, country or parish.” Statistics, however, 
not only provides scientific or ‘objective’ representations of the state of the state; 
it also rationalizes and standardizes its object into administratively convenient 
formats. Its history thus also displays the shifting interests and concerns of the 
state. Analyzing the history of the forms and categories used in state-istics may 
therefore shed light on the politics of membership in modern nation-states. In 
particular, it may clarify some of the “banal” or “invisible” ways in which states 
tend to take care of their populations (see also Billig 1995, 2009).  
To this end, we present here a historical-sociological case-study that 
analyzes the politics of membership in a pre-eminent example of modern 
statistics, viz. the population census. The census is commonly defined as an 
“attempt to count all the people in a country at a given point in time” (Headrick 
2000: 76). In most nation-states, statisticians opt for the household in its habitual 
place of residence as their census’ basic unit of observation. In fact, this starting 
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point has been so often used as to be almost invisible (e.g., Anderson 1988; 
Bracke 2008). By analyzing the implications of this ‘natural’ point of departure, 
and the various ways in which statisticians assigned individuals to habitual 
residences, we may, however, illuminate some basic expectations regarding 
‘legitimate’ forms of membership and belonging. By examining the different ways 
in which statisticians and census-takers organize the population census, we may 
be able to clarify how the coupling between population and territory is 
articulated in modern nation-states (Foucault 2009; see also Jasanoff 2004; 
Carroll 2006; Malesevic 2013).  
Our case-study focuses on the Belgian population census. The first census 
in Belgium was organized in 1846, about a decade and a half after its 
independence, by the statistician Adolphe Quetelet. After 1846, the censuses 
followed at regular, mostly ten-year intervals. Quetelet remained in charge of the 
Belgian censuses conducted in 1856 and 1866, but he was at the same time very 
active and influential at the international level. He created, for example, the 
International Statistical Congress, which first met in Brussels in 1853. The 
meetings of the Congress and its successor, the International Statistical Institute, 
were attended by many high-level ‘state servants’ from countries throughout 
Europe and America.2 The start of its activities not only coincided with what has 
been called the “avalanche of printed numbers” (Hacking 1991). As other 
researchers time and again emphasize, Quetelet’s concern with the development 
                                                                   
2 It might be added that the Belgian state also constituted an influential early example of a 
modern state, whose political construction was widely used as a source of inspiration in 
the revolutionary constitution-making and state-building period of the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Quetelet’s influence on the world of state-istics was also made 
possible by the modern organization of the Belgian state and its influence in the emerging 
global political system (see Hawgood 1964; Desrosières 2008: 41-45). 
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of standardized methods also had considerable impact on the infrastructure of a 
broad range of statistical traditions – both in the nineteenth century and 
afterwards. Indeed, “those who attended [these meetings] pushed their 
governments to adopt a standard template for census making on the Queteletian 
model” (Curtis 2002: 20-21; see also Brian 1989, 2002; Desrosières 2008: 7-59; 
Bracke 2008: 131-167; Randeraad 2011; Prévost and Beaud 2012: 49-62). While 
we do not claim to clarify the state-istical representations of membership and 
belonging, the following case-study may yet have broader relevance.  
Our primary historical sources consist of the official reports, which 
contain a presentation of the census results, as well as a rather technical part that 
reproduces the instructions to the census-takers.3 In order to contextualize these 
historical sources, we have also made use of reports of the International 
Statistical Congress, and of Belgian juridical sources. 
Altogether, our time frame spans about a century. Our focus is on the 
period between the first Belgian population census (1846) and the tenth, which 
was taken shortly after the Second World War (1947). Within this time frame, 
specifications of the notions of habitual residence and resident population have 
not only come to define the state-istical representations of the state; our analyses 
also show how the classification schemes of the Belgian population censuses shed 
light on an underlying politics of membership and belonging within the Belgian 
state.4 In view of the path-dependent character of the development of the state, 
                                                                   
3 We refer to the census reports by the letter B followed by the year the census.  
4 This development also took place at the international level. For the International 
Statistical Institute, the existence of an intimate relationship between the resident 
population and social and economic conditions became an explicit point of departure in 
the 1930s. “C’est donc la population résidante qui donne l’image fidèle des conditions 
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it should not come as a surprise that these classifications have remained 
influential in the postwar period, in which the ‘welfare state’ has more actively 
taken responsibility for its population. It may moreover be added that the state is 
well equipped to insist on treating individuals according to its proper 
classifications and designations. It is able to use and impose its own instruments 
in order to distinguish between individuals who belong and individuals who do 
not, to acquire from its population the resources it needs to survive, to exclude 
from among the beneficiaries of state largess those parts of the population 
deemed ineligible for benefits, and so on (Scott 1998: 82-83).  
In the following section, we trace the articulation of the basic principles 
used to determine habitual place of residence in the Belgian population censuses. 
Afterwards, we analyze how these general principles were specified for different 
population categories, such as military personnel, institutional inmates, or people 
without ‘appropriate’ habitual residence. In the concluding part of this paper, we 
briefly summarize how our findings shed light on the articulation of the coupling 
between population and territory in the modern nation-state.  
 
4.2. PRINCIPLES  
 
In the late eighteenth century, the notion of ‘habitual residence’ was already used 
in legal texts and contexts. The notion of habitual residence carried less legal 
implications than that of legal domicile, but it clearly implied more than ‘simple 
residence.’ It referred to the formation of particular habits, to the development of 
                                                                   
démographiques existantes, c’est elle aussi qui décide de la structure sociale et 
économique du territoire donné” (BIIS 1934: 161). 
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a moral attachment to a place, to the establishment of a home. It also comprised 
the idea that each individual could only be morally attached to one territorial unit 
or place of residence (e.g., Proudhon 1798: 95-96; Sirey 1808: 453-454; Sirey 
1809: 7). In this sense, it appeared, for example, in legislation on the territorial 
jurisdiction of courts. Courts were given jurisdiction over persons who habitually 
resided within the bounds of their geographical territory. In the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, the idea that a habitual residence ought to be established over 
a ‘reasonably significant’ or ‘considerably long’ period of time would remain an 
important element within all legal and administrative definitions of this concept. 
Once the statisticians had taken hold of this notion, however, they also had to 
specify what, according to a state-istical view, could and could not constitute a 
habitual place of residence. In order to reconstruct these decision-making 
premises or rationales, we hereafter pay particular attention to three cognate 
concepts that were related to, but also distinguished from that of habitual 
residence in the Belgian state-istics: temporary residence, legal domicile, and 
household membership.  
 
4.2.1.  HABI TUAL RESI DE NCE VS .  TEMPORARY RESIDENCE  
 
Although the census is mostly defined as an attempt to count all the people in a 
country at a given point in time, statisticians often also distinguish between two 
definitions of the total population. This population may comprise either all 
persons physically present in the country or all habitual residents of the country 
at the time of the census. The total of all persons present is referred to as the de 
facto population and the total of habitual or usual residents as the de jure 
population. The Belgian statisticians have traditionally aimed at including both de 
facto and de jure enumerations, although an increasing emphasis on the de jure 
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principle emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century (see also 
Thorvaldsen 2006: 84-85). In the process, the meaning and relevance of the 
distinction between temporary and habitual residence shifted, too.  
Quetelet’s official aim in 1846 was to count and classify the de facto 
population. But the census-takers also had to distinguish between three types of 
residence at the level of the municipality as the primary territorial unit within the 
nation-state: habitual, temporary and de passage (B 1846: L-LII).5 Family 
households were expected to be present in their habitual residence; hotels or 
dwellings, where people stayed for less than one month, were considered as 
constituting résidences de passage; institutions that sheltered people for more 
than one month, such as prisons, military barracks or boarding schools, were 
called temporary residences. Two census forms were used: one for the family 
households and one for the corps collectifs in momentary or temporary places of 
residence. For Quetelet, the distinction between these types also allowed for 
distinguishing between the resident population and the so-called “floating 
population” [la population flottante et mobile]. In the 1846 census, all persons 
physically present in what was counted as habitual residences on Belgian territory 
were also counted as habitual residents, while all persons in temporary 
residences and résidences de passage were seen as temporary movers, i.e. 
individuals habitually residing in or belonging to another municipality (and 
perhaps another nation-state).  
                                                                   
5 Attempts were also made to count individuals who were temporarily absent from their 
habitual place of residence; both the heads of household and the census-takers were 
asked to include information on absentees on the household schedules. But the 
statisticians did not yet put forward guidelines or instructions in order to distinguish 
between the individuals staying in temporary places of residence and those temporarily 
absent from their habitual place of residence.  
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In 1856, Quetelet made a more explicit attempt to identify, enumerate 
and classify the de jure population. While the different census forms for family 
households and corps collectifs remained in use, the structure of these forms 
changed in important respects. In the 1856 census, information not only had to 
be provided about all people physically present in the household. On the one 
hand, the household schedules now included a field in which information about 
the habitual residence of temporary visitors had to be listed (B 1856: XXXVIII-
XXXIX, XLI-XLII). On the other hand, the head of household was also explicitly 
required to provide information about household members who were 
temporarily absent at the moment the census was taken. The 1856 census thus 
explicitly included and counted absentees, at least if they were expected to 
return to the household and their habitual place of residence (B 1856: XLVIII, LVI, 
LXXII). In comparison with the first population census, the territorial focus thus 
also shifted from counting people in different types of residence to determining 
temporary absence from their habitual place of residence.  
The following censuses built upon and elaborated the 1856 model. The 
distinction between temporary and habitual residence became a starting point for 
the Belgian state-isticians. On the 1866 census forms for family and collective 
households, a field was added to provide information about the actual presence 
[séjour réel] and the habitual place of residence [résidence habituelle] of all 
individuals in/of the household on census day. These individuals also had to be 
divided into two separate groups: those who belonged to the household, whether 
present or temporarily absent on census day, in the upper part, and those who 
were present in the household but did not regularly belong to it, in the bottom 
part. Against this background, the instructions to the census-takers time and 
again reiterated the point that each individual could only be member of one 
household at any given time (B 1866: VII-VIII, XI-XII, XXXVI, XLII). The census-
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takers were also urged to make the ‘appropriate’ decision after having visited the 
dwellings. 
In 1880, this template did not change.6 However, special cards were 
introduced for individuals who were considered to be but temporary visitors on 
census day. While the head of household still had to complete the census 
questionnaire for the temporarily absent members of the household, these 
special cards were used to collect the same information from the temporary 
movers themselves. Both the horizontally split household schedule and the 
special individual cards proved to be stable statistical innovations (e.g., B 1880: IX; 
B 1900: LXXXII; B 1920: 18-21; B 1930: 4; B 1947: 108-113; B 1961: 49-51). They 
had to provide a better picture of what the statisticians did not stop calling “the 
facts.” They had to ensure that the groups of habitual and temporary members 
were always clearly distinguishable from one another; they also had to eliminate 
the double-counting of persons who were enumerated both at their permanent 
residence and at the residence they were visiting on census day. The introduction 
of these technical ‘improvements’ also reflected and legitimated the statisticians’ 
focus on the de jure population of their state. They also showed how the state 
started to specify and impose its proper membership criteria. For example, 
already in the census of 1866, the last one organized and directed by Quetelet, 
only the individuals who resided habitually in the municipality were counted and 
depicted as its “real habitants” [les véritables habitants de la commune, ceux qui y 
résident habituellement] (B 1866: XLIV-XLV).  
                                                                   
6 Following a recommendation made during the 8th session of the International Statistical 
Congress in 1872, the Belgian statistical authorities started to conduct censuses in years 
ending on a 0. Therefore, the fourth Belgian census, which was originally scheduled for 
1876, ended up taking place in 1880 (see also Quetelet 1873: 121). 
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The underlying distinctions remained of relevance in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century censuses – as the Belgian statisticians built upon and 
elaborated the “Queteletian model.” But how could they distinguish between 
actual presence and regular residence? What constituted for them habitual 
residence, when physical presence as such could not be regarded as decisive? 
How did they separate the real habitants from the others? What kind of problems 
emerged when these definitions were applied? In the next sections, we will look 
in more detail at the interactions between this statistical view and both legal and 
common-sense representations of society.  
 
4.2.2.  HABI TUAL RESI DE NCE VS .  LE GAL DOMICI LE  
 
Despite their emphasis on the de jure population, the Belgian statisticians had 
reason to rely on the concept of habitual residence instead of that of legal 
domicile. For Quetelet, departing from legal domicile would lead to a fictive or 
false rather than a factual image of the population, while the census-takers would 
never be able to immediately verify people’s declarations about their legal 
domicile.7 In all of the Belgian censuses, the census-takers have in fact been 
instructed to register people’s habitual residence and not their legal domicile 
(e.g., B 1856: LXXII; B 1880: CVI, CVIII; B 1900: LXXXIX; B 1930: 27; B 1947: 50). 
Examples of differences between habitual residence and legal domicile have also 
                                                                   
7 It may be added that the results of the first population census were used to construct a 
permanent register of population at the communal level within Belgium. This register was 
to be regularly updated. Legal residents have since 1847 been required to report to their 
local administration all changes of domicile, both moves from one household to another 
and moves from one municipality to another (see Bracke 2008: 286-289).  
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been amply provided. Under the Belgian law, the partners in a married couple are 
deemed to have the same legal domicile. Non-emancipated minors also have to 
share their legal domicile with their parents or guardians. But, according to the 
census instructions, the habitual residence of married women who lived 
separated from their husbands and that of non-emancipated minors who lived 
apart from their parents or guardians was the place of residence where they were 
regularly living, and not their legal domicile. Following its own self-description, 
the main aim of the census was to provide accurate information about the real 
situation in the country at the moment the census was taken (e.g., B 1846: XL; B 
1900: XC; B 1947: 64). In 1890, the legal domicile was even qualified as “strange 
to the census” (B 1890: CXXXV). 
In this sense, the Belgian statisticians did not use the de jure/de facto 
distinction in a strict, judicial sense. It was, for example, not used to distinguish 
couples who are legally married from those who are just cohabiting de facto. The 
de jure population of a particular, administratively relevant territory was defined 
as the total of all persons ‘habitually’ living within the bounds of this territory. 
This focus may be seen to reflect and underpin the rise of “rational-legal 
authority” within the modern state (see Weber 1978). Legal authority is needed 
to define and identify the de jure population, but the Belgian state-isticians also 
insisted on the difference between legal domicile and habitual residence to 
provide evidence of their orientation towards “the facts.”8 
However, legal definitions of the situation continued to play a role in the 
world of the Belgian statisticians. From 1866 onwards, the census-takers were 
                                                                   
8 Alternatively, it is common in legal discussions to describe the habitual residence as a 
situation of fact. The habitual residence is “a factual notion and needs no connection with 
any given law system” (De Winter 1969: 428). 
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instructed to use the legal domicile to classify individuals who, according to the 
state-istical criteria, only disposed of a temporary but not of a habitual 
residence.9 Moreover, the statisticians also incorporated elements of the idea of 
legal domicile into their notion of habitual residence. While the notion of habitual 
residence primarily puts stress on past experience (the fact that a residence had 
been established and maintained for a ‘reasonably significant’ period of time), the 
notion of legal domicile includes some future intention. To establish a legal 
domicile within a particular jurisdictional territory, a clear factual base must be 
accompanied by an animus semper manendi, i.e. an intention to reside there 
“indefinitely” (e.g., De Winter 1969; Krebs 2011). As we will see in more detail in 
our analyses of specific cases in the second half of this paper, the intention to 
establish a residence somewhere for an indefinite period of time already played a 
role in discussions about the habitual residence of parts of the population in the 
1866 census (B 1866: LXXV, LXXXIII-LXXXIV). From the 1900 census onwards, the 
animus was more generally employed as a criterion for defining people’s habitual 
place of residence. A temporary residence was defined as a place where people 
temporarily stayed without having the intention to establish at this place their 
new home (B 1900: CXLIV; B 1910: 95; B 1920: 8; B 1930: 5, 27; B 1947: 50). As we 
will see, however, the statisticians were more willing to invoke residential 
intentions for particular parts of the population than for others. 
 
                                                                   
9 In addition, for individuals with more than one habitual residence, the statisticians 
argued that the legal domicile had to be recorded as the habitual residence (see B 1866: 
LXXXVII; B 1890: CXVII). From the 1900 census onwards, the term ‘domicile’ was replaced 
in this context by ‘principal residence’ or ‘principal home’ (see B 1900: CXLVI; B 1910: 3; B 
1930: 7, 27; B 1947: 50). People who had neither habitual residence nor domicile had to 
be counted as members of the de facto population (see B 1890: CLXXVIII). 
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4.2.3.  HABI TUAL RESI DE NCE VS .  HOUSE HOLD ME MBE RSHI P  
 
Since 1846, the Belgian statisticians have reduced the diversity of social, co-
residential units to two basic forms or types. They worked with two types of 
census forms: one for family households and one for collective bodies or 
collective households, such as workhouses, prisons, asylums, sanatoria, 
madhouses, hospitals, barracks, orphanages, boarding schools, hotels, hostels, 
floating vessels, and so on. While the census questionnaires were almost identical 
for both types, important differences were imputed at the level of their territorial 
or residential commitments.  
In the Belgian censuses, the family household was redefined primarily in 
terms of its place of residence. All individuals habitually living together were 
assumed to be members of the same household. Inversely, the household was 
understood to consist of all the individuals who habitually lived under the same 
roof (e.g., B 1846: LI; B 1866: XXXIX; B 1880: X; B 1890: LXX; B 1900: CXLV; B 1910: 
2, 28; B 1930: 5; B 1947: 50). The statisticians’ main emphasis was thus on 
residential commitments, not on kinship relations. Not the family members of the 
household head, but the habitual residents in the same household had to be 
included as “real habitants.”10 Against this definitional background, the household 
head was instructed to provide information on all temporary movers (visitors and 
                                                                   
10 On this basis, the statisticians also developed a strong interest in relations within the 
household. From the 1866 census onwards, they started to inquire into the degree of 
parenthood between the head of household and the other household members (B 1866: 
XLI, LXXXV; see also B 1880: XLVIII-XLIX; B 1890: LXXXII-LXXXIII, CXX). From 1900 onwards, 
household members without kinship relation with the head of household also had to 
provide more detailed information about their “position” or “situation” in the household 
(B 1900: CLIV; B 1910: 2-3, 103; B 1920: 10; B 1930: 6; B 1947: 104; B 1961: 43). 
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absentees). Against this background, it was also repeatedly stipulated that the 
habitual residence of live-in servants or workers had to coincide with the habitual 
residence of their maître ou patron. Even if these servants and workers were 
married and did have their own family, they could not have their own household. 
All of them were considered to belong to the household of their master (e.g., B 
1856: XXXVIII, LXXXII; B 1866: VIII, LXXXII; B 1890: CXXXI; B 1900: CXLIII; B 1910: 
48; B 1920: 10; B 1930: 6; B 1947: 50). The definitions specified and imposed by 
the statisticians thus also ‘bracketed’ other potentially relevant distinctions. In 
their perspective, the family household was defined as a territorial, not as a 
natural unit. 
The emphasis was quite different in the case of the corps collectifs. In 
1846, all individuals present in collective bodies were counted as part of the 
floating, non-resident population. In the following censuses, when the focus was 
more explicitly on the de jure population, the statisticians remained hesitant to 
treat a corps collectif as a relevant residential unit. The census-takers were mostly 
instructed to treat these people as temporary movers. They had to be entered as 
but temporarily present in the collective household on census day and as 
temporarily absent from their habitual place of residence. They could not 
habitually stay at the place they were physically present on census day (e.g., B 
1866: XLI, LXXXII; B 1890: CXXXIII; B 1900: V; B 1910: 28; B 1930: 7; B 1947: 51). It 
proved, however, difficult to treat all (individuals in) collective bodies uniformly. It 
often also proved difficult to determine the place where these individuals 
habitually belonged – in the case of foster children in orphanages, paupers in 
workhouses, vagrants in colonies, aliénés and lunatics in madhouses, elderly in 
nursing homes, prisoners in penitentiary institutions, monks and nuns in 
convents, conscripted soldiers in barracks, and so on. People living in so-called 
“ambulant” dwellings, such as living wagons, ships or boats, also created 
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problems for statisticians, whose classifications are based on their residential 
categories. In the following part of this paper, we will look in more detail at some 
of these issues in order to further clarify the coupling between population, 
territory, and belonging in modern state-istical discourse.  
In sum: the Belgian statisticians built upon the idea that there is only one 
habitual residence where the individual usually resides and routinely returns to 
after visiting other places. This habitual place of residence had to be a “matter of 
fact” (see also Latour, 2004). It had to be a habitation réelle et effective. Although 
there was no consensus on the length of time a person should have a place of 
residence for it to become habitual, the statisticians first of all distinguished 
between habitual residence and temporary residence/presence. Although there 
was no consensus on the strength of intention (animus semper manendi) that 
would have to be shown to establish ‘habit’, the statisticians also tried to come to 
terms with shifting forms of legal authority and shifting common-sense 
representations of residence or co-residence. In order to identify and count the 
habitual population, however, their means of observation and description 
intervened in the social and territorial order they tried to depict. As we will see, 
the recurring problems and difficulties, and the diversity and variability of the 
solutions imagined to overcome them, are also indications of how ‘the facts’ 
themselves resisted the territorial containment of populations by the modern 
nation-state.  
 
4.3. SPECIFICATIONS  
 
The specification of the rules for determining people’s habitual place of residence 
did not solve the ‘practical’ problems and difficulties with which census-takers 
 116 
 
were confronted. In response to these problems and difficulties, the statisticians 
repeatedly put forward more detailed instructions with regard to specific 
population groups. Hereafter, we will look at the shifting rationales behind the 
instructions for particular parts of the population, such as the members of the 
military, the inmates of other total institutions, and the individuals without 
habitual residence or legal domicile. As we will see, these different population 
parts could not only be treated differently at the same point of time. The 
territorial commitments could also be specified differently for each group at 
different points in time. In our approach, this variability ceases to be a mere 
obstacle to using the “printed numbers” in historical and sociological research. At 
the level of specific population groups, too, the rationales behind the 
instructions/constructions of the statisticians are probably as historically and 
sociologically relevant as the many comparative and longitudinal data series 
which build upon the “printed numbers” of the population censuses and other 
statistics.  
 
4.3.1.  M I LI TARY PE RSONNE L  
 
Census after census, much attention was paid to the classification of the 
members of the Belgian Army. This should not come as a surprise, as recruitment 
into the armed forces was organized and controlled by the state itself. In the 
decades after independence, the main basis for recruitment into the troops was 
one of selective conscription. A system of drawing lots was used to select the 
annual intake of conscripts, but exemptions could be purchased by arranging 
substitutes. Shortly before the First World War, this system was abolished and 
compulsory and universal military service for young men established (Warnier 
and De Vos 2010). But while conscription lasted for a period of three years for 
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most of the nineteenth and early-twentieth century, many changes took place in 
the ways in which the Belgian statisticians and census-takers assigned the 
conscripts and other military personnel in their barracks to ‘appropriate’ habitual 
places of residence. 
In the 1846 census, all members of the military were counted as being 
temporarily present at the place they were on census day (B 1846: L). In the next 
census, it was specified that conscripted soldiers resided habitually at the place 
they were living before they had joined the army or at the place where their 
family was living on census day. For the census-takers, their habitual place of 
residence could not be the military garrison where they were stationed at the 
moment the census was taken. For the officers, too, the habitual residence 
coincided with the place of residence of their family household. If officers were 
living with their family in a residence provided for by the army, this residence had 
to be regarded as their habitual place of residence (B 1856: LXXII).  
In the 1866 and 1880 census, the statisticians explicitly distinguished 
between two categories, viz. the conscripted recruits, on the one hand, and the 
volunteers and substitutes [les remplaçants or les substituants], on the other. For 
the regular residence of conscripted soldiers, the census-takers again had to list 
the habitual place of residence of their family household. The regular residence of 
volunteers and substitutes who belonged to a household to which they were 
planning to return also had to coincide with their household’s habitual place of 
residence. But for the volunteers and substitutes who had given up their home or 
who were not planning to return to it, the regular residence had to be the place 
where they were stationed on census day (B 1866: XL; B 1880: X, XI). The 
statisticians thus invoked the aforementioned animus principle here – at least for 
the volunteers and substitutes, not for the conscripts. The conscripts were not 
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expected to have their own residential intentions; they were expected to return 
to their household of origin.  
Interestingly, sharp objections to this practice were raised in 1890. It was 
established that the members of the military no longer lived in their household of 
origin; their habitual residence had to be in the military barracks where they were 
habitually quartered (B 1890: IV, LXX, CXVII). It was added that counting soldiers 
and officers as residents of the place where they came from could easily lead to 
false or fictive numbers, as these people were in reality living where they were 
stationed. A more practical argument was added, too. If the members of the 
military were not defined as temporary movers, the information would not have 
to be gathered in two ways: via the forms for their original households (to be 
completed by the heads of household for the temporary absent household 
members) and via the special individual cards for the members of the collective 
households. Both extra work and extra problems (caused by differences between 
the individual cards and the household schedules) could thus be avoided (B 1890: 
CXVII, CXLI).  
However, the rules for determining the habitual residence of military 
personnel were changed once again in the 1900 census. Practical concerns were 
no longer expressed. Instead, the statisticians returned to the distinction between 
conscripted recruits, volunteers and substitutes. For the conscripted soldiers, the 
habitual residence had to coincide with the place of residence of their household; 
exceptions were granted only for conscripted soldiers who did not belong to any 
family household (B 1900: XCV). But the habitual residence of the volunteers and 
substitutes was the place of residence assigned to them by the Belgian Army (B 
1900: XC). To legitimate this difference, the statisticians now recurred to the 
distinction between obeying the law [obéir à la loi] and practicing a freely chosen 
profession [une profession volontairement choisie] (B 1900: XC). Following this 
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line of reasoning, the conscripted soldiers did not actually leave their family. They 
had only temporarily ‘interrupted’ their career to obey the law; they were 
expected to return to their family after they had fulfilled their legal duties. The 
volunteers and substitutes, however, were presumed to have established a new 
habitual place of residence as a consequence of their free choice.11 They were 
expected to belong to the ‘neighborhood’ where their own career choices had 
brought them (B 1900: IV; see also B 1910: 3; B 1930: 6).12  
In the case of the military personnel, classificatory changes thus did not 
only take place in the course of time; despite the fact that the members of the 
military often lived under the same circumstances, different kinds of territorial 
attachment were also presumed to exist for different membership categories at 
the same moment in time. Moreover, the history of the presumed territorial 
commitments of the members of the military also demonstrates that the 
                                                                   
11 “Ils ont embrassé la carrière des armes comme ils auraient exercé tout autre métier. Il 
est logique de reconnaître qu’ils ont, par suite de leur engagement volontaire, acquis une 
nouvelle résidence en dehors du ménage et qu’ils doivent appartenir à la population de 
droit de la commune où l’exercice de leur métier les appelle à résider” (B 1900: XC; see 
also B 1900: IV; B 1910: 3; B 1930: 6). In the 1920 census, which took place shortly after 
the First World War, the habitual residence of soldiers, who served in the army of 
occupation in the Rhineland and who had not preserved a home in Belgium, was in their 
municipality of origin (B 1920: 7). 
12 At that time, it was frequently contended that the possibility of purchasing exemptions 
by obtaining substitutes (cf. supra) put the burden of the conscription system on the poor 
(see Warnier and De Vos 2010). Remarkably, however, the statisticians defined the time 
spent by substitutes in military service as a voluntary choice. As a result of this distinction 
between conscripts and volunteers, members of the same household who served under 
different ‘regimes’ in the Belgian Army could also be reassigned to different habitual 
places of residence. 
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statisticians themselves had difficulty coming to terms with the implications of 
the classifications they used. Statistics is often presented as an objective or 
natural way of describing the nation-state, but the many hesitations of the 
statistical authorities themselves in the case of these state servants already 
abundantly demonstrate that there is nothing natural or uncontestable about it. 
  
4.3.2.  INSTI TUTI ONAL INMATES  
 
The statisticians encountered different kinds of problems and difficulties in the 
case of institutional inmates. As mentioned before, they remained hesitant to 
enter collective households as the habitual place of residence of its ‘members’ 
(e.g., B 1856: LXXII; B 1866: XLI; B 1880: XLIII-XLIV, CIX; B 1890: CXXXIV; B 1900: 
LXXXIX-XC). The individuals had to be registered as only temporarily present in 
the corps collectif at the moment the census was taken – and thus as temporarily 
absent from their habitual place of residence. They were expected to return 
‘home’ as soon as they no longer had a reason to be part of these collective 
households. On various grounds, the statisticians could thus administratively 
reassign these individuals to places considered more appropriate. In the course of 
time, however, a number of exceptions were also granted.  
In general terms, the Belgian statisticians tried to distinguish between 
collective households that either permanently or temporarily sheltered 
individuals. For collective households that were considered to constitute places of 
residence only temporarily, no exceptions were allowed. For the statisticians, it 
would, for example, be “illogical” to treat a hospital as a habitual place of 
residence, because hospitalization was “by nature” but a temporary event. 
Hospital stays had to be compared with hotel stays (B 1900: V, LXXXIV, XCI; see 
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also B 1910: 3, 36; B 1930: 7; B 1947: 50). For “temporarily” hospitalized 
individuals who no longer possessed a home, their last residence or their 
municipality of origin had to be entered as their regular place of residence. 
In contrast, the 1866 census accepted that the elderly and incurables who 
received shelter in hospices could be habitually residing in these institutions. 
Prisoners could also enter their total institution as their habitual place of 
residence, at least if they did not have a family or a habitual residence, and if they 
did not know where to go to after their release (B 1866: XLI, LXXXII). In 1880, 
much attention was devoted to the introduction of the special cards for the 
temporary movers, but the instructions to the census-takers did not mention 
grounds for possible exceptions. All individuals in collective households were 
expected to be but temporarily present at the place they were on census day 
(e.g., B 1880: XLIII-XLIV, CIX). In the following censuses, some grounds for 
exceptions were again stated. Next to the elderly and the prison inmates, 
exceptions could then also be granted for the mentally ill in asylums or nursing 
homes, the children placed in foster homes, and the students living in boarding 
schools. But these exceptions were, again, only possible when these individuals 
did not belong to a family household from which they were just temporarily 
separated (e.g., B 1890: LXX, CXXXIII; B 1900: LXXXIII; B 1910: 28; B 1947: 50, 99).  
Of course, the growing number and diversity of “total institutions” 
(Goffman) may be seen as reflecting the growing range of interventions of the 
state in the state. Interestingly, different principles were also called upon to 
legitimate and explain the interventions made. The statisticians compared the 
elderly and incurables in hospices and the children in foster homes or orphanages 
with the military volunteers. They argued that all these individuals had 
established a new home that replaced their former one. It was therefore 
legitimate to consider the place they were living as their regular or habitual 
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residence (B 1900: XC, CXLV; B 1910: 28, 36; B 1947: 84). A slightly different line 
of argument was developed for students in boarding schools, mentally ill in 
nursing homes, and prison inmates. These population categories were compared 
with the military conscripts. Following the statisticians, all of these individuals 
could be expected to reside but temporarily in these institutions – either on the 
basis of their own will or of the will of those who had authority over them, or in 
order to obey the law [soit par suite d’un déplacement dépendant de leur volonté 
propre ou de la volonté de ceux qui ont autorité sur elles, soit pour obéir à la loi] 
(B 1900: XC). But exceptions could be granted out of sheer necessity, viz. by la 
force des choses (e.g., B 1900: XCI, CXXXVIII; B 1910: 36).13  
A very different approach, finally, was developed for the members of 
religious communities, especially Roman-Catholic monasteries and cloisters. 
However, a number of changes also took place for this part of the population. In 
1846, the members of religious communities were only counted as part of the 
floating, non-resident population, despite the fact that monastics promise to 
spend their entire life in one particular monastery and to remain tied to one place 
                                                                   
13 As of 1900, as mentioned before, conscripted soldiers who had no family household 
could also be registered as habitually residing in their military barracks (see B 1900: XCV). 
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(stabilitas loci).14 The census report only refers to difficulties that census-takers 
encountered when trying to include monks and nuns who had ‘withdrawn’ from 
the world in the population census. As the members of religious communities 
were – in their own terms – in this world but not of it, many of them also 
objected to being included in worldly systems of surveillance, such as the census. 
But while some concerns about the accuracy of the presented data are implicitly 
expressed, it is at the same time explicitly stated that all people on the territory 
were to be included in the population census – if only as members of the 
country’s floating population (B 1846: LXVI).  
In 1856, the census-takers still remained somewhat prudent with regard 
to the enumeration of the members of monasteries and cloisters. They left it to 
the members of the religious communities themselves to specify their own 
habitual place of residence [le lieu de la residence habituelle tel qu'il a été déclaré 
dans le bulletin] (B 1856: LXXIX). The census report includes no further details or 
instructions. Starting in 1866, it then was more directly stipulated that the de jure 
residence of these individuals was in the monastery or cloister to which they 
habitually belonged. If some of them were not present in their community on 
census day, their absence had to be recorded on the enumeration sheet (e.g., B 
                                                                   
14 In Roman-Catholic Canon Law, a distinction is made between contemplative orders and 
active orders or congregations. In Europe, most active congregations emerged in the 
nineteenth century as part of the religious reaction to the perceived secularization of 
society. Its members were mainly active in the fields of education and health care. The 
active congregations did not require stabilitas loci from their members. They were indeed 
often defined as a kind of sacred militia, whose members could be put to use in a wide 
variety of settings under a wide variety of circumstances. But the Belgian census-takers 
did not distinguish between both forms of religious devotion. In fact, they often seemed 
ignorant of the difference (Tihon 1976; Vanderstraeten 2014).  
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1866: LXX; B 1880: X, CXXXV; B 1890: LXX, CXVII, CXXXIII). Following the 
statisticians, they applied in this case the same rule as for other voluntary 
workers (B 1880: X; B 1900: XXIV; B 1910: 3, 28; B 1930: 6-7; B 1947: 50). In the 
1890 census, it was added that the monastery or cloister was likely to be the 
“final destination” of its members. Implicitly invoking the stabilitas loci vow, it 
was added that they were likely to live at this place until the end of their lives [il y 
a lieu de croire qu'ils y termineront leur existence] (B 1890: CXVII). Again, a variety 
of choices and rationales can thus be reconstructed during the time period under 
study for a relatively well defined and easily identifiable part of the population. 
As we have seen, the statisticians gradually built their classifications upon 
individualist notions such as intention or free choice. They also referred to legal 
obligations or decisions that emerged out of “sheer necessity.” But they never 
directly inquired into the motives of individual residential choices. They made use 
of these notions in order to legitimate and justify some of their own choices and 
interventions. Convergences or divergences between the descriptions of the 
statisticians, on the one hand, and those of the population groups themselves, on 
the other, also inform about official representations of the social status of these 
groups. Only few collective households were routinely perceived as voluntary 
associations whose members were habitually attached to the territorial units 
where they gathered (see Weber 1946: 452; Weber 1978: 37). ‘Agency’ was not 
attributed to the members of all groups; ‘fine distinctions’ continued to play an 
important a priori role in the classifications.  
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4.3.3.  INDIVIDUALS WI THOUT (HABI TUAL)  RESIDENCE  
 
Despite their emphasis on counting all the people in the country, preferably at 
their habitual place of residence, the statisticians also decided to depart from 
their own doctrines – and either exclude particular residences and particular parts 
of the population from the census, or deliberately blur the boundaries between 
habitual and temporary places of residence.  
Shifts in the ways in which foreign diplomats were enumerated or not 
enumerated in the census provide a good illustration of the shifting concerns of 
the Belgian statisticians and its underlying rationales. No special instructions for 
counting foreign diplomats were put forward in the first population censuses. 
From 1866 onwards, however, it was stipulated that foreign diplomats could not 
be included, as it was not possible to consider them to be part of either the de 
jure or the de facto population (B 1866: X; see also B 1880: CVIII; B 1890: LXXI; B 
1910: 33; B 1930: 5, 27). As they represented other nations, they could be neither 
habitually nor temporarily residing in Belgium. Although they could doubtless be 
physically present in the country on census day, they could thus neither be 
included in the de jure nor in the de facto population count. The distinction here 
thus did not follow from the facts; it preceded the observation of these facts.  
Other, somewhat similar administrative interventions occurred for people 
living in the “ambulant” dwellings. Although it was explicitly stated in 1866 that 
living wagons, floating vessels and other ambulant dwellings could be treated as 
habitual residences, this practice changed around the end of the nineteenth 
century (B 1866: XLV). From the 1890 census onwards, an ambulant dwelling 
could no longer serve as regular place of residence (B 1890: LXX; B 1900: V, 
LXXXIII, LXXXV; B 1910: 3; B 1930: 10; B 1947: 52). On the census form for 
collective households, its inhabitants had to be recorded as being temporarily 
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absent from their former habitual place of residence. In the absence of a former 
habitual place of residence, their domicile of origin had to be registered as if it 
was their habitual place or residence, regardless of whether they were in reality 
living there with the other members of the household [elles y ont réellement ou 
fictivement leur ménage] (see, e.g., B 1900, LXXXIII; B 1910: 3; B 1930: 8). It was 
also stipulated that these individuals were counted as members of the de jure 
population of the municipality in which they had their domicile. Individuals who 
had neither habitual residence nor legal domicile had to be counted as members 
of the de facto population (B 1890: CLXXVIII). The argument was that these 
dwellings were not “fixed on the ground” [fixées au sol]. It was added that these 
individuals could not be counted as part of the de jure population of a 
municipality when they only temporarily resided within that municipality (B 1890: 
CXVIII; B 1900: CXLV-CXLVI; B 1910: 36). For the statisticians, this decision 
“necessarily” had to be made. It resulted from la force des choses (B 1900: 
CXXXVIII; B 1910: 89).  
Related to this, it was specified that non-residential buildings, which were 
fixed on the ground, could not serve as habitual places of residence because 
individuals were not allowed to live there. For the 1900 census, the examples 
provided in the census report included administrative buildings, post or telegraph 
offices, churches, museums, factories, mills, ateliers, railway stations, and so on. 
Exceptions were possible if parts of these buildings were designed and 
constructed for dwelling purposes, as for janitors or wardens, but only on 
condition that these inhabitants had no other habitual place of residence (e.g., B 
1900: CXLII; B 1947: 69).  
In the opposite direction, in the 1920 census it was added that the 
provisory constructions in which victims of the First World War were living could 
be considered habitual places of residence. Even if these victims no longer had a 
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home, they had to be attributed a habitual place of residence. Two options were 
presented. If the victims intended to return to the municipality in which they had 
originally been living, they had to be counted as residents of their place of origin; 
if the victims had other intentions or were still uncertain about where to settle, 
they had to be attributed to the municipality in which they were temporarily 
residing on census day (B 1920: 8). In the 1947 census, related but also somewhat 
different rules were created for those victims of the Second World War who had 
had to abandon their home and had not yet found another one. It was stated that 
the habitual residence of these individuals was the place where their home used 
to be located. In addition, all individuals who had had to leave the country during 
the war (prisoners of war, political prisoners, deported individuals, forced 
laborers) and who had not yet returned on census day were counted as de jure 
residents – at least if they had kept a home in Belgium or intended to return to 
Belgium, and when their absence was not caused by a conviction (B 1947: 51-52).  
 
4.4. CONCLUSION  
 
We have thus far analyzed the articulation of the notion of habitual residence in 
the Belgian population censuses. Following the (Belgian) statisticians, this habitual 
residence is the place where the individual usually resides and routinely returns 
to after visiting other places. In order to allow for a scientific, objective 
description of the state of the state, it needs to be a “matter of fact.” Our 
analyses have focused on both the elaboration of the basic principles for 
determining such territorial commitments and the specifications for particular 
population groups. We have not only pointed to the variability of the conventions 
used to determine this “matter of fact.” We have also drawn attention to the 
increase of detailed instructions for assigning habitual residences to a broad 
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range of distinct population groups in the course of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth century. Seen from this historical-sociological perspective, the history 
of state-istics sheds light on the politics of membership and belonging in the 
Belgian state. 
Even if some of the specifications we reconstructed may appear quite 
odd, none is arbitrary or insignificant, since the range of options available is 
determined by the basic premises and properties of the statistical classification 
system. In part, this is a consequence of the path-dependent structure of the 
censuses: the range of options is at each moment limited by the interventions 
that have been made in the past. In part, this is also a consequence of the fact 
that these classification schemes possess ‘systemic’ qualities: none of their 
elements can be completely determined without taking into account its place in 
the overall structure. 
As we have seen, the articulation of the notion of habitual residence 
enabled Quetelet and his successors to direct attention to what was increasingly 
considered to be the ‘relevant’ population of the state, viz. the de jure population. 
Ostensibly technical improvements in the census methodology first introduced 
and then built upon the distinctions between those who regularly reside on 
Belgian territory and those who do so only temporarily or momentarily, between 
those who are considered to be real habitants and those who are not, and 
between those who belong to the nation-state and those who do not (or only 
partially). “What counts” has been cast and recast in ways that build on or depart 
from the coupling between population and territory, between individual and 
habitual place of residence. Even in scientific or objective descriptions of the state 
of the state, only individuals who regularly reside in a given municipality are 
counted as its “real habitants.”  
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In many regards, the state-istical interventions have also become 
increasingly direct and intrusive. Individualist notions such as intention or free 
choice (i.e. agency) were invoked to clarify or legitimate certain options, but the 
statisticians never directly inquired into the residential commitments of individual 
people. They used these notions to justify their own choices and interventions. As 
we have seen, the statisticians also considered an increasing number of 
population groups to be ‘deviant.’ Its members were not counted on the place 
they were physically present at the time the census was taken; they were, on 
various grounds, reassigned to places considered more appropriate. Individual 
‘agency’ was never attributed to the members of all groups. The nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century history of state-istics hence shows how the Belgian state 
and its statisticians have tried to manage ‘their’ population. Without postulating a 
strict correspondence between this state-istical system and other kinds of state 
interventions, our analyses hence also shed light on the differentia specifica of 
what with Foucault and others may be called the étatisation of membership in 
society (Foucault 1984).  
In the course of the last centuries, nation-states have subjected their 
population to ever-more sophisticated technologies of regulation and control. It 
often remains difficult to contest and hence politicize the properties and premises 
of these technologies. The census methodology, as shaped by Quetelet and 
others in the nineteenth century, shows how nation-states have used their 
territorial organization to embrace ‘their’ populations. It shows how the scientific 
or objective representations of the state of the state have from the very 
beginning built upon and legitimated particular politics of membership or 
belonging. The history of this state-istical system is also a history of the struggles 
over belonging in and to the nation-state. It is also a history of the doubts or 
contestations regarding de jure membership status for particular parts of the 
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population. The census not only generates facts about the population; it also 
creates facts to act upon. 
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5.  THE NATION-STATE IN ITS STATE-ISTICS 
(BELGIUM ,  1846-1947)1 
 
5.1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
The term ‘statistics’ was first used in the eighteenth century. For Gottfried 
Achenwall, the author of the influential Abriss der Staatswissenschaft der 
europäischen Reiche (1749), the term referred to the study of the state 
(Staatswissenschaft). In the latter part of the eighteenth century, the term also 
appeared in English. In 1797 the Encyclopaedia Britannica described statistics as 
‘a word lately introduced to express a view or survey of any kingdom, country or 
parish’. During most of the nineteenth century, the etymology of the term 
‘statistics’ was still much alive: statistics meant state-istics, the empirical or 
scientific study of the state.  
The rise of statistics and other information systems is linked with 
fundamental social and cultural changes that took place in that period (see, e.g., 
Headrick 2000). State-istics had to cover the growing need for information in the 
emerging ‘enlightened’ political regimes in Europe. Absolutist monarchs could still 
refer to their divine right to rule in their own personal or dynastic interests, as 
though these were the only interests they had to consider. In contrast, 
enlightened politics implied that monarchs ruled for the benefit of their subjects 
or citizens. Knowing what was in the interest of one’s people, however, required 
a lot more information than knowing one’s own personal or family interests. 
                                                                   
1 This final case-study has not yet been submitted for publication. 
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Since the nineteenth century, numbers and statistics have become basic parts of 
the bureaucratic machinery of modern states. 
Ian Hacking (1990, 1991) has used the phrase ‘avalanche of printed 
numbers’ to characterize the rapid development of information technologies and 
the growing scale of statistics in the nineteenth century. For illustrative purposes, 
he refers to the United States census and its expansion. In 1790, the first census 
asked four questions of each household. In 1880, the tenth census posed 13,010 
questions in various questionnaires addressing people, firms, farms, hospitals, 
churches and more. Statistical thinking has thus also been implanted in a 
bureaucratic machinery. Behind the rise of state-istics and the avalanche of 
printed numbers, as Hacking puts it, ‘lay new technologies for classifying and 
enumerating, and new bureaucracies with the authority and continuity to deploy 
the technology’ (1990: 2-3). It may be added that censuses and other statistics 
not only provide objective or scientific representations of the state. They also 
depict their object in state-istically relevant formats. Modern states not only 
introduce and make use of particular distinctions to classify and enumerate their 
population; they are also well equipped to insist on treating their people 
according to their proper classifications and designations (see Scott 1998: 82-83). 
Seen in this light, the history of state-istics and of state-istical concepts and 
classifications may shed light on the shifting interests and concerns of the modern 
state.  
In this paper, we will present a historical-sociological case-study that 
focuses on the ways in which the modern state has come to conceive of itself as a 
nation-state, on the modifications in the definition of national identity and 
national citizenship in the population census. The census is commonly defined as 
an ‘attempt to count all the people in a country at a given point in time’ (Headrick 
2000: 76). In the census, the statisticians typically included a range of questions 
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about the socio-economic situation of households and their individual members. 
However, they also inquired into the ‘nation’ and its citizens. They also explored 
ways to legitimize the existence of the nation-state and to distinguish between 
members and non-members, nationals and foreigners. By tracing the ways in 
which the ‘nation’ (as idea and as community) was delineated, we hope to 
illuminate the tensions and conflicts that presided over the production of some 
basic modern state-istical concepts and categories.  
We will, more particularly, present a historical-sociological analysis of the 
population censuses conducted in Belgium. We believe that Belgium allows for a 
particularly interesting case-study, not only because of the specific characteristics 
of the Belgian nation-state, which resulted in the second half of the twentieth 
century in fundamental processes of state-reform, but also because of the fact 
that the Belgian homo statisticus Adolphe Quetelet played a key role in the 
development of population censuses and state-istics – both nationally and 
internationally. Perhaps the following case-study therefore also has some broader 
relevance. The time frame of our analysis consists of a period of about one 
century: from the first Belgian population census taken in 1846 until the tenth 
population census conducted in 1947. As we will see, it is in this time period that 
contemporary representations of the Belgian nation-state and its state-citizenship 
emerged. 
Our primary historical sources consist of the Belgian census reports. These 
reports contain a presentation of the results of the census, as well as a rather 
technical part that reproduces the instructions to the census-takers. We will refer 
to these reports by the letter B followed by the year the census was taken.2 In 
                                                                   
2 The Belgian censuses take place with regular, mostly decennial intervals. Under 
Quetelet, the first ones were organized in 1846, 1856 and 1866. Afterwards the Belgian 
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order to contextualize these historical sources, we have also made use of reports 
of international statistical organizations, such as the International Statistical 
Congress, and of Belgian juridical sources, such as the Belgian Constitution and 
the Belgian Civil Code. 
In the Belgian censuses, three different items have been connected with 
the nation-state as such: language, place of birth, and nationality. Hereafter we 
will first discuss the language question and its modifications in the course of time. 
While language is said to have a relatively defined territorial component in the 
modern era (Gellner 1983; Rokkan 1999), the idea of ‘one nation, one language’ 
was also contested in Belgium. We show how language has become the source of 
relatively strong social and cultural cleavages within the Belgian nation-state – 
with the well-known tensions between its different linguistic communities in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Afterwards we analyse the ways in which 
data about each individual’s birthplace and national citizenship were collected 
and processed in the Belgian censuses. These analyses also show how definitions 
of national identity correspond with changing state-istical interests in managing 
and controlling migration in a world characterized by increasing transnational 
mobility. In the final section, we conclude with a discussion of the historical and 
contemporary relevance of the distinction between insiders and outsiders, or 
nationals and foreigners for the project of nation-building within Belgium. 
                                                                   
statisticians followed a suggestion made by the International Statistical Congress (which 
aimed at facilitating international comparisons) and started to organize the census in 
years ending with a 0. Due to the outbreak of the Second World War, no census could 
take place in 1940. The tenth census only took place in 1947; it also was a limited one, 
which was primarily intended to take stock of the state of the state after the devastations 
of the War. 
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5.2.  RELIGION AND L ANGUAGE  
 
In early-nineteenth century Europe, the idea had started to gain ground that 
language and territory were (or had to be) inextricably linked. One more or less 
standardized and uniﬁed language was increasingly seen as an identifying marker 
for a particular state; knowledge of ‘its’ language also became an essential 
requirement for social mobility in the state (see Burke 2004; Edwards 2009). 
Peter Burke (2004: 10), for example, refers to the French priest and politician 
Henri Grégoire, who at the time of the French Revolution started to propagate 
the teaching of Standard French all over France in order to ‘fondre tous les 
citoyens dans une masse nationale’ (melt all citizens into a national mass).3  
However, the nineteenth century not only saw the development of direct 
links between territorial and linguistic unity. In various parts of Europe, linguistic 
diversity also gained ground. Several ‘other’ languages used, or formerly used, 
within the territory of the state could be revived. Examples include the Frisian, 
Norwegian or Finnish movements. It was also in the context of this struggle 
between unifying forces and, to some extent, diversifying forces, that Belgium 
was founded in 1830. 
At the Congress of Vienna in 1814, the Southern Netherlands had been 
united with the Northern Netherlands to form the United Kingdom of the 
                                                                   
3 The first census also inquired into religious adherence. It was concluded that almost the 
entire population adhered to Catholicism (B 1846: XXXVII). The following population 
censuses, however, did not again include an item about religion. In our source materials, 
we found no explanation for this shift. But we may speculate that the ideological tensions 
in Belgium in the second half of the nineteenth century made the inclusion of this item 
too controversial.  
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Netherlands. But a range of social differences created obstacles for the 
unification policies of King William I. Especially religious matters (the Protestant 
North versus the Catholic South) were important in the conflict preceding the 
separation. The language issue also played a role in the conflict. William’s 
language policy had aimed at uniting the two regions under a common Dutch 
language. After the Belgian Revolution, the new Constitution guaranteed freedom 
of language (Servais, Mechelynck, Servais and Schnock 1933: 5). In practice, 
however, French was perceived as the more prestigious language and quickly 
replaced Dutch in all official domains and official functions (see, e.g., Dubois 2005; 
Vandenbussche 2007; Wils 2009). French was not only the language of 
enlightenment, progress and modernity; above all, it also was a symbol for the 
national struggle for independence (Vandenbussche 2007).  
The census reports were drafted in French only until 1930. With the 
exception of the 1856 census, all censuses taken between 1846 and 1947 
included language items. In the first Belgian census, the statisticians defined 
language as one of the most enduring distinguishing features of people or 
populations.4 The census included, more particularly, a question on the habitually 
spoken language [la langue parlée habituellement] (B 1846: LV). People were 
asked to declare the language they most frequently used. No options were 
specified; the respondents could fill in any language. In the summary tables with 
                                                                   
4 ‘Parmi les caractères qui distinguent les populations entre elles, l'un des plus inaltérables 
est sans contredit le langage’ (B 1846: XXXVI). In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, similar ideas prevailed at the level of the International Statistical Congress. 
Language was referred to as the core marker of nationality; concomitantly, language 
items had to be used to obtain information about the different nationalities within a state 
(e.g., Commission Permanente du Congrès International de Statistique 1874: 11, 37-38, 
43).  
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the results, the statisticians grouped the data in the following categories: French 
or Walloon (which they considered to be a variety of Standard French), Flemish or 
Hollandish (which was considered to be a variety of Flemish), German, English, 
and other languages (B 1846: XXXVII). The figures presented made clear that the 
majority of the Belgian population spoke either French or Flemish, while German 
was spoken in parts of the Belgian province of Luxembourg. The statisticians 
added that all other languages were only used by a small group of migrant 
workers and merchants, and by foreigners who were only temporarily residing in 
Belgium (B 1846: XXXVII).  
In the 1846 census report, the Belgian statisticians also invoked the 
authority of ‘philologists’ to refer to the unifying force of a common, standardized 
language. In their view, the line of demarcation between the French- and Flemish-
speaking populations was a symptom of more fundamental social divisions within 
the Belgian state [le peuple belge se trouve divisé sous le rapport du langage 
parlé] (B 1846: XXXVI). 
Without any explanation, the 1856 census questionnaire entailed no item 
about language. But, as of 1866, new attempts were made to inquire into the 
linguistic identity of the population of the Belgian nation-state. The statisticians 
also rephrased the language item. In 1866, the aim was no longer to collect data 
about the variety of languages spoken within the country. Instead the statisticians 
started to collect information about the ability of citizens to speak French, 
Flemish or German. The statisticians seemed to distance themselves from the 
idea of ‘one state, one nation, one language’. They now depicted the most 
commonly spoken languages in Belgium – French or Walloon, Flemish or 
Hollandish, (Lower) German or Luxembourgish – as the state’s national languages 
(see, e.g., B 1866: XII; B 1880: XLIX; B 1890: CL; B 1900: CLXX).  
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From 1866 onwards, individuals were more particularly asked to declare 
which and how many of the Belgian national languages they habitually used. 
Hence, the language data could not only be used to determine the strengths of 
the different monolingual blocs within the state. The statisticians also started to 
show interest in the incidence of bi- and trilingualism among the Belgian 
population (see B 1866: XXI-XXII; B 1880: XXV; B 1890: XXXV- XXXVIII; B 1900: 
XXXIX-XLV; B 1910: 105, 203; B 1920: T1, 16-17). It might be assumed that this 
interest was politically and state-istically motivated. The emphasis on bi- and 
trilingualism could serve to distinguish Belgium from France with its assimilatory 
French-only policy which ruled out all regional languages. This official 
‘presentation of self’ could strengthen the Belgian identity and protect the 
nation-state against France’s expansion plans (see Vogl and Hüning 2010; Hüning 
2013).  
At the moment that the statisticians started focusing on the ability to speak 
one of the Belgian national languages, they also started to refrain from processing 
data on the use or knowledge of ‘foreign’ languages, such as English, Italian or 
Latin.5 People unable to speak any of the national languages also did not have to 
specify the languages they were able to speak; they were simply classified in the 
residual category of ‘inhabitants who don’t speak one of the three languages’ 
(see, e.g., B 1866: XLII; B 1880: LXXXV; B 1890: CXXII; B 1900: CLVI; B 1910: 105).  
                                                                   
5 The directives to the census-takers were straightforward. In 1866, for example, the 
statisticians stated: ‘Il ne faut pas s’occuper des langues étrangères: anglais, italien, etc.’ 
(B 1866: XLII). In 1880, they remarked: ‘Il ne sera tenu aucun compte ici des 
renseignements qui auraient été fournis, dans le bulletin de ménage, sur d’autres langues 
parlées que les trois langues nationales qui viennent d’être indiquées, notamment sur 
l’anglais, l’italien, le latin, etc.’ (B 1880: LXXXV). 
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As of 1910, while continuing to ask about the national languages known, 
the Belgian census-takers also asked those who named more than one language a 
second question, namely, which one they used most frequently (see, e.g., B 1910: 
4; B 1920: T1, 26; B 1930: T1, 41; B 1947: 70). In summary tables about the 
linguistic state of the nation, bi- or trilingual inhabitants were afterwards counted 
two or three times. For example, Flemish-speaking inhabitants who also had 
knowledge of French were added to both the Flemish- and the French-speaking 
population (e.g., B 1910: 203; B 1920: T1, 63; B 1930: T2, 14). But much 
opposition crystallized around this strategy, especially in the Flemish-speaking 
part of the country. As Flemings were more often than Walloons bilingual 
(amongst others while secondary education was on the entire territory French 
until the late-nineteenth century), the census data were believed to overestimate 
the number of French-speakers (see Levy 1960; Verdoodt 1983). Although, at the 
end of the nineteenth century, new legislation had started to grant more 
linguistic rights to the Flemish-speaking population, the so-called Flemish 
movement now increasingly pursued the idea of a linguistically homogeneous 
Flanders. In this context, bilingualism was viewed as a transitional stage from 
Flemish- to French-speaking (see also O’Neill 2000; Haarman 2012).  
Already in the 1880 census, the statisticians had started to express their 
doubts about the completeness and correctness of the language count (B 1880: 
LXXXIII). The census-takers were instructed to double-check the responses to the 
language item (B 1890: CXXVIII-CXXX). Fines were imposed to penalize individuals 
who attempted to make false declarations (B 1890: CXI, CXXIX; B 1900: CXXXVII; B 
1910: 88). However, the statisticians did not believe that these measures had the 
hoped for results. In the early-twentieth century, they explicitly invoked the 
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increase of false language declarations to account for the declining number of 
bilingual Flemings (e.g., B 1910: 203-204; B 1920: T1, 64).6  
Another series of statistical interventions is worth mentioning, too. 
Throughout the entire period under study, the collection of data on the language 
skills of (very) young children and mute people caused concern. In the 1846 
census, the rule was put forward that the language spoken in their family had to 
be registered for all newborns and mute persons (B 1846: L, LV, LXIX). In the 1866 
census, a residual category was created for the deaf-and-dumb, while the 
language(s) of the parents had to be entered for all children who were not yet 
able to speak (B 1866: XLII). In the 1880 census, the residual category for the 
deaf-and-dumb again disappeared; dumb people who knew one of the national 
languages were now considered to speak this language. At the same time, it was 
now argued that children over two years of age were considered to be able to 
speak, while children below that age were not (B 1880: XXV, LXXXV). In the 1890 
census, the census-takers again entered for the children who were not yet able to 
                                                                   
6 A longer quotation seems appropriate: ‘La connaissance simultanée des deux langues 
nationales aurait-elle brusquement cessé de se propager en pays flamand pour ne faire 
des progrès que dans le Brabant et les provinces wallonnes? Il est permis de douter que 
les statistiques révèlent la véritable situation à cet égard. Il est à remarquer en effet, que 
la diminution relative du nombre des habitants parlant les deux langues est, à peu de 
chose près, compensée par l’augmentation relative de ceux qui ne parlent que le flamand. 
Cette remarque permet de se demander si un certain nombre de flamands bilingues 
n’auraient pas déclaré à ce recensement-ci ne connaître que le flamand’ (B 1910: 203-
204; see also B 1920: T1, 64). In the eyes of the state-servants, only the Flemish 
population was expected to be bilingual. It did not work the other way round: French-
speaking Belgians did not have to be bilingual, as Flemish was seen as inferior and thus 
not considered worth learning (see Vogl and Hüning 2010; Hüning 2013).  
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speak the language of their parents (B 1890: IV).7 As of 1900, however, they 
returned to the rule applied in 1880 – and thus re-created a category for children 
who were not yet able to speak a language but in the process of learning one 
(e.g., B 1900: V; B 1910: 4; B 1920: T1, 16; B 1930: T1, 41; B 1947: 106). For the 
dumb, the statisticians stuck to the rule that these people were considered to 
speak the national language they habitually used to express their ideas [dont ils se 
servent habituellement pour exprimer leurs idées] (e.g., B 1890: CXXII; B 1900: 
CLVI; B 1910: 105; B 1947: 99).  
Some more systematic observations may be added. Despite the focus on 
the langues parlées (the spoken languages), the census reports show many traces 
of the impact of standard written languages on national identity constructions in 
Belgium. The nationalization of the languages commonly used in Belgium 
depended on processes of standardization and homogenization. In 1880, the 
census-takers were explicitly directed to consider Walloon as a variety of French, 
Dutch or Hollandic as varieties of Flemish, and Lower-German or Luxembourgish 
as varieties of German (see, e.g., B 1880: LXXXV; B 1890: XXXV; B 1910: 44, 105). 
From the 1890 census onwards, only French, Flemish and German appeared as 
headings in the census reports (see, e.g., B 1890: LXXXIII, LXXXV; B 1900: CV; B 
1910: 45). This homogenization did not cause problems in Wallonia. Throughout 
the entire period under study, the Romance varieties spoken in Wallonia were 
regarded as dialects of the prestigious French language. In the whole French 
                                                                   
7 As of 1890, the statisticians also more explicitly defined what was meant by being able 
to speak a language (e.g., B 1890: CXXXI; B 1900: CLVI; B 1910: 105). Literacy (i.e. the 
ability to read and write) was not required. But people had to be capable of expressing 
themselves by means of this language in their daily life. ‘C’est ainsi qu’il n’est point un 
habitant du pays, quelque illettré qu’il soit, qui ne sache parler; fût-ce incorrectement, le 
français ou le wallon, le flamand, etc.’ (B 1890: CXXXI; see also B 1900: CLVI; B 1910: 105). 
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language area, local dialects had been in decline since the sixteenth century, i.e. 
since the development of standard French out of the dialect of the Île de France 
(Nadeau and Barlow 2006). But the sociolinguistic situation was different in 
Flanders. Not only was there, due to the lack of official regulation policies, no 
Flemish standard language. In the nineteenth century, the aforementioned 
religious differences also stood in the way of closer linguistic collaboration 
between Flanders and the Netherlands. In the Catholic South, the opposition to a 
joint Flemish-Dutch standard language was at least in part motivated by the fear 
of possible Protestant influence from the Netherlands.  
In the early-twentieth century, however, the Flemish movement had 
become more oriented toward the Netherlands. The identification of the Flemish 
varieties in Belgium with the Dutch of the Netherlands was a way to enhance the 
prestige and thus strengthen the position of Dutch (Flemish) against French in 
Belgium (Vogl and Hüning 2010: 238). In 1947, the label Flemish was replaced by 
that of Dutch in the Belgian population census (e.g., B 1947: 106-112). In the eyes 
of the state and its state-istics, Flemish now was a variety of Dutch (while the 
Romance varieties spoken in Wallonia had always been viewed as varieties of 
standard French). In 1932, new language legislation specified that the results of 
the language count had to be used to determine the language regime of the local 
municipalities (see B 1947: 52). In Flanders, however, the results of the language 
count (which pointed to the ‘frenchification’ of Brussels and a number of other 
municipalities) were again highly contested. While the objectivity of the language 
census was called into question, pressure was also built for the establishment of a 
constitutional language border between the Dutch- and French-speaking regions 
within Belgium. Many local authorities in Flanders opposed any new language 
census. Owing to this political conflict, the government postponed the 1957 
census (see, e.g., Levy 1960; Verdoodt 1983; Louckx 1982). The next census was 
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conducted in 1961, but language questions were now dropped from the census. 
Shortly afterwards, the territorial language border was established (1962-1963).  
In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, different ideas and 
definitions of the nation-state have developed within Belgium. As in most other 
nation-states, a common and uniform language was in the new, independent 
state regarded as an identifying marker that could hold all the inhabitants of the 
state together (see, e.g., Arel 2002; Edwards 2009; Malesevic 2013). Over time, 
however, the Belgian state has become subdivided into separate language 
territories. The official demarcation of these language territories was not simply a 
solution to a language conflict; it also followed from and reinforced the 
nineteenth-century idea of ‘one state, one nation, one language’. The history of 
the Belgian language census and its representations of the nation-state sheds 
light on the identity problems with which the Belgian state was faced. As we have 
seen, this state-istics did not simply provide information about the state of the 
nation-state; it also created a dynamic that came to threaten the very existence 
of the Belgian nation-state. From the perspective of the Belgian state, there might 
have been a number of reasons to henceforth forbid the organization of language 
censuses on Belgian territory. But it is questionable whether the abolishment of 
the language census is or will be a solution to the identity problems of the Belgian 
nation-state. 
 
5.3.  PLACE OF BIRTH AND NATIONALITY  
 
The Belgian state originated at a time when states were ideally linked to one 
language (and one religion) and when languages had – at least in theory – to be 
uniform and to serve as identifying markers holding all the members of the 
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nation-state together. But not only linguistic unity was at that time linked with 
national unity. The concept of citizenship also arose together with the concept of 
the nation-state. In the course of the nineteenth century, the rights conferred 
upon citizens started to grow in number and substance. But these rights were 
also increasingly confined to nationals. An increasing delimitation of national 
citizenries took place. Citizenship came to mean membership in the nation-state 
(see Hobsbawn 1990; Brubaker 1992; Torpey 2000; Surak 2012).  
After the Belgian Revolution of 1830, nationality law established Belgian 
citizenship. On the basis of this nationality law, citizenship could be automatically 
attributed (by the state to the individual), acquired (by the individual through 
procedures prescribed by the state) and withdrawn (from the individual by the 
state authorities). Until the early-twentieth century, the basic principles of this 
legislation remained unchanged. After the First World War, protectionism 
prevailed and greater restrictions in granting Belgian citizenship to foreigners 
were imposed (Caestecker 1999; Caestecker and Vrints 2012; Foblets, 
Yanasmayan and Wautelet 2013).  
Citizenship was in principle granted at birth. The dominant Belgian practice 
built upon the principle of jus sanguinis paterni [right of blood in the paternal 
line]: a child whose father was a Belgian citizen automatically acquired Belgian 
citizenship, irrespective of the place of birth. This mode of attribution was 
legitimized by the conviction that citizenship could not simply follow from 
‘accidentally’ having been born in Belgium, but had to be seen as the 
consequence of family or blood ties, as the heritage of a community, which is 
made up of people who together form a sovereign nation. But the principle of jus 
soli [right of soil] was also introduced: a child born in Belgium to non-Belgian 
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parents, for example, could acquire the Belgian nationality if certain requirements 
(mainly pertaining to age and residence) were fulfilled.8 Belgian citizenship could 
moreover be lost by individuals who voluntary acquired the citizenship of a 
foreign state, voluntarily served in a foreign army, or settled abroad and did not 
show any evidence of a will [animus] to return to Belgium. 
However, despite the elaboration of the politico-legal institution of Belgian 
citizenship, and despite its symbolic importance for the new state, the Belgian 
census did not include any question about nationality until the end of the 
nineteenth century (1890). In the first censuses, the census-takers were even 
instructed not to take nationality into account. The census-takers had to gather 
data about all those present in the household – quelle que soit leur nationalité (B 
1866: XXXI). The Belgian statisticians used another variable to provide a more 
detailed overview of the modes of membership in the nation-state. Instead of 
nationality, they focused on people’s place of origin or birth (e.g., B 1846: XXXVI- 
XXXVII; B 1856: XIX, XLVIII, XLIX; B 1866: 19; B 1880: XXI; B 1890: XXIII-XXIX).  
In the view of the Belgian statisticians, the question about the place of 
origin or birth enabled them to monitor people’s ‘movements’ on the territory of 
the Belgian state (B 1846: XXXV; see also B 1856: XVIII; B 1866: XX). Initially, the 
statisticians showed a strong interest in both intra- and inter-national movements 
(B 1846: XXV; B 1856: XIX; B 1866: 18; B 1880: XXII). But in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century, their state-istical interest shifted almost exclusively towards 
                                                                   
8 The principle of ‘one family, one citizenship’ was also stressed. A foreign woman who 
married a Belgian took the citizenship of her husband and so did the children born in 
wedlock. Inversely, a Belgian woman who married a foreigner, or whose partner no longer 
remained Belgian, lost her Belgian citizenship, on condition that she acquired the 
citizenship of her husband. 
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international migration. At that time, they also started to speculate on the 
motives the growing number of migrants might have. In their opinion, economic 
motives dominated. The statisticians argued that most étrangers living on Belgian 
territory had left their country of origin to find fortune in Belgium. They added 
that it was not likely that these étrangers would return to their country of origin 
or birth (e.g., B 1890: XXXIII; B 1900: XXXVII).  
As of 1880, the census reports started to include longitudinal overviews of 
population movements to and from Belgium.9 However, the distinction between 
place of birth and nationality disappeared in the 1880 report. The table drafted by 
the statisticians divided the growing number of foreigners residing on Belgian 
territory on the basis of their place of birth, but the table’s title promised an 
overview par nationalité (B 1880: XXIII). Based on census data from a number of 
other countries, such as France, Germany, the United States and Great Britain, 
the 1880 census report also tried to provide an overview of the number of 
‘Belgians’ living abroad. But in an explanatory note, the statisticians clarified that 
the term ‘Belgians’ solely referred to people born in Belgium and not to people 
with the Belgian nationality in the legal sense of the word (B 1880: XXIV).10 In its 
                                                                   
9 As of 1880, the Belgian census reports show evidence of growing international 
collaboration among statisticians and other state servants (see B 1880: VII, VIII; B 1890: 
V). The census-takers also started to record more detailed information about the place of 
origin of foreigners. Foreigners no longer only had to inform about the country in which 
they were born, but also provide more specific information, such as municipality and 
province of birth (see B 1890: IV-V, LXXXIII; B 1900: CLVII; B 1910: 43, 107; B 1920: T1, 21; 
B 1930: T1, 40; B 1947: 110).  
10 The footnote to the table reads as follows: ‘Le mot Belge doit être ici entendu 
seulement en ce sens qu’il s’agit de personnes nées en Belgique, abstraction faite de la 
question de nationalité légale’ (B 1880: XXIV). 
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official state-istics, Belgium thus applied the principle of jus soli. Its state-isticians 
primarily distinguished between nationals and foreigners on the basis of 
territorial criteria. The Belgian nation-state was conceived of as a community of 
birth, of native-born citizens. 
Six decades after Belgium’s independence, the 1890 census was the first to 
include an item on the legal nationality status of the inhabitants. According to the 
statisticians, the inclusion of this item constituted un intérêt national et 
international; they also mentioned that they followed the example of several 
other states (B 1890: IV-V). In the census report, the statisticians now made clear 
that only individuals who possessed Belgian nationality status could be identified 
as Belgians or nationals. Inversely, foreigners were defined as individuals who did 
not possess Belgian nationality status (B 1890: LXXXIII; B 1910: 49). The item on 
the legal nationality status did not replace but supplement that on people’s place 
of birth or origin. Different understandings of belongingness were thus 
introduced. The difference was also stressed on many occasions; in the 
instructions to the census-takers, the statisticians repeatedly insisted that 
nationality declarations needed to be made in conformance with the legal 
definition of nationality (e.g., B 1900: LXXXIV; B 1910: 29). 
However, the presentation of the data on national citizenship in the census 
reports also shows the lasting concern of the statisticians with the increase of the 
number of migrants. In fact, the Belgian statisticians often presented tables in 
which the data on nationality and place of birth were compared or crossed. In 
1890, for example, the statisticians started to focus on the countries of birth and 
of nationality of the largest number of foreigners on Belgian territory (e.g., B 
1890: XXXV; see also B 1900: XXV; B 1910: 192; B 1920: T1, 59). As of 1900, they 
also focused on the balance between migration from and to Belgium (e.g., B 
1900: XV; B 1910: 183; B 1930: T3, 53). With some pride, it was for example noted 
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in the 1900 census report that the emigration was higher than the immigration. 
While the growth of the population living on Belgian territory was mainly 
‘homemade’, Belgium was also able to contribute considerably to the so-called 
‘international circulation of humanity’ (B 1900: XV).11  
As of 1890, the statisticians also devoted substantial parts of the census 
reports to the presentation and interpretation of cross-tabulations in which 
different categories of citizenship appeared. They distinguished, for example, 
between Belgians born in Belgium, Belgians born abroad, individuals of foreign 
nationality residing in Belgium and born in Belgium, and foreigners residing in 
Belgium but born outside of Belgium. They not only compared the size of the 
different citizenship categories, but also discussed changes over time (or the lack 
thereof) and speculated about push- and pull-factors, such as economic 
opportunities and urbanization (e.g., B 1890: XXXIV; B 1900: XXXVI-XXXVIII; B 
1910: 195-198; B 1920: T1, 59; B 1930: T3, 48, 54-55, 58-59, 72). Indirectly, these 
tables allowed to identify the individuals who might qualify for naturalization 
procedures and hence be entitled to acquire the Belgian nationality.  
In the same context, the statisticians also started to pay attention to 
gender differences (e.g., B 1900: XXXV; B 1910: 195; B 1920: T1, 59). For example, 
they linked the finding that most immigrants were men with economic factors. 
Male immigrants were depicted as economic players, who migrated to Belgium to 
find jobs (B 1890: XXXIII; B 1900: XXXVII; B 1910: 197). The high number of 
women from the neighboring countries that lived in Belgium was attributed to 
                                                                   
11 ‘Il est très intéressant de noter que la Belgique ne tire que de ses propres forces 
l’augmentation remarquable de sa population et que […] elle fournit encore un contingent 
d’environ 3 par mille de ses habitants à la circulation internationale de l’humanité’ (B 
1900: XV). 
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the demand for household workers in Belgium (B 1890: XXXIII; B XXXV; B 1910: 
195; B 1920: T1, 59; B 1930: T3, 77). The high proportion of women born in 
Belgium to foreign parents was said to be the counterpart of men’s higher 
mobility. Not only for economic reasons did men more easily migrate, they often 
also had to return to their country of nationality to fulfill their military service (B 
1900: XXXVII; B 1910: 197). The higher proportion of women among the Belgians 
born abroad was linked with the nationality legislation: women born to foreign 
parents could become Belgian by marrying a Belgian, while men less easily lost 
their foreign nationality (B 1900: XXXVII; B 1910: 197).  
In the interwar period, the Belgian statisticians continued to publish 
analyses of citizenship categories in relation to migratory movements.12 
Foreigners now also needed to inform about the duration of their stay in Belgium; 
they also had to specify whether or not they had applied for a residence permit – 
and hence had the intention to stay in Belgium (see, e.g., B 1930: T1, 41, 47, 49; B 
1947: 105-106, 111-112). Interestingly, the statisticians also (again) developed an 
interest in intra-national migration movements. More particularly, in the 1930 
census, the statisticians started to calculate emigration and immigration flows 
from Flanders to Wallonia (B 1930: T3, 51). They now took this internal division as 
the point of departure of their analyses well before the establishment of the 
language border in Belgium and the regionalization of the nation-state (B 1930: 
T3, 50-52).  
                                                                   
12 It should, however, be added that in 1920, thus shortly after the First World War, it was 
only possible to organize a limited census. In 1930, the statisticians also indicated that it 
became difficult to establish and interpret the longitudinal data series, because the 
territorial borders of Belgium were redrawn after WWI (B 1930: T3, 74). More in 
particular, the German-speaking ‘Eastern cantons’ came to Belgium as a consequence of 
the 1919 Versailles Treaty. 
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After the Second World War, the bureaucratic regulations about citizenship 
increased once more (see also Brubaker 1992; Simon 1999; Surak 2012). In the 
1947 census, the statisticians thus asked naturalized Belgians to specify how they 
had acquired Belgian citizenship (B 1947: 51, 99, 106). The foreigners residing on 
Belgian territory on census day had to provide detailed information about their 
residence rights (B 1947: 67). The Second World War and the collaboration with 
Nazi Germany also left its traces. Individuals from whom the Belgian citizenship 
status had been withdrawn (and who had hence become foreigners) had to be 
identified separately (see B 1947: 69). Altogether, the statisticians now 
distinguished between no less than 13 categories of Belgian citizens, 7 categories 
of foreigners and 4 categories of state-less individuals (B 1947: 93).  
This evolution reflects the rise of what Max Weber has called the ‘rational-
legal authority’ within the modern state. With Michel Foucault, we might also 
speak of the étatisation and nationalisation of membership (Foucault 1984: 302-
303; see also Brubaker 2010; Surak 2012). In the nineteenth and twentieth 
century, citizenship has become increasingly articulated as membership in nation-
states – both in Belgium and abroad. But the history of the statistical articulation 
of citizenship also shows the growing grasp of the state bureaucracy. In 
twentieth-century Belgium, the political community has become divided into ever 
more categories. For the modern state, such distinctions between citizens and 
citizenship categories might fulfil another set of instrumental purposes. Although 
citizenship is still a key instrument for defining national identity, it has also 
become a key instrument for controlling access to particular social rights, for 
disciplining the national citizens, and for monitoring migration in a world 
characterized by increasing transnational mobility.  
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5.4.  CONCLUSION  
 
The Kingdom of Belgium was founded in 1830. In many different ways, it has tried 
to establish itself as a modern nation-state. As other nineteenth-century nation-
states, it has invested much energy in order to integrate its members, and to 
define the difference from other national communities. On the basis of analyses 
of one of its key instruments, viz. its state-istics, it is possible to reconstruct how 
the Belgian state has created its ‘imagined community’ (see also Anderson 1983; 
Scott 1998; Desrosières 1998). On the foregoing pages, we have more particularly 
looked at the state-istical ‘nationalization’ of languages and citizenship status.  
Belgium has never been a state based on the principle of ‘one state, one 
nation, one language’ – although it was founded at a time when one state was 
ideally linked to one nation and one language. Its Constitution guaranteed a 
number of freedoms, including the freedom of language choice, but French 
remained the socially and culturally dominant language throughout the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, 
however, the Flemish movement was also able to create its ‘imagined 
community’. It built on the same, nineteenth-century principle of ‘one state, one 
nation, one language’. In the second half of the last century, the pursuit of a 
linguistically homogeneous Flemish state has become part of Flemish mainstream 
politics. As we have pointed out, conflicts over the statistical representations of 
this identity marker played an important role in the course of this historical 
process. The state-istical constructions of national identity created a reality of 
their own within the Belgian state. But analyses of the printed numbers of the 
census reports only tell part of the story. Analyses of the various ways in which 
linguistic unity and national identity were counted and envisaged also shed light 
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on the premises and principles underlying the Belgian nation-state. In this setting, 
what was not counted was as important as what was counted.13  
 The statisticians also used other criteria to define and circumscribe the 
nation. In the first Belgian censuses, they registered people’s place of birth. In this 
sense, they initially defined the nation as all those united by birth. In the 1890 
census, they also started to record people’s nationality or legal citizenship status. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, ever more elaborate and complex 
classifications of people’s citizenship status had to be put to use. As we have 
seen, this historical shift evolved with and reflected the development of a new 
politics of belonging, which is characterized by the étatisation and nationalization 
of membership or citizenship (Foucault 1984). The Belgian statisticians have thus 
come to define the nation as the community of individuals who have received full 
citizenship rights from the Belgian state, and thereby used citizenship categories 
to monitor the ‘wealth of the nation’.  
 
5.5.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
5.5.1.  BE LGI AN CE NSUS RE PORT S  
 
B 1846 Population. Recensement général (15 Octobre 1846), Bruxelles: Le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1849. 
                                                                   
13 The same might be assumed in the case of religion. As we pointed out earlier, only the 
first Belgian census included a religion count. Religious adherence was no longer counted 
at the moment that the ideological conflicts between Catholics and Liberals started to 
increase. On this basis, different ideological ‘pillars’ started to develop in nineteenth-
century Belgium.  
 159 
 
 
B 1856 Population. Recensement général (31 Décembre 1856), Bruxelles: Le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1861. 
 
B 1866 Population. Recensement général (31 Décembre 1866), Bruxelles: Le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1870. 
 
B 1880 Population. Recensement général (31 Décembre 1880), Bruxelles: Le 
Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1884. 
 
B 1890 Population. Recensement général de 1890. Tome I, Bruxelles: Le Ministre 
de l’Intérieur et de l’Instruction Publique, 1893. 
 
B 1900 Population. Recensement général du 31 Décembre 1900. Tome I, Bruxelles: 
Le Ministre de l’Intérieur et de l’Instruction Publique, 1903. 
 
B 1910 Recensement général de la population du 31 décembre 1910. Tome I, 
Bruxelles: Le Ministre de l’Intérieur, 1916. 
 
B 1920 Population. Recensement Général du 31 Décembre 1920. Tome I, 
Bruxelles: Le Ministre de l’Intérieur et de l’Hygiène, 1926. 
 
B 1920 Population. Recensement général du 31 Décembre 1920. Tome III, 
Bruxelles: Institut National de Statistique, 1926. 
 
B 1930 Population. Recensement Général au 31 Décembre 1930. Tome I, 
Bruxelles: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1934. 
 160 
 
 
B 1930 Population. Recensement Général au 31 Décembre 1930. Tome I, 
Bruxelles: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1936. 
 
B 1930 Population. Recensement Général au 31 Décembre 1930. Tome I, 
Bruxelles: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1937. 
 
B, 1947 Algemene Volks-, Nijverheids- en Handelstelling op 31 December 1947. 
Deel 1, Brussel: Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1949. 
 
5.5.2.  OTHE R RE FERENCE S  
 
Achenwall, G., (1749), Abriß der neuesten Staatswissenschaft der vornehmsten 
Europäischen Reiche und Republicken, Göttingen: Schmidt. 
 
Anderson, B., (1983), Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism, London: Verso. 
 
Arel, D., (2002), ‘Language categories in censuses: backward- or forward-looking’, 
in Kertzer, D.I. and Arel, D. (eds), Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, 
Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press: 92-120. 
 
Brubaker, R., (1992), Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
 161 
 
Brubaker, R., (2010), ‘Migration and membership’, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, 41 (1): 61-78. 
 
Burke, P., (2004), Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Caestecker, F., (1999), ‘In het kielzog van de Natie-Staat: de politiek van 
nationaliteitsverwerving, -verlies en -toekenning, 1830-1909’, Belgisch Tijdschrift 
voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis, 27 (3-4): 323-349. 
 
Caestecker, F. and Vrints, A., (2012), ‘De nationalisering van Duitse immigranten 
en hun familieleden in België (1850-1920): het perspectief van kwalitatieve 
bronnen,’ in Kok, J. (ed), Leren van historische levenslopen: historisch-
demografisch onderzoek in Vlaanderen en Nederland, Leuven: Acco: 199-220.  
 
Commission Permanente du Congrès International de Statistique, (1874), Compte-
Rendu des Conférences de Stockholm en 1874, Saint-Petersburg: Trenké & Fusnot. 
 
Desrosières, A., (1998), The Politics of Large Numbers, Harvard: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Dubois, S., (2005), L’invention de la Belgique: Génèse d’un Etat-Nation 1648-1830, 
Brussels: Racine. 
 
Edwards, J., (2009), Language and Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 162 
 
Foblets, M.-C, Yanasmayan, Z. and Wautelet, P., (2013), Country Report: Belgium, 
Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory.  
 
Foucault, M., (1984), ‘Le pouvoir, comment s’exerce-t-il?’, in Dreyfus, H. and 
Rabinow, P. (eds), Michel Foucault: un parcours philosophique, Paris: Gallimard: 
297-321 
 
Gellner, E., (1983), Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
 
Haarman, H., (2012), ‘Language and ethnicity in a European context’, in Hüning, 
M., Vogl, U. and Moliner, O. (eds), Standard Languages and Multilingualism in 
European history, vol. 1, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing: 97-125. 
 
Hacking, I., (1990), The Taming of Chance, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Hacking, I., (1991), ‘How should we do the history of statistics?’, in Burchell, G., 
Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 181-195. 
 
Headrick, D. R., (2000), When Information Came of Age: Technologies of 
Knowledge in the Age of Reason and Revolution, 1700-1850, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hobsbawn, E.J., (1990), Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 163 
 
Hüning, M., (2013), ‘Standardsprachenideologie. Über Sprache als Mittel zur Ab- 
und Ausgrenzung’, in Besamusca, E., Hermann, C. and Vogl, U. (eds), Out of the 
Box: Über den Wert des Grenzwertigen, Wien: Praesens: 105-122. 
 
Levy, P.M., (1960), La querelle du recensement, Bruxelles: Institut belge de 
science politique. 
 
Louckx, F., (1982), Vlamingen tussen Vlaanderen en Wallonië: taalaanvaardings- 
en taalontwijkingsprocessen in een meertalige situatie, bekeken vanuit de 
sociologische literatuur over etnische en raciale verhoudingen (Reeks Taal en 
Sociale Integratie, Volume V), Brussel: Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
 
Malesevic S., (2013), Nation-states and Nationalisms: Organization, Ideology and 
Solidarity, Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Nadeau, J.-B. and Barlow, J., (2006), Plus ça change: The story of French – from 
Charlemagne to the Cirque du Soleil, London: Robson Books. 
 
O’Neill, M., (2000), ‘Belgium: language, ethnicity and nationality’, Parliamentary 
affairs, 53 (1): 114-134. 
 
Rokkan, S., (1999), State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Scott, J.C., (1998), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
 164 
 
Servais, J., Mechelynck, E., Servais, P. and Schnock, L., (1933), Les codes et les lois 
spéciales les plus usuelles en vigueur en Belgique: avec des notes de concordance 
et de  urisprudence utiles   l interprétation des textes, Bruxelles: Éditions Émile 
Bruylant. 
 
Simon, P., (1999), ‘Nationality and Origins in French Statistics. Ambiguous 
Categories’, Population: An English Selection, 11: 193-219. 
 
Surak, K., (2012), ‘Nation-Work: A Praxeology of Making and Maintaining 
Nations’, European Journal of Sociology, 53 (2): 171-204. 
 
Torpey, J., (2000), The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the 
State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Vandenbussche, W., (2007), ‘Wij willen Willem weer: Het Verenigd Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden als breekijzer voor een nieuwe 19de-eeuwse taalgeschiedenis’, in 
Vandenbussche, W. and Janssens, G. (eds), Taalpolitiek, taalplanning en 
taalgebruik in het ‘Verenigd Koninkri k der Nederlanden’ (1814–1830), Gent: 
Koninklijke Academie voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde: 129–135. 
 
Verdoodt, A., (1983), Bibliographie sur le problème linguistique belge, Québec: 
Centre international de recherche sur le bilinguisme. 
 
Vogl, U. and Hüning, M., (2010), 'One nation, one language? The case of Belgium’, 
Dutch Crossing. A Journal of Low Countries Studies, 34 (3): 228-247. 
  
 165 
 
Wils, L., (2009), Van de Belgische naar de Vlaamse natie: een geschiedenis van de 
Vlaamse beweging, Leuven: Acco. 
 
 
 167 
 
6.  EPILOGUE  
 
6.1.  UNE HISTOIRE A-HISTORISANT E  
 
It is often said that the nineteenth century statistics had to cover the growing 
need in modern nation-states for information about the ‘state of the state’. This 
point of view was also echoed by the nineteenth-century statisticians in Belgium. 
The Belgian censuses had to satisfy “the needs of most public administrations as 
well as those of science in its diverse manifestations: ethnography, history, 
economics and statistics” (B, 1880: XIV). But it is also clear that the “avalanche of 
printed numbers” (Hacking, 1982) produced by modern state-istics helped to 
think of society as a social entity, as a social reality sui generis, as a corps social 
that was governed by its own laws and regularities. In my dissertation, I have 
argued that the population statistics not only provided detailed figures about the 
population, but also actively contributed to the establishment of a conceptual 
framework that made it possible to conceive of the population as a social entity, 
as a corps social with particular features and possibilities. The nineteenth-century 
population statistics also created and rendered rigid new conceptualizations of 
the social by subjecting the population to specific ‘search engines’ or information 
technologies and specific knowledge regimes. Both politicians and statisticians 
believed that censuses and statistics could further social progress by facilitating 
inquiry, analysis and intervention. 
On the foregoing pages, I have used a genealogical approach to shed light 
on the ways in which social complexity was translated into a ‘legible’ and 
statistically convenient format in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century (see 
also Foucault, 1977b; Fairclough and Holes, 1995; Scott, 1998; Schulten, 2012). 
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Sociologically and historically, it is not helpful to conceive of the statistical ‘system 
of thought’ that both followed from and reinforced the diffusion of the modern 
‘quantifying spirit’ as but a textual reality. The concepts, definitions and 
classifications used in the censuses are not but textual realities; they also embody 
a material, extra-discursive reality. Different forms of practice have been shaped 
and organized by this discourse (see also Foucault, 1981a). Not only was 
participation in the Belgian population census obligatory for all residents on the 
Belgian territory. Different techniques and instruments were also used to count 
and classify the population. On the basis of the statistical concepts, definitions 
and classifications, local census-takers moreover distinguished between different 
population categories or different social entities (family vs. collective 
households), assigned or reassigned individuals to different habitual places of 
residence, and so on. On the foregoing pages, I have thus conceived of the 
Belgian population census as both a discursive and a governmental practice. In a 
similar way, Hacking has spoken of a loop effect (Hacking, 1985). The statistical 
representations of the social clearly determine “the space of possibilities of 
personhood” (Hacking, 2004: 107). 
Against this background, I have explicitly attempted not to reduce the 
state-istical discourse to a narrative. Rather than sketching a histoire historisante 
by approaching the discourse used in the Belgian census reports as a ‘set of 
representations’ of a certain social reality, I have focused on the analysis of the 
interests and forces at play in the production of this kind of statistical knowledge 
(see also Foucault, 1981a, 1981b; Fairclough, 1993). I have thus neither tried to 
draw a positivist historiography of ‘pure facts’, nor to present a traditional 
‘narrative of events’. Instead I have focused on the ways in which statistics has 
been invented and exploited as state-istics, as a tool of describing and governing 
the ‘state of the state’. I have built on the idea that population statistics are quite 
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yet necessary instruments of governance that spread over the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century. Against this background, I have also tried to 
show how population statistics is both a cause and a consequence of our 
predominant views of what is modern society. The statistical tools and 
instruments not only identify the parts or ‘cornerstones’ of modern society; they 
also construct and regulate the social reality the state-isticians aim to identify. 
The Belgian census reports served as the primary source material for my 
genealogical analyses. While I have also made use of ‘secondary’ source material 
(such as the parliamentary papers, legal texts and documents, reports of the 
International Statistical Congresses), especially in order to be able to grasp the 
interchange between the statistical discourse and other discourses, the focus of 
my dissertation has not explicitly been on these processes of interchange, nor on 
the processes of discursive ‘re-circulation’. The emphasis has rather been on the 
premises and rationales underlying one type of discourse, viz. the population 
state-istical discourse (Foucault, 1981a). In this regard, my research obviously is 
confronted with particular limitations. Additional, complementary research on 
the basis of other, non-statistical source material is not only possible, but also 
promising. The same can be said with regard to analysis of other statistical 
traditions, either at the national or the international level. I hope that in the near 
future myself and/or others will have the possibility to explore a broader range of 
sources from this critical, sociological and historical perspective. In this epilogue, 
however, I will present a brief overview of the arguments developed on the basis 
of analyses of my primary source material as well as some more general 
concluding remarks. 
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6.2.  INCLUSION ,  EXCLUSION  
 
In the preceding chapters, I have attempted to show how the discursive practices 
in the population censuses led to the production of certain kinds of knowledge – 
at the cost of other kinds of knowledge. In the second chapter, I have directly 
looked into the types of exclusions produced in the censuses. This chapter more 
particularly highlights the intimate relationship between territory and population 
in the population statistics; it shows how parts of the population are both 
included and excluded because they are attributed to specific ‘exclusion places’. 
In spite of the “equivalence agreement” (Desrosières, 2000), the Belgian state-
istics produced and used ‘exclusion places’ in order to distinguish between 
different population categories. The excluded individuals remained members of 
the corps social and thus part of the state’s population, but they were also 
identified as individuals who had to be set apart and subjected to specific 
interventions. In this regard, I have argued that the discursive formation of the 
exclusion places in the censuses prelude later forms of welfare-engineering. The 
statistical ‘system of thought’ was closely linked with the state’s interest in the 
productivity of its population; the hierarchy of exclusion categories displays the 
importance of particular social parameters – and the necessity of monitoring and 
surveying them. 
In the following chapters of this Ph.D. dissertation, I have focused on the 
interplay between the specificity of the tools and techniques used “to count all 
the people in a country at a given point in time” (Headrick 2000: 76), on the one 
hand, and the kinds of knowledge production derived from employing such tools 
and techniques, on the other. In the third, fourth and fifth chapter, too, my 
analyses have indicated how the processes of inclusion and exclusion are 
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inseparable in population state-istics. These processes are constitutive of one 
another; they are different sides of the same coin. 
The analyses in the third chapter show how the observation and 
classification tools of statistics not merely ‘represent’ social realities. They 
mobilize specific norms or evaluative standards; they depict the ‘normal’ 
household in very specific hierarchical terms, thereby reinvigorating a view of the 
social order based on hierarchically structured family households with male heads 
of household. Although other forms of depicting the household structures could 
also have been probed, the Belgian statisticians remained inclined to focus on 
hierarchical structures. With a number of variations, they continued to use these 
structures to define and distinguish between different categories of people. In the 
fourth chapter, I have indicated how the articulation of the notion of habitual 
residence is linked with the development of distinctions between those who 
regularly reside on Belgian territory and those who do so only temporarily or 
momentarily, between those who are considered to be ‘real habitants’ and those 
who are not, and between those who ‘belong’ to the nation-state and those who 
do not (or only partially). Both in the third and the fourth chapter, it becomes 
clear how, despite of the ‘official’ emphasis on the de facto population and the 
task “to count all the people in a country at a given point in time” (Headrick, 
200076), the emphasis shifts towards defining and numbering the de jure 
population of the Belgian nation-state.  
In a similar way, the findings presented in the fifth chapter of this 
dissertation show how the articulation of citizenship ideals is dependent on 
exclusion mechanisms. The ways in which foreigners are distinguished from 
nationals cannot be disconnected from the ‘phenomena’ the Belgian statisticians 
wanted to ‘grasp’ and classify. The principles they used to count actively 
contributed to defining both citizens and non-citizens. The questions they asked 
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articulated the distinction between people who ‘really’ belonged to the nation-
state and people who did not or only in particular ways and regards but not in 
others. In this regard, too, the distinction between inclusion and exclusion thus 
allows us to shed light on the ways in which our statistical categories have come 
to organize our observations of the social world.  
 
6.3.  CONTINUITIES ,  DISCONTINUITIES  
 
Time and again, historical and sociological research which makes use of census 
data is confronted with the historical variability of the concepts and definitions 
that were used in the population censuses. Although the core of the census 
technology remained relatively stable over time within Belgium, the state-istical 
categories and categorizations used to ‘represent’ the social body were 
constantly ‘under construction’. But the historical variability in the census 
methodologies and nomenclatures does not only need to be regarded as a source 
of difficulty (e.g., when the objective is to construct longitudinal or comparative 
tables). As I have shown, it may also be regarded as a source of information on 
the genesis of the categories that organize predominant observations and 
representations of the social world. 
My analyses of the history of statistical forms and classifications has 
brought out the fact that they arise and evolve in a way that involves constant 
interaction between practical and cognitive concerns. While the censuses and 
population statistics are of course constructed to meet administrative objectives 
and conform to learned representations of society, they must also, in order to 
produce ‘printed numbers’ and be truly usable, come to terms with common, 
ordinary practices and representations (Simon, 1999). The statistical concepts and 
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definitions thus need to be understood by both the census-takers and the 
population members who needed to complete the questionnaires. Seen in this 
light, the variability of statistical conventions may cease to be a mere obstacle to 
establishing longitudinal data series or comparative tables. In this dissertation, it 
has become a kind of clue: it informs us in specific ways about the interactions 
between science, administration, and society. 
More in particular, I have pointed to a number of ways in which the 
interaction between practical and cognitive concerns worked out in the Belgian 
censuses. In this regard, the particular Eigenlogik of these population statistics 
also becomes manifest. For example, as is shown in the fifth chapter, the 
statistical ‘invention’ of the categories of Belgians by birth and naturalized 
Belgians illustrates how categories used in the population statistics can transcend 
or bypass civic or legal status categories. In this regard, these state-istics not only 
reinforced dominant views on nationality and belonging, but also actively 
contributed to the institutionalization of new definitions and boundaries of 
citizenship. Also, as shown in the third and fourth chapter, the implementation of 
the de jure view in the censuses indicates how the statistics both made use of 
legal notions and defined them in their own state-istical way. In many regards, it 
may indeed be argued that the state-istical discourse was a discourse of its own; 
it possessed its own systemic qualities. While particular legal concepts or 
definitions were put to use, others were not. While specific scientifically 
‘approved’ concepts or classifications became part of the discourse at a particular 
moment in time, the same concepts and classifications could be changed, 
abandoned or ‘re-translated’ at later moments in time.  
Altogether, my analyses have indicated how much of the changes in 
statistical definitions and classifications were introduced in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. However, my analyses have also shown how most of the 
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changes in the state-istical discourse took but their definite shape at the very end 
of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century. It may be 
argued that some of these changes relate to the way in which statistics tried to 
come to terms with changing social realities, with shifting common-sense 
representations of residence or co-residence in modern society, with new 
expectations regarding the role of individuals in national societies. But, even more 
characteristic of the statistical discourse of that time is the underlying trend 
towards a ‘governmentalization’ of the social body. The quest for governmental 
control transformed the Belgian nation-state and its state-istics by placing a 
premium on the articulation of the relation between population and territory, 
between individual and household, between citizen and nation-state. 
 
6.4.  POWER-KNOWLEDGE IN STATE-ISTICS  
 
The many changes in the statistical methodologies and nomenclatures were not 
only the result of technical or ‘material’ improvements in the state bureaucracies. 
The changes in the items included in the census questionnaires also reflected 
changes in the kind of information that was of interest to the state and changes in 
the way in which the state defined its own function or position vis-à-vis its 
population. The historical variability in statistical nomenclatures and 
methodologies thus does not just refer to changes in statistical tools and 
techniques, but also in statistical systems of thought and governmental practices.  
In the third and fourth chapter, for example, I have argued that the 
definition of the population in de jure terms, which became dominant in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century, highlights some of the ways in which the state 
became much more active in controlling and regulating membership within the 
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nation-state and within the ‘natural’ institution of the household. On the 
foregoing pages, I have also argued that the state-istical ‘invention’ of the 
collective household reflects the shifting self-conceptions of the state and sheds 
light on the premises on the basis of which the welfare state would later develop 
alternatives to kinship and household dependence. Moreover, as the fifth chapter 
has made clear, the changes in the ways in which statisticians distinguished 
between citizens and non-citizens are obviously related with the development of 
regulatory, bureaucratic systems that control the attribution of membership 
rights to individuals. In this regard, the instructions to the census-takers and the 
interpretation of the data also clearly show how the state-istical discourse used in 
the census reports incorporates normative expectations regarding solidarity 
within, or belonging to the nation-state. 
The organization of the censuses does not only ‘reflect’ existing power-
relations within the Belgian state. The statistical armamentarium also facilitates 
specific power-relations – at the cost of other ones (see also Foucault, 1977a). In 
the second chapter, I have thus been able to show how the differentiation and 
specialization of state-controlled organizations for excluded individuals reflects 
the expanding reach of the modern state as a ‘rational’ bureaucracy. The state 
used and imposed its own instruments in order to distinguish between individuals 
who were fully included and individuals who were not (see also Scott 1998: 82-
83). Moreover, the different designations for excluded populations not only 
reflected, but also legitimated and reproduced different modes of monitoring and 
treatment, different regimes of surveillance and regulation, different degrees of 
exclusion from and within society. In a similar way, the analyses presented in the 
fifth chapter of this dissertation show how the census started to distinguish 
between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ forms of belonging. The census questionnaires 
themselves did become political, governmental instruments. By including 
 176 
 
declarations of ‘intention’ and detailed passport information, the censuses 
became themselves an instrument of control and surveillance.  
In many regards, my research has indicated how the concepts and 
classifications that are endorsed by the statisticians are a function of discourse 
rather than a ‘reflection’ of the reality, or, to put it differently: what counts as 
‘true’ is more correlated with a ‘will-to-power’ than with a ‘will-to-truth’ (see 
Foucault, 1981a). There are no ‘true’ or ‘false’ statements – but there are specific 
conditions of possibility under which statements become meaningful, become 
either true or false. On the foregoing pages, I have tried to clarify some of the 
fundamental assumptions that underlie the practices of contemporary social 
inquiry, assumptions that are so basic as to become almost invisible to people 
operating on their basis.  
The methodological imperative stemming from these findings is a strong 
skepticism towards state-istical state-ments that legitimate and validate 
themselves on the grounds of their ‘natural’ or ‘scientific’ qualities. My analyses 
rather call for an awareness of the all-pervasiveness of the power-knowledge 
complex (see also Porter, 2000: 489; Hook, 2001: 524). Although the history of 
social science has usually been written as a history of ideas, of theoretical 
innovations, of ‘paradigm shifts’, social science was from the beginning also 
bound up with systematic empirical and ‘governmental’ interventions. Statistics, 
too, has been a way of understanding and reforming social reality, of defining le 
corps social.  
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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH  
 
The main part of this ‘cumulative’ dissertation consists of four articles and thus 
of four case studies, which use Belgian administrative statistics to analyse 
different aspects of the state- and nation-building processes and governmental 
techniques that were developed and used between the mid-nineteenth and the 
mid-twentieth century. Each case-study has theoretical ambitions, which reach 
beyond the case-study itself. Each time, an attempt is made to articulate the 
complex interactions between science, government, and society in the modern 
era in new ways.  
In the first case-study, the point of departure is the ‘modern’ ambition to 
include the entire population into the nation-state and into the population 
censuses. But in spite of this strong emphasis on social inclusion, censuses also 
legitimate and reinforce several kinds of exclusion. In this chapter, attention is 
drawn to the range of exclusions and exclusion places that appeared in the 
Belgian population censuses. It is shown how statistics identify ‘residual’ 
categories such as the poor and indigent, the disabled of body or mind, the 
elderly and invalids, beggars and vagabonds. It is also shown how the Belgian 
statisticians used exclusion places –asylums, barracks, colonies, madhouses, 
mental hospitals, monasteries, prisons, and so on – to distinguish between 
different categories of population members. The analysis presented here 
highlights the intimate relationship between population and territory in the 
‘search engines’ of the Belgian statisticians. The discursive constitution of 
territorial exclusions allows me to analyse the articulation of inclusion ideals – in 
the period before such ideals became firmly institutionalised in the so-called 
welfare state of the post-war period. 
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The main unit of observation of the Belgian population census was the 
household in its place of residence. The second case-study focuses attention on 
the re-articulation of this time-honoured institution of the household within 
modern statistical discourse. The household was the proverbial cornerstone of 
society, to which individuals were attributed but to which they were also 
considered to ‘belong’. In this chapter of my dissertation, I focus on the 
representation and definition of the household in the censuses. Also, I pay 
attention to the implications following from more ‘technical improvements’, i.e. 
changes in data collection techniques, introduced by the statisticians to count 
the population. The changes in the notion of ‘belonging’ to a household show 
how the state (re-)articulated its expectations regarding the cornerstones of 
society. It is also shown how the representation of the household in state-istics 
not only reflected new ways of managing the population, but also mobilized 
specific norms and evaluative standards about the individuals who constitute 
the household. 
The third case-study focuses on another aspect of belongingness in the 
nation-state, viz. that expressed by the notion of the habitual place of residence. 
In this chapter, I use the history of Belgian state-istics more particularly in order 
to shed light on the politics of membership in the modern state. Each territorial 
state is expected to embrace the social lives of the people contained in it; each 
claims the right to monitor the condition, to promote the welfare, and to protect 
the rights of ‘its’ people. In the modern world, individuals have become conceived 
as incorporated into the political order as exclusive subjects of a single state. In 
this chapter of my dissertation, I try to illuminate this politics of membership and 
belonging by studying the instruments that states have used to embrace their 
populations. Changes in the articulation of the notion of ‘habitual residence’ in 
the Belgian population censuses show how the history of statistics is also a history 
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of the struggles over belonging in and to the territorial state. Here again it 
becomes clear that the census not only generates facts about the population; it 
also creates facts that may form the basis of social interventions.  
Nowadays conceptions of citizens and non-citizens, of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ and their respective rights and obligations in a nation-state, highly 
depend on the historical trajectory of the nation-state itself. The final case-study 
addresses this historical trajectory by focusing on the socio-cultural aspects of 
‘belonging’ to or citizenship in the nation-state. These socio-cultural aspects of 
citizenship involve mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. In this final chapter of 
my dissertation, I examine the evolution of the socio-cultural boundaries of 
citizenship as conceptualized in the state-istics of the Belgian state, more 
particularly in terms of each individual’s place of birth, nationality and language. 
My analyses show how the statistical constructs did not merely reproduce 
existing concepts of citizens and non-citizens, of foreigners and nationals, but also 
actively contributed to the installation of new citizenship boundaries by changing 
the census questionnaires and putting forward new categories and classifications. 
By examining the modifications in these state-istical constructs, I hope to 
elucidate the more complex history of the construction of citizenship identities in 
the contemporary Belgian nation-state.  
The epilogue, finally, presents a brief summary of the main findings of my 
research and presents some more general reflections. 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
Deze doctoraatsdissertatie bestaat uit vier artikelen of gevalsstudies. In elk van 
de hoofdstukken werd de Belgische bevolkingsstatistiek geanalyseerd om staats- 
en natievormingsprocessen alsook beleidstechnieken in de periode van het 
midden van de negentiende eeuw tot het midden van de twintigste eeuw te 
belichten. Telkenmaal werd er gepoogd een nieuw licht te werpen op het 
complexe samenspel tussen wetenschap, beleid en samenleving in de moderne 
tijd. In dit hoofdstuk werd aandacht geschonken aan de exclusies en 
‘exclusieplaatsen’ in de Belgische volkstellingen. 
De eerste gevalsstudie vertrekt van de idee dat elk individu telt en dus ook 
geteld moet worden bij de volkstellingen. Ondanks de sterke klemtoon op 
sociale inclusie, legitimeren en versterken volkstellingen echter ook vormen van 
exclusie. In dit hoofdstuk werd aandacht geschonken aan de exclusies en 
‘exclusieplaatsen’ in de Belgische volkstellingen. Er wordt hierbij aangetoond 
hoe de statistiek ‘residuele categorieën’ identificeert, zoals de armen en de 
behoeftigen, de gehandicapten, de geesteszieken, de ouderen en invaliden, de 
landlopers en bedelaars. Er wordt ook aangetoond hoe de Belgische statistici 
gebruik maakten van exclusieplaatsen – asielen, barakken, kolonies, instellingen, 
kloosters, gevangenissen, enzovoort – om een onderscheid te maken tussen 
verschillende bevolkingscategorieën. De analyse die in dit hoofdstuk wordt 
gepresenteerd, belicht de nauwe relatie tussen bevolking en territorium in de 
‘zoekmachines’ van de Belgische statistici. De discursieve bepaling van 
territoriale exclusies werpt ook een licht op de vorming van inclusie-idealen in 
de periode voorafgaand aan de institutionele verankering van deze idealen in de 
welvaartstaat. 
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De voornaamste observatie-eenheid van de Belgische volkstelling was het 
huishouden in zijn verblijfsplaats. In de tweede gevalsstudie wordt de aandacht 
gericht op de herformulering van deze aloude instelling in het moderne 
statistische discours. Het huishouden was de spreekwoordelijke hoeksteen van 
de samenleving. Mensen werden niet alleen toegewezen aan een huishouden, 
zij werden ook verondersteld tot een huishouden te ‘behoren’. In dit deel van 
mijn proefschrift richt ik mijn aandacht op de presentatie en representatie van 
het huishouden in de volkstellingen. Ik kijk hierbij ook naar de implicaties die 
volgen uit zogenaamde ‘technische verbeteringen’, zoals veranderingen in 
datacollectie technieken. Wijzigingen in de betekenis van de idee van ‘behoren 
tot een huishouden’ tonen hoe de staat in de loop der tijd zijn verwachtingen 
ten aanzien van de hoekstenen van de samenleving herformuleert. Daarnaast 
wordt ook aangetoond hoe de representatie van het huishouden in de staat-
istiek niet alleen een nieuwe vorm van bevolkingsmanagement weerspiegelt, 
maar ook specifieke normen en criteria mobiliseert met betrekking tot de 
individuen die deel uitmaken van het huishouden.  
In de derde gevalsstudie wordt ingegaan op de notie van het gewoonlijk 
verblijf. De betekenisverschuiving van de inhoud van die notie in de Belgische 
bevolkingsstatistiek laat toe om licht te werpen op de ontwikkeling van de 
politiek van lidmaatschap in de moderne natiestaat. Elke territoriale staat wordt 
verondersteld om zijn bevolking te beschermen en te omvatten; iedere 
territoriale staat claimt het recht om de toestand van zijn bevolking te 
monitoren, zijn welvaart te vergroten alsook zijn rechten te beschermen. 
Individuen worden beschouwd als behorend tot één enkele natiestaat. In dit 
deel van mijn doctoraat poog ik de politiek van lidmaatschap en ‘behoren tot’ te 
belichten door de studie van de instrumenten die staten hebben gehanteerd om 
hun bevolking te omvatten. De betekenisverschuiving van de inhoud van de 
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notie van ‘gewoonlijk verblijf’ in de Belgische volkstellingen toont hoe de 
geschiedenis van de statistiek ook een geschiedenis is van conflicten rond het 
verblijven in en het behoren tot de territoriale staat. Opnieuw wordt het 
duidelijk dat de volkstelling niet alleen feiten over de bevolking representeert, 
maar ook feiten genereert die aan de basis kunnen liggen van sociale 
interventies. 
Hedendaagse conceptualisaties van burgers en niet-burgers, ‘insiders’ en 
‘outsiders’ en hun respectievelijke rechten en plichten in de natiestaat worden 
in grote mate bepaald door het historische traject van de natiestaat zelf. De 
laatste gevalsstudie richt zich op dit historische traject door de socio-culturele 
aspecten van het ‘behoren tot’ de natiestaat onder de loep te nemen. Bij de 
socio-culturele aspecten van burgerschap zijn mechanismen van exclusie en 
inclusie betrokken. In dit laatste deel van mijn proefschrift onderzoek ik de 
evolutie van de socio-culturele begrenzingen van burgerschap zoals die tot 
uitdrukking komen in de statistiek van de Belgische staat, en, in het bijzonder, 
via de vragen naar eenieders geboorteplaats, nationaliteit en taal. Mijn analyses 
tonen hoe de statistische constructen niet alleen bestaande concepten van 
burgers en niet-burgers, vreemdelingen en Belgen reproduceerden, maar ook 
actief hebben bijgedragen tot de bepaling van nieuwe grenzen van burgerschap. 
Door de veranderingen in deze statistische bouwstenen te onderzoeken hoop ik 
licht te werpen op de meer complexe geschiedenis van de constructie van 
burgerschapsidentiteiten in de huidige Belgische natiestaat.  
In de epiloog wordt tot slot een beknopt overzicht gegeven van de 
voornaamste bevindingen uit mijn onderzoek. Ook worden hier een aantal 
algemene bedenkingen geformuleerd. 
 
